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CONSUMER INSOLVENCY COUNSELING FOR
CALIFORNIANS IN THE 1980's
Gary Neustadter*
INTRODUCTION
Attorneys who counsel insolvent debtors in California will
have significant new tools for that task in the 1980's because
of the recent enactment or amendment of state and federal law
affecting three closely related concerns of debtors: collection
conduct, -wage garnishment and bankruptcy (both liquidation
and what was formerly termed wage earners' proceedings).
Effective insolvency counseling will require a thorough famil-
iarity with the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,'
which governs the conduct of collection agencies, 2 with the re-
cently enacted provisions of the California Civil Code which
govern the conduct of debt collectors and debtors,3 with the
Employees' Earnings Protection Law4 (the formal title of Cali-
fornia's new wage garnishment law), and with the recent revi-
sion of federal bankruptcy law.'
While this article focuses on the impact of this legislation
© 1979 by Gary Neustadter.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; B.A.,
University of California, Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles,
1971.
The author wishes to thank Paul Hammerness, a graduate of the University of
Santa Clara School of Law, for his important contribution to the preparation of this
article. The author also wishes to thank the Honorable Seymour J. Abrahams, Bank-
ruptcy Judge for the District Court for the Northern District of California, and Arnold
Cornez, Esq., and Phillip Bluer, Esq., members of the Santa Clara County Bar Asso-
ciation, some of whose insights are shared in this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692o (Supp. 1 1977).
2. See note 39 and accompanying text infra. The conduct of collection agencies
in California is also governed by provisions of the Business and Professions Code and
by administrative regulations promulgated by the California Bureau of Collection and
Investigative Services. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6860, 6863, 6947, 6947.1 (West 1975
& Supp. 1979); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 606-641 (1978). A fuller discussion of the
law governing the conduct of collection agencies as well as the conduct of persons who
seek to collect debt on their own behalf follows in the text accompanying notes 35 - 76
infra.
3. Fair Debt Collection Practices (Robbins-Rosenthal) Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1788-1788.32 (West Supp. 1979).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 723.010-.154 (West Supp. 1979).
5. See text accompanying notes 113-359 infra.
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upon counseling for the individual consumer debtor" seeking
relief from insolvency, some of the legislation is also clearly
relevant to counseling of debtors, including judgment debtors,
who are not experiencing general financial distress but who
may simply be seeking to resist or forestall collection of an
individual debt or enforcement of an individual judgment.
Implications for the counseling of these debtors will, hopefully,
become apparent in the discussion of insolvency counseling.'
In some ways it would have made more sense for this as-
sortment of legislation to have come from one legislative body
with a mind to evaluate, and restrike (if necessary), the bal-
ance between effective creditor remedies and important protec-
tions for debtors experiencing financial distress. One legisla-
ture, with that goal, might have been able to more effectively
consider and then manipulate the relationship between wage
garnishment and bankruptcy, or the relationship between wage
garnishment and welfare, or the relationship between harsh
collection practices and bankruptcy.' However, that ideal ap-
6. I have chosen the phrase "individual consumer debtor" and have titled this
article Consumer Insolvency Counseling for Californians in the 1980's because of my
desire to focus upon the individual, generally employed, whose insolvency arises from
debts incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes and who is not a
sole proprietor or a partner of a partnership. I have avoided the phrase "wage earner"
both because that phrase is frequently associated with Chapter XIII wage earners'
proceedings under the repealed Bankruptcy Act (only one tool for insolvency counsel-
ing) and because insolvency counseling is frequently required for persons involuntarily
unemployed or unemployed because of their housekeeping or child rearing responsibili-
ties in the home. Much of what is said in the article will, of course, bear upon counsel-
ing for persons who do not fit the above description.
7. The reforms of federal bankruptcy law also clearly impact significantly on
business insolvency counseling. That subject, addressed and to be addressed by others,
will not be treated here. For a useful introduction to business insolvency counseling
under the revised bankruptcy law, see Downey, Ferriell and Pfeiffer, The Proposed
Bankruptcy Reorganization Provisions: A Comparison of the Current Law with Chap-
ter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1978); Trost & King,
Congress and Bankruptcy Reform, Circa. 1977, 33 Bus. L. 489 (1978).
8. There are studies of the relationship between wage garnishment and voluntary
bankruptcy. Compare D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 28-32 (1971) (voluntary filings before passage of the federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act) with Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemp-
tion from Garnishment on Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rules, 77 COM. L.J. 360 (1972)
(concluding that as a result of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, in states
where the Act increased the amount of wages exempt from execution, voluntary bank-
ruptcy filings declined) and Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R.
32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 776 (1975)[hereinafter House
Hearings](statement of Professor Philip Shuchman, University of Connecticut School
of Law) (wage garnishment not a major cause of bankruptcy). I am unaware of any
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pears unrealistic because those relationships are enormously
complex, because the ideal would clash with principles of fed-
eralism, and because interest group pressures would be so
strong as to make the task nearly impossible.
Insolvency counselors are left, then, to ply their trade with
bits and pieces of different laws, enacted at different times by
different sovereignties with different constituencies. This arti-
cle is intended to help build an understanding of how the newly
shaped pieces of the same puzzle fit together. To do so, the
article first considers the problems faced during the initial
client interview and, in doing so, paints a broad picture of the
counseling alternatives. Following that overview, the article
discusses, in turn, specific provisions of the new legislation
governing collection practices, wage garnishment, voluntary
bankruptcy (liquidation), and the adjustment of debts of an
individual with regular income.
COUNSELING ALTERNATIVES
It is a formidable task for the consumer insolvency coun-
selor to remember and maintain technical mastery of the vari-
ety of alternatives for relief from insolvency and then in each
case to be able to draw upon such knowledge to facilitate the
client's choice of the most economically and emotionally satis-
fying alternative. The task is the more difficult because of the
importance of responding effectively as a counselor to a person
whose request for assistance cries out for understanding and
empathy. Many debtors are terribly embarrassed by their ina-
bility to cope with their financial affairs, even if their difficul-
ties were caused by factors beyond their control. Many debtors
are frightened about the future and this fear may have been
heightened by nasty and often illegal collection efforts. Many
debtors feel guilty about their inability to pay debts and find
morally objectionable any alternative that will relieve them of
their financial obligations. They may be torn terribly between
that guilt and the felt necessity to obtain a fresh start. Effective
studies relating harsher wage garnishment to increases in the number of persons seek-
ing welfare or unemployment compensation, but my intuition suggests that a correla-
tion exists. I am similarly unaware of any studies relating harsh collection practices
to the rate of voluntary bankruptcy but again suspect some correlation. The statement
of findings and purpose of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act states that
"[albusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankrupt-
cies ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
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insolvency counseling, then, must merge compassion with
knowledge.
In the last decade, some members of the legal profession
and some educators and students in the nation's law schools
have gained heightened awareness of and sensitivity to this
human dimension of legal counseling. They have been moved
to believe, as I believe, that compassion, understanding and
empathy are fully as important to legal counseling as is techni-
cal mastery of the law.' Some people do not share this view,
however, or at least have not looked at legal counseling from
this additional perspective. Following their survey of law stu-
dent, law teacher and law school alumni reaction to hypotheti-
cal problems involving marriage and family conflicts, Thomas
Shaffer and Robert Redmount have written:
These problems cry out for creative, personal concern,
for some sort of personal relationship between lawyer and
client. They are occasions for compassion. . . .Few law-
yers, at any level of maturation, were interested in how
their clients felt. They found no professional usefulness in
how they themselves felt. They saw themselves as mechan-
ics. . . .Almost no one showed concern for the emotional
turmoil of clients, not even a divorce client who demon-
strated instability and hinted at suicide.' 0
Our findings confirm what some legal educators think
and others know: Legal education advances the view that
law is a technical enterprise. The lawyer's professional
strength and power are considered to be in his ability to
9. Two recent law books for law students reflect increased concern for the per-
sonal dynamics of the attorney-client relationship: G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE
LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); L.
BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING By LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL
PROCESS (1978). Those books also provide a useful beginning reference to some of the
other writing on the subject. See also D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). Some of my colleagues at the Uni-
versity of Santa Clara Law School share this concern. Recently, the Santa Clara Law
School faculty approved a two year experimental program offering law students the
opportunity to enroll for credit in selected courses offered in the University's counseling
degree programs.
My attitudes toward lawyering and the legal education process have been heavily
influenced by my continuing association with legal educators who are participating in
the Columbia University School of Law's Project for the Study and Application of
Humanistic Education in Law, initially funded by a grant from the National Institute
of Mental Health. Some initial writing emerging from the work of the people in the
Project appears at Symposium on Legal Education, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 291 (1978).
10. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 5 (1977).
[Vol. 19
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analyze and conceptualize in legal terms. . . .Because of
the emphasis placed on legal competence, rather than
human competence, concern about people may even be
regarded as an undesirable incursion into the 'real' busi-
ness of law. It is often the orderliness of solutions that is
preferred, rather than the appropriateness of a solution for
clients .... "
It is my wish that this article's focus upon substantive law not
advance the view that insolvency counseling is solely a techni-
cal enterprise.
In seeking relief from insolvency, attorney and client can
choose from a wide range of alternatives. They may explore
ways in Which income of the debtor or of the debtor's family
can be increased or basic living expenses reduced to enable the
debtor to cope with present and future budget demands as well
as with past due obligations. The client may be able to refi-
nance debts which are currently due, particularly if collateral,
such as equity in a residence, is available to secure the loan.
Attorney or client may be able to negotiate a formal composi-
tion or extension of past due obligations; this may require or
may be facilitated by liquidation of some of the client's assets.
Attorney and client may seek to forestall some or all collection
efforts by requesting a delay in payments, by invoking protec-
tions against unfair collection practices, and by asserting the
full range of debtor protections against execution upon a judg-
ment, including protections against wage garnishment. Attor-
ney and client may seek to resist claims of individual creditors
by asserting available defenses or counterclaims. Finally, the
client may file a petition for liquidation and discharge or a
petition for adjustment of debts under federal bankruptcy law.
In order to help the client choose an appropriate solution, the
insolvency counselor must understand the details and conse-
quences of each alternative.
Increasing Income or Reducing Expenses
Increase in family income or reduction of basic living ex-
penses (housing, food, transportation, clothing, utilities and
medical care) is a rather obvious yet often overlooked possibil-
ity for relief from financial distress. Additional funds made
available by increasing income or reducing expenses may be
11. Id. at 128.
1979]
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sufficient to enable the debtor to cure defaults in payment and
maintain future payments on existing debts. Increase in the
debtor's salary may be foreseeable in either the debtor's pres-
ent or alternative employment (or possible future employment
if not presently employed). To supplement family income, the
debtor may be willing and able to moonlight for a time or other
family members might obtain part or full time employment. In
addition, slightly larger income will be available if the debtor
or members of the debtor's family are not claiming the full
number of income tax withholding exemptions to which they
are entitled.
Some debtors may also be able to reduce basic monthly
living expenses. Most debtors do not overspend for food or utili-
ties; some do overspend for housing, transportation, or clo-
thing." Although frequently inconvenient or unpalatable, it is
sometimes possible for the debtor and the debtor's family to
relocate from expensive to less expensive rental housing or sell
an automobile for which high monthly payments are required,
and then purchase, if necessary, an automobile for which
monthly payments are considerably lower. Alternatively, the
debtor might lease an automobile, a transaction for which the
"down payment" and monthly payments are usually consider-
ably lower than comparable payments in a purchase transac-
tion.' 3 The possibility of reducing other expenditures should
also be explored.
If the total amount of debt is not overwhelming and if the
debtor or debtor's family is willing and able to increase income
or reduce expenses, counseling to those ends is certainly appro-
priate.
12. These and some other factual assertions in the text derive from my personal
experience in counseling approximately two hundred clients at the Legal Aid Society
of Santa Clara County during the past two years.
13. Federal law regulates consumer lease transactions. Counsumer Credit Cost
Disclosure (Truth in Lending) Act, §§ 181-186, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (1976); Regu-
lation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.15 (1978) (Consumer leases). California law also regulates
consumer automobile leases. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2985.7-2990 (West Supp. 1979). Both
assure that the consumer lessee is not saddled with large balloon payments at the
termination of the lease. 15 U.S.C. § 1667b (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2988 (West Supp.
1979). Neither act prescribes uniform terminology for payments made at the inception
of the lease or during the term of the lease. Compare Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §
226.15(b) (1978) and CAL. CIv. CODE § 2985.8 (West Supp. 1979) with Regulation Z,




A debtor may seek to refinance debts as an alternative to,
or in addition to, increasing income or reducing living expen-
ses. Refinancing can take a number of forms, can be sought
from several sources, and can relate to all or any part of the
individual's existing debts.
Sometimes consumers can obtain bill consolidation loans
from personal property brokers. 4 Interest rates are high and
such lenders usually insist upon securing the loan by taking a
security interest in the household goods or automobile of the
debtor. 15
Consolidation loans may be available from other sources.
Other institutional lenders may be willing to loan at lower rates
if convinced of the ability of the debtor to repay or if sufficient
collateral is available to secure the loan. One source of collat-
eral, of course, is equity in a residence and the attorney can
suggest to the homeowning debtor that he or she consider refi-
nancing on the basis of real property security. An individual
lender, usually a relative or close friend, may be willing to lend
substantial sums without collateral. Many clients will be ex-
tremely reluctant, however, to seek financial help from rela-
tives or will have already exhausted that source.
Refinancing of an individual debt obligation may also be
sufficient to relieve the financial distress of the client. A large
car payment or other large loan payment may be reduced and
the term of the loan extended, particularly if the remaining
term of the loan is relatively short and if the value of any
existing collateral continues to be sufficient to secure the loan.
Surplus funds thus generated can then be devoted to other
purposes.
Composition or Extension
The client, individually or with the assistance of the attor-
ney, may be able to negotiate a formal settlement with some
or all creditors that provides for a reduction in the total amount
14. Personal property brokers, such as Beneficial Finance Co. and Household
Finance Co., are regulated by provisions of the California Financial Code. CAL. FIN.
CODE §§ 22000-22653 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979).
15. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22451-22451.5 (West 1968 & Supp. 1979) set out the maxi-
mum interest charges which the lender may receive for a loan. The lender may take a
security interest in the borrower's personal property as collateral for the loan, id. §
22457, but may not take a security interest in real property of the borrower if the
principal amount of the loan is less than $5,000, id. § 22466.
19791
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of debt due (composition) or an extension of time in which to
pay (extension).'" The client's negotiating position may be
strengthened by communicating to creditors the threat that
liquidation or adjustment of debt proceedings may be initiated
failing their cooperation. Negotiation of extensions is fre-
quently possible in connection with credit card obligations,
medical bills and debts owed a personal property broker.
Compositions or extensions may be facilitated by liquida-
tion or surrender of assets. For example, a debtor may be able
to sell an automobile which is not immediately necessary for
the family and use the proceeds to partially or fully pay a debt.
Immediate partial payment of a debt may be acceptable to a
creditor in full satisfaction of an obligation." Some debts may
be extinguished by voluntary surrender of property subject to
a security interest. Property purchased under a retail install-
ment contract may be returned to the seller; surrender of the
collateral (other than an automobile) effectively extinguishes
the debt because the California retail installment sales law
prohibits deficiency judgments.' 8
Forestalling Collection or Resisting Execution
Recent legislation governing collection conduct provides
significant tools to resist collection efforts of creditors or their
assignees.' 9 The debtor, in some circumstances, may even insist
that extra-judicial collection efforts cease entirely, even though
not harassing or inconvenient, by simply informing the debt
16. There may be little practical difference between refinancing debt, negotiat-
ing a formal extension of an existing debt or debts, or requesting that the creditor defer
collection. However, the text treats these alternatives separately because the form and
sometimes the substance of these alternatives may differ. For example, one might
refinance a debt with a personal property broker by negotiating and executing an
entirely new loan or negotiate a formal extension of a secured automobile loan from a
bank or simply request a department store to wait three months before expecting any
payments on a revolving charge account.
I do not treat assignments for the benefit of creditors because that remedy is
uneconomical except in business insolvency counseling.
17. The promise of the creditor to forego future attempts to collect the remaining
amount originally owing is supported by adequate consideration if the promise is in
writing or if payment is made prior to the time the balance in full would have been
due. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1524 (West 1954) (part performance of an obligation accepted
by creditor in writing extinguishes the obligation); id. § 1541 (written release); Petro-
leum Collections Inc. v. Sulser, 265 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 976, 70 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1968);
Blumer v. Madden, 128 Cal. App. 22, 16 P.2d 319 (1932).
18. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.5 (West 1973).
19. See text accompanying notes 35-76 infra.
[Vol. 19
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collector of the debtor's unwillingness or inability to pay and
by requesting that further extra-judicial collection efforts
cease.' 0
Explanation to a creditor of a debtor's current financial
emergency, especially if coupled with assurances of reasonably
prompt resumption of payments, will frequently delay collec-
tion efforts and provide the debtor valuable additional time.
Even if a debt collector sues to enforce an obligation, the mini-
mum thirty day period between service of summons and com-
plaint and entry of default judgment additionally delays the
potential for execution upon property of the debtor.
Execution against property of the individual consumer
debtor usually consists of wage garnishment. Federal law auto-
matically protects most of a debtor's wages and California law
offers additional protection, in some cases, upon a showing of
necessity.2' Execution against other property of the debtor is
less frequent. Creditors usually cannot levy against household
belongings of the debtor22 and execution on a debtor's automo-
bile may be impossible. A creditor may be able to obtain a lien
against real property used as a residence but will usually not
20. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text infra and text accompanying notes
95-97 infra.
22. Household furnishings, appliances, wearing apparel and similar specified
items are exempt from execution (except in an action to foreclose a lien on such
property or in an action for their purchase price) if ordinarily and reasonably necessary
to and actually used by the debtor or the debtor's resident family. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§§ 690.1, 690.52 (West Supp. 1979). The California courts have determined what is
"ordinarily and reasonably necessary" by reference to the debtor's station in life; this
expansive reading of the exemption certainly discourages execution upon these kinds
of property. Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969);
Independence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
The California Law Revision Commission is currently drafting a proposed compre-
hensive reform of the state's enforcement of judgment provisions, including its exemp-
tion provisions. Among the Commission's proposals is one which would narrow the
exemption for household furnishings and like items by establishing an upper limit to
the value of any individual item. CAL. L. REvisIoN COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDA-
TION RELATING TO ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 707.520 (unpublished staff draft Feb.
1979) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N TENTATIVE
RECOMMENDATION].
23. A debtor's equity in one automobile is protected to the extent of $500. CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.2 (West Supp. 1979). Unless the debtor owns two or more
vehicles, the sheriff may not receive any bid in an execution sale unless the bid exceeds
the sum of the motor vehicle exemption, the aggregate amount of all liens and en-
cumbrances on the vehicle, and the amount necessary to repay the judgment creditor
for fees and costs advanced to the levying officer. Absent such a bid, the sheriff must
return the automobile to the debtor. Id. § 690.2(b)-(d).
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be able to force a sale or fund a bid at a forced sale."'
Through judicious and good faith use of debtor protections
from harsh collection tactics and protections against or limita-
tions on execution to enforce a judgment, the debtor may be
able to gain valuable time to overcome temporary financial
distress.
Defenses or Counterclaims
In some cases, financial distress for the individual con-
sumer debtor may be caused by one or a few large debts. In
such cases especially, it is appropriate for the attorney to ex-
plore with the client any possible defenses to payment of the
obligation, or possible counterclaims which the debtor could
assert and use as leverage to negotiate a settlement.
In addition to the statute of limitations, and traditional
contract or fraud defenses, federal and state consumer protec-
tion legislation of the past two decades is a wellspring for defen-
ses or claims. Debtors derive substantial and far reaching pro-
24. The judgment creditor may obtain a lien on such property by recording an
abstract of judgment with the county recorder of the county in which the real property
is located, unless the debtor has previously recorded a valid declaration of homestead
with respect to such property. Id. § 674. Swearingen v. Byrne, 67 Cal. App. 3d 580,
136 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1977). If a valid declaration of homestead has been filed, a lien on
the property may only be obtained by seeking forced sale of the property. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1245 (West 1954). A sale is not possible unless the fair market value of the
residence exceeds the sum of the debtor's exemption and all liens and encumbrances
on the property. Id. § 1255. If a sale would be possible, the judgment creditor would
cause the sheriff to levy writ of execution upon the property (thus creating the lien,
id. § 1245) and follow levy of the writ by timely application for appointment of apprais-
ers. Id. §§ 1245-1252. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 690.31 (West Supp. 1979) mandates
different procedures for the forced sale of residential property which is not protected
by a declaration of homestead but which is nevertheless protected by the claimed
residential exemption. Krause v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 499, 144 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1978).
Forced sale of homesteaded property requires a bid in cash (or by certified or
cashier's check) sufficient to pay at least the amount of the debtor's exemption and
all liens and encumbrances on the property and this is probably also true for forced
sale of property subject to the claimed residential exemption. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1255-
1256 (West 1954); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.31(a)(1)-.31(j) (West Supp. 1979); Kelly
v. Barnet, 24 Cal. App. 119, 140 P. 605 (1914). Moreover, the judgment debtor is
entitled to redeem the property from sale for twelve months following sale. CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE §§ 700a, 701-702 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979). It is not surprising, therefore,
that forced sales of residences are rare.
For a fuller treatment of the nature and relationship of the declared homestead
exemption and the claimed residential exemption see Adams, Homestead Legislation
in California, 9 PAC. L.J. 723 (1978). Revision of this part of California's enforcement
of judgment law is also contemplated by the proposal of the CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION
COMMISSION. COMM'N TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 22, at 66-78.
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tection in consumer credit transactions from the federal truth-
in-lending, equal credit opportunity, fair credit reporting and
fair credit billing legislation." Federal warranty legislation and
Federal Trade Commission Rules provide additional protection
for consumer debtors." Parallel California consumer credit leg-
islation" and legislation governing retail installment sales,2"
warranties,2 unfair and deceptive practices, 3 and door-to-door
25. Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure (Truth in Lending) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1667e (1976); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1976); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1976) (amending the Truth in Lending Act).
26. Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
§§ 101-112, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976) (amending sections of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58). See Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act - An
Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer Protection
Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73 (1978).
Among the Federal Trade Commission Rules, those which are relevant to the
kinds of debts frequently incurred by consumer debtors are: (1) Existing rules govern-
ing door-to-door sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1978); negative option plans, id. § 425, mail
order merchandise, id. § 435, and proprietary vocational and home study schools, id.
§ 438 (effective January 1, 1980); (2) proposed rules which would govern credit prac-
tices, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 444), funeral practices,
40 Fed. Reg. 39,901 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 453), health spas, 40 Fed. Reg.
34,615 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 443), hearing aids, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,646
(1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 440), insulation, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,678 (1977) (to be
codified in 16 C.F.R. § 460), mobile homes, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,334 (1975) (to be codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 441), and used motor vehicles, 41 Fed. Reg. 1089 (1976) (to be codified
in 16 C.F.R. § 455); (3) possible future proposed rules embodying established principles
of consumer protection, 41 Fed. Reg. 3322 (1976).
There may be no private right of action under these trade regulation rules. See
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (private parties have
no right of action to enforce provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act); but see
Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (claim for
relief stated by private parties to enforce provisions of Act where FTC had previously
issued cease-and-desist order against nearly identical deceptive and unfair trade prac-
tices of the same defendant). However, violation of those rules would almost certainly
be an unfair or deceptive practice in California, entitling the individual to restitution-
ary relief. CAL. Bus. & PaoF. CODE §§ 17200, 17203 (West Supp. 1979); Chern v. Bank
of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976). This would
probably also be true for violations of Federal Trade Commission Rules which imple-
ment provisions of the federal consumer warranty legislation noted above, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 701-702 (1978) (disclosure and pre-sale availability of written consumer product
warranty terms and conditions).
27. Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1747-1748.5 (West
1973 & Supp. 1979); Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, CAL. Civ. CODE §§
1785.1-.35 (West Supp. 1979); The Holden Credit Denial Disclosure Act of 1976, CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 1787.1-.3 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1799.90-.96 (West Supp.
1979) (warnings to guarantors).
28. Unruh Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979); Auto-
mobile Sales Finance Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-2984.4 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979).
29. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 2314-2316, 2719 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1790-1797.5 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
30. CAL. Bus. & PRO. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979).
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sales3' offer protections to consumer debtors which complement
or enhance protections under federal law. Moreover, given vir-
tual elimination of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in con-
sumer transactions, defenses and claims will be assertable in
some fashion against third party assignees of an original credit
seller or lender.32
In many instances of insolvency counseling, potential de-
fenses may not be worth asserting because the total amount of
debt calls for other insolvency relief, such as liquidation and
discharge under bankruptcy law. Expenditure of time and ef-
fort on even meritorious defenses or claims is foolish if liquida-
tion is appropriate and will result in discharge of the debt in
any event. However, if the amount of potential recovery for any
debtor claim against a creditor is large, the client may wish to
consider assertion and prosecution of that claim without or
prior to filing a petition for liquidation with the hope that
substantial recovery might enable the debtor to pay other
debts. If the debtor declines this option, the claim will pass to
the bankruptcy trustee as an asset of the estate.3
Recourse to Bankruptcy Law
Federal bankruptcy law offers the individual consumer
debtor the option to seek court supervised and enforced adjust-
ment of debts by way of composition or extension or discharge
of indebtedness following liquidation. 4 Adjustment of debts
may be advisable if the debtor wishes and is able to pay his or
her debts, or some portion of each, and is willing to subject his
or her income to court supervision for several months or years.
In the event that all other alternatives are unacceptable, liqui-
dation will be advisable if the debtor can exempt all or a sub-
stantial portion of his or her assets for a post-bankruptcy fresh
start, if the debtor would be entitled to a discharge, and if a
substantial portion of the debt is dischargeable.
31. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1689.5-.13 (West Supp. 1979).
32. See, e.g., Warren, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1041 (1971); Comment, The Federal Trade Commission Rule on the Preservation
of Consumers' Claims and Defenses - What Price Protection?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
815 (1976).
33. The claim will be an asset of the estate under section 541 of title 11 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 but may be abandoned under section 554 of title 11 if
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 541, 554 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
34. See text accompanying notes 113-359 infra.
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Nothing in the new collection conduct, wage garnishment,
or bankruptcy legislation affects some of the alternatives out-
lined here. The legislation is clearly relevant, however, to sev-
eral of the alternatives: forestalling collection of debt, resisting
wage garnishment, and the filing of a petition for adjustment
of debts or for liquidation and discharge. It is to those alterna-
tives that the remainder of this article is addressed.
FACING DEBT COLLECTORS
Communications between debtor and debt collector, of
which there must be thousands each day, frequently offer in-
tense human drama, drama to which the attorney is seldom
privy and which therefore is somewhat more difficult for the
attorney to appreciate. Imagine for a moment the actors in this
drama. The employee of the creditor or collection agency has
practiced his part many times and has accumulated a wealth
of information and techniques. For that actor the individual
debtor may be no more than one person, among hundreds in a
caseload, from whom money is to be extracted so that a file can
be cleared off the desk and put out of mind as well as out of
sight. The individual debtor usually does not act in the drama
by choice; more often the role has been thrust upon him by the
vagaries of unemployment, illness, disability, or family prob-
lems.35 New to the stage, the individual debtor may know little
about what to say or how to respond to the often intense pres-
sure which may be brought to bear upon him to pay his obliga-
tions. In some cases, the debt collector acts humanely, with
sympathy and patience and in the spirit of cooperation. In
other cases, the debt collector acts inhumanely, with discour-
tesy and belligerence and in a spirit approaching extortion. :11
35. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 57-76
(1974).
36. In September, 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. 1977) to remedy widespread abuses by third party debt
collectors. The legislative history noted many forms of abuse, including obscene or
profane language, threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepre-
sentation of a consumer's legal rights, disclosure of a consumer's personal affairs to
friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a consumer through
false pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal pro-
cess. S. REP. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1695; see NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 42 (1972) (recommendations of Comm'n); Resort to the Legal Process
in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles - Alternative Meth-
ods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879, 896-901 (1967).
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For its participants, especially for debtors, acting in the drama
can be a distasteful and upsetting personal experience.
The insolvency counselor can play an important role in
this drama, more so in the 1980's than before because of recent
legislation increasing the protections of debtors against harass-
ing, abusive, unfair, or simply annoying collection efforts. The
insolvency counselor may need to do nothing more than pro-
vide information enabling the debtor to communicate and ne-
gotiate more effectively with debt collectors. More may be re-
quired where the debtor continues to feel incapable of dealing
with a debt collector or where the client would be entitled to
assert, by way of defense or counterclaim, prior unlawful collec-
tion practices as a basis for negotiating a settlement of the debt
collector's claim for payment.
Liability in tort-for invasion of privacy, or defamation, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress-is generally insuf-
ficient to control collection practices because individual ele-
ments of a cause of action are difficult to prove and because
the debtor subject to collection is typically the least capable of
affording legal representation. 7 The difficulty of proof and the
often limited amount of potential damages will deter many
attorneys from representing clients for a contingency fee.
Legislation of the late 1970's reaches beyond traditional
tort theories to constrain collection practices. In 1977, Congress
enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act38 to govern the
conduct of collection agencies but not the conduct of creditors
collecting debts on their own behalf.3" In the same year, Califor-
nia enacted the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act4" which governs the conduct of debt collectors gener-
37. For an analysis of tort remedies for unreasonable collection practices, see
Shienfeld, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection Activities, 9
Hous. L. REV. 615, 628-33 (1972); Hurt, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 201
(1965); Comment, Effectively Regulating Extrajudicial Collection of Debts, 20 ME. L.
REV. 261 (1968).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. 1 1977).
39. The definition of "debt collector" in the federal legislation clearly excludes
creditors collecting debts on their own behalf and also excludes certain persons or
entities, such as attorneys and consumer credit counseling services, who collect debts
on behalf of others. Id. § 1692a(6). In a recent report to Congress, the Federal Trade
Commission urged Congress to broaden the scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act to govern the conduct of all persons seeking to collect debt because of widespread
abuses noted in the collection conduct of persons other than debt collectors. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES-1979 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS (Mar. 20, 1979) reprinted in [19741 CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE (CCH) No. 557,
pt. Z, at 6-7.
40. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1788-1788.32 (West Supp. 1979).
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ally, not just collection agencies,4' and which also imposes spe-
cific obligations upon debtors.2 In California, collection agen-
cies are also governed by the Business and Professions Code
which mandates a licensing system administered by the Bu-
reau of Collection and Investigative Services of the Department
of Consumer Affairs.43 While provisions of the Business and
Professions Code and administrative regulations of the Bu-
reau44 constitute an independent source of debtor protection,
they are discussed only in passing here because the more recent
federal and state legislation in general provide greater protec-
tion for debtors. 45
Both the federal and California law governing collection
conduct are relatively straightforward and easy to understand.
Both begin with statements of finding and purpose and con-
tinue with definitions which serve to delineate the scope of
their coverage. 4 Through definitions of the word "debt",
"creditor", and "consumer", both laws limit their protections
to the individual consumer debtor whose debt arose in a trans-
action concerning money, property or services acquired primar-
ily for personal, family or household use.41
Each law lists specific collection practices which are pro-
41. In the California legislation, the term "debt collector" means "any person
who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or others,
engages in debt collection." Id. § 1788.2(c) (emphasis added).
42. The obligations imposed upon debtors include refraining from applying for
credit when there is no reasonable probability of being able, or no intention, to repay
an obligation, refraining from submitting false or inaccurate information in seeking
credit, refraining from using credit privileges which have been terminated or sus-
pended, notifying a creditor of an unauthorized use of an account, and notifying the
creditor of a debtor's change of name, address, or employment. Id. §§ 1788.20, 1788.22.
Some of these obligations are conditioned upon the creditor disclosing such obligations
to the debtor clearly and conspicuously in writing. Id.
43. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6863-6956 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979).
44. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 606-641 (1978), promulgated under the authority
granted in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6863 (West Supp. 1979).
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6947.1 (West Supp. 1979) imposes civil liability
upon a collection agency that engages in conduct which violates the provisions of
section 6947. Among other things, section 6947 prohibits any unfair or misleading
practices and resort to any illegal means or methods of collection. Id. § 6947. CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1978) lists certain practices, including some practices to
be discussed in the text, which could be termed unfair, misleading or illegal within
the meaning of section 6947. In actions maintained under section 6947.1, the prevailing
party is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6947.1(c) (West Supp. 1979).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692a (Supp. 1 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1788.1-.2 (West
Supp. 1979).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)-(5) (Supp. 1 1977); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1788.2(d)-(e),(i)
(West Supp. 1979).
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hibited, provides for consumer redress through civil liability
and, in the case of the federal legislation, provides for enforce-
ment by administrative agencies. No very useful purpose would
be served by repeating the lists of prohibited practices here. It
does seem appropriate, however, to highlight and compare
some of the more significant proscriptions of each law and to
consider the effectiveness of the prescribed remedies. As this
comparison proceeds, bear in mind one important distinction:
if the debt collector is a collection agency, its conduct must be
measured by the highest standard of debtor protection which
can be derived by reading both the federal and California laws
together, because the federal law preempts any state law (con-
cerning collection agencies) that is less protective of debtors
than the federal law and defers to any state law that is more
protective of debtors. 8 If, however, the debt collector is not a
collection agency, the debt collector's conduct may be mea-
sured only by reference to the California law (as well as by
reference to principles of tort) because the federal law does not
(yet) apply to debt collectors that are not collection agencies.
Communication with the Debtor
Both laws prohibit communications with the debtor which
are harassing, or abusive, or inconvenient. Obscene or profane
language, threats of violence to person or reputation or prop-
erty, and telephone calls at midnight or with unrelenting fre-
quency are among the kinds of conduct which are prohibited."
Both laws go further, however. Under the federal law, the debt
collector may not communicate in any way with the debtor if
the debt collector knows that the debtor is represented by an
attorney with respect to the debt in question and has knowl-
edge of, or can readily ascertain, the name and address of the
attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond to communica-
tions within a reasonable time or unless the attorney consents
to communication with the debtor.5" The California law con-
tains a similar prohibition which is further conditioned upon a
written notification from the attorney to the debt collector stat-
ing that the debtor is represented by the attorney and request-
ing that further communications with the debtor cease." This
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (Supp. 1 1977).
49. Id. §§ 1692c(a)(1), 1692d; CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1788.10-.11 (West Supp. 1979).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (Supp. I 1977).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.14(c) (West Supp. 1979).
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power is obviously potent because it enables the attorney to
offer immediate respite to the debtor who is overwrought from
persistent collection efforts. However, redirecting communica-
tion to the attorney may ultimately prove costly to the client
or harassing to the attorney if the debt collector persists in
frequent communications."
The federal law also allows the unrepresented consumer
debtor to demand that communication from debt collectors
cease. The individual debtor may insist that all but limited
types of communication terminate simply by giving the debt
collector written notification of the debtor's refusal to pay a
debt (a refusal which need not be explained) or of the debtor's
desire that communication cease.53 This request can also origi-
nate from the spouse or parent of the debtor as well as from the
debtor. 4 There is no similar power granted the debtor under
the California law and therefore this valuable tool of debtor
protection is available only to restrain the conduct of collection
agencies. Finally, the federal law, but not the California law,
prohibits the debt collector from communicating with the
debtor at the debtor's place of employment if the debt collector
knows or has reason to know that the employer forbids such
contact with its employees."
Communication with Third Parties
Debt collectors are aware that communication with per-
sons other than the debtor concerning a debtor's delinquency
in payment is potentially embarrassing to or disruptive for the
debtor. Accordingly, debt collection practice has included com-
munication about the debtor's delinquency or the conse-
quences of continued delinquency with the debtor's employer
or fellow employees, with members of the debtor's family, or
with friends or neighbors of the debtor with the expectation
52. It should be noted, however, that the attorney to whom communications are
to be directed would also be protected against harassment because both the federal
and California law prohibit debt collectors from engaging in conduct that will harass,
abuse, or oppress any person. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (Supp. 1 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE §
1788.11 (West Supp. 1979). Accordingly, it would appear that a debt collector who
must restrict communications to the attorney may not communicate with the debtor
on the grounds that an attorney has failed to respond to the debt collector's communi-
cations if the lack of attorney response is attributable to harassing conduct by the
collection agency.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
54. Id. § 1692c(d).
55. Id. § 1692c(a)(3).
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that this communication will pressure a debtor to pay. ' Both
laws severely restrict this practice.
Under the federal law, a debt collector may not communi-
cate at all with an employer except for the purpose of acquiring
or confirming location information concerning the debtor or
except as is necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial
remedy. 7 Communication to acquire location information is
carefully circumscribed: there can be no mention that a debt
is owing, no communication by post card, no written communi-
cation which in any way suggests that the inquirer is a debt
collector or that the inquiry relates to the collection of a debt,
and, generally, only one such communication is allowed.", The
provisions of the California law governing contact with the
debtor's employer are similar."
The federal law permits the debt collector to seek location
information from persons or entities other than the debtor's
employer but otherwise prohibits any communication with all
but a few specified third parties. 0 The California law appears
to be somewhat less restrictive in this respect because it does
not explicitly prohibit communication regarding a debt with
friends or neighbors of the debtor."'
Threats to Initiate Legal Action
As one would expect, both the federal and California law
prohibit the debt collector from threatening action which is not
lawful, including a threat of arrest and imprisonment for non-
payment of debts, or the threat to dispossess the debtor of
property which is not subject to an enforceable security interest
or which is exempt from execution.2 But one might not expect
the further protection afforded by both laws through their pro-
hibition of threats to undertake even appropriate legal action,
56. For an example of this kind of lender pressure, see Homburger, Harassment
of Borrowers by Licensed Lenders, 1 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 39 (1965).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b) (Supp. 1 1977).
58. Id. § 1692b.
59. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1788.12(a) (West Supp. 1979).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) (Supp. 1 1977).
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.12(b) (West Supp. 1979) prohibits a debt collector
from communicating information regarding a consumer debt to any but a few specified
persons in the debtor's family. From this prohibition a court might imply that such
communication with friends or neighbors would also be prohibited, but there is nothing
expressly stated in the statutory language to that effect.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(1), 1692e(4)-(5), 1692f(6) (Supp. 11977); CAL. CiV. CODE
§ 1788.10(a),(e)-(f) (West Supp. 1979).
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such as repossession of collateral subject to a security interest
or suit followed by judgment and garnishment of wages, unless
the debt collector has a present intention to undertake such
legal action. 3 Regulations of the Bureau of Collection and In-
vestigative Services of the California Department of Consumer
Affairs provide useful guidance to help determine if a debt
collector entertains a present intention to initiate legal action.
Under these regulations, a threat to undertake legal action will
constitute an unfair or misleading practice if the debt collector
does not entertain a present intention to initiate legal action
in the form, manner, or time limit represented to the debtor.
That intention may be established or disproved by discovering
whether the amount of the claim is within the customary range
that has in the past resulted in the licensee (collection agency)
initiating legal action on that amount alone, or when that
amount is cumulated with other claims. 4 These regulations do
not apply to debt collectors other than collection agencies, " but
they offer useful guidelines for measuring the intention of any
debt collector to initiate legal action and might successfully be
urged as such in negotiations or in litigation.
Other Unfair Practices
Both the federal and California law list and prohibit a
variety of other practices, including false and misleading repre-
sentations, which have characterized past collection practices.
Use or the threat of use of "deadbeat lists," the threat that
assignment of a debt will cut off defenses, the collection of or
the threat to collect unauthorized charges, the use of docu-
ments that simulate court or governmental agency documents,
and suits initiated in courts where venue is improper are among
the practices prohibited.6 In addition, the federal law requires
that a debt collector provide the debtor with certain informa-
tion concerning a debt at the time of or within five days of
initial communication with the debtor.6 7 This information
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4)-(5) (Supp. 1 1977); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1788.10(e),
1788.13(k) (West Supp. 1979).
64. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627(g) (1978).
65. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(3), 1692e(6), 1692e(9), 1692f(1), 1692i (Supp. 1 1977);
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1788.10(d), 1788.12(c), 1788.13(e), 1788.14(b), 1788.15 (West Supp.
1979).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (Supp. 1 1979). The written notice must contain five
items: the amount of the debt; the name of the creditor; a statement that unless the
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must include a statement to the debtor of the debtor's right to
demand verification of the debt by the debt collector in those
cases in which the debt is disputed.68
Civil Liability
Enforcement of this array of restrictions upon collection
conduct will fall primarily to the individual consumer debtor.
While the federal law may be enforced through administrative
action by the Federal Trade Commission"u and although both
the federal and California law may be enforced by California's
public prosecutors,70 the resources of those agencies are limited
and demands upon their time are great. Under the civil liabil-
ity provisions of both laws the individual consumer debtor may
initiate legal action to recover actual damages and civil penal-
ties and may recover costs and attorney's fees in appropriate
cases. 7 The debt collector will not be liable, however, if an
debtor disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion of it, within 30 days of the
receipt of the notice, it will be assumed valid by the debt collector; a statement that
if the debtor does dispute the validity of the debt, the collector will mail a copy of the
judgment or verification of the debt to the debtor; and a statement that the collector
will provide the debtor with the name and address of the original creditor (if different
from the current creditor) upon the debtor's written request within the 30 day period.
Id. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5).
68. Id. § 1692g(a)(4). If the debtor demands verification of the debt within the
30 day period by giving notice that the debt is disputed, or requests the identity of
the original creditor, section 1692g(b) provides that the debt collector "shall cease
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof" until the collector mails the
debtor the verification, copy of judgment and/or name and address of' the original
creditor. Id. § 1692g(b).
69. Administrative enforcement of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is en-
trusted generally to the Federal Trade Commission, with enforcement by other federal
agencies as specified in section 16921(b). Id. § 16921(a)-(b). In Re Trans World Ac-
counts, 90 FTC 350 (1977), is an example of F.T.C. administrative enforcement con-
cerning debt collection practices. The complaint in that case was issued prior to enact-
ment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act under the general authority of the
Federal Trade Commission to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). Such a complaint would now probably be issued under
the authority of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
70. Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or of the Robbins-
Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act would no doubt amount to an unfair or
deceptive practice within the meaning of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp.
1979). The state attorney general, district attorneys, and certain city attorneys are
authorized to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties for violation of' section 17200.
Id. §§ 17204, 17206.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (Supp. 1 1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1788.30 (West Supp.
1979). There are some significant differences between the civil liability provisions of
the two laws. The federal law permits but the California law prohibits class actions.
Actual damages are allowable under both laws, but penalties of' not less than $100 nor
more than $1,000 are allowed under the California law only upon proof of' wilful and
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action is not timely brought," or if the debt collector can prove
by a preponderance of evidence that a violation was uninten-
tional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such
errors, 3 or if the violation was attributable to good faith com-
pliance by the debt collector with an advisory opinion of the
Federal Trade Commission. 4 Moreover, if the debt collector is
not a collection agency it may not be held liable under the
California law if it timely cures a violation that is capable of
being cured 5 or if the debtor has failed to comply with certain
obligations imposed upon debtors by California law."!
Armed with the threat of civil liability, the debtor or
debtor's attorney can insist that undesired extra-judicial
collection efforts are curtailed or terminated and, if violations
have already occurred, use the threat of liability to bargain
more effectively for reduction in amounts payable or for an
extension of time in which to pay.
The recent legislation governing the conduct of debt
collectors provides a valuable tool in insolvency counseling.
Recourse to it can at least bring the insolvent debtor some relief
from the emotional turmoil often attendant to facing debt
collectors. It may also provide the debtor with additional time
to restore balance to financial affairs. Of course, nothing in the
legislation prohibits a debt collector from initiating legal action
to collect a debt, including garnishment of wages following
knowing violation, whereas penalties in an individual action not exceeding $1,000 are
allowable under the federal law even though unintentional.
72. Both laws establish a one year statute of limitations running from the date
on which the violation occurs. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (Supp. 11977); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1788(f) (West Supp. 1979).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (Supp. 11979); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1788.30(f) (West Supp.
1979). This defense derives from the identical defense first introduced in connection
with federal truth in lending legislation, Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure (Truth in
Lending) Act, § 130(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(c) (West 1974 & Supp. 1979). The defense
has been narrowly construed to apply mainly to clerical errors. See, e.g., Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (Supp. 1 1977).
75. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1788.30(d) (West Supp. 1979). The statute gives no guid-
ance on the question of which violations are capable of being cured, or how a violation
could be cured. One could easily imagine a debt collector curing the violation arising
from the false representation that assignment of the debt would cut off defenses by
informing the debtor to the contrary. But could the violation consisting of the use of
obscene language, or the threat to use violence, or any number of other actions truly
be cured? Would an apology suffice as a cure?
76. Id. § 1788.30(g). The debtor's obligations are mentioned in note 42 supra.
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judgment. Thus, invoking protection against wage garnish-
ment is another important aspect of relief from insolvency.
WAGE GARNISHMENT UNDER THE EMPLOYEES' EARNINGS
PROTECTION LAW OF 1978
As previously suggested, it may be desirable to suggest
that an individual consumer debtor attempt to forestall collec-
tion efforts." A clear potential consequence of this approach for
the wage earning debtor is the possibility that a creditor or
several creditors will reduce their claims to judgment and seek
to satisfy the judgment(s) by means of wage garnishment. The
wait-and-see stance may be more or less desirable depending
upon the ability of the debtor to live with, impede, or defeat
the use of this remedy. It is therefore essential that the insol-
vency counselor be fully conversant with the law governing
wage garnishment.
California's existing wage garnishment law,"8 superceded
by the Employees' Earnings Protection Law, effective January
1, 1980,11 is familiar to many. It has been discussed and criti-
cized fully in the existing literature. 0 Less well known, per-
haps, have been the continuing efforts of the California Law
Revision Commission to induce reform of wage garnishment
law in ways which the Commission perceived to be beneficial
in some respects to all parties concerned: debtors, creditors and
employers.8 ' The Commission's recommendations, appearing
first in proposed legislative form in 1972, s2 were tossed about
for seven years.8 3 Persistent efforts by the Commission to
77. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
78. Basic provisions governing wage garnishment until the effective date of the
Employees' Earnings Protection Law are found at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 682.3,
690.6, .50 (West Supp. 1979).
79. Id. §§ 723.010 - .154 (added by 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 1133, § 7, at 3796). At
the request of the Judicial Council and California Law Revision Commission, the
original effective date of the law (July 1, 1979) was delayed to provide the Judicial
Council with more time to prepare mandatory forms required by the law. 1979 Cal.
Stats. ch. 66, § 5.
80. See, e.g., Comment, Wage Garnishment: Still Driving the Wage-Earning
Family to the Wall, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 631 (1977).
81. The Commission was charged by Resolution Chapter 202 of the Statutes of
1957 and by Resolution Chapter 45 of the Statutes of 1974 to include study of wage
garnishment in their work. Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment
Exemptions, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 903 (1974).
82. S.B. 88, 1972 Reg. Sess. (1972).
83. Bills encompassing Commission recommendations for wage garnishment re-
form were defeated or died in the 1972 Regular Session, the 1974 Regular Session and
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achieve significant reform have been consistently opposed and
frustrated by creditor interests. As a consequence, the Employ-
ees' Earnings Protection Law, though impressive in its length
and detailed treatment of specific garnishment issues, is only
slightly more than a shadow of the important substantive re-
forms urged so long by the Commission.
The Employees' Earnings Protection Law does include
some important reform in procedure, in garnishment to collect
state taxes, and in garnishment to collect delinquent alimony
and child support obligations. Save for some discussion of the
procedure by which a debtor is to claim an exemption of
wages from garnishment, I shall leave explanation and analysis
of these reforms to others. Prior to that discussion, however, I
wish to comment upon those of the Commission reforms which
were not enacted because, from my perspective, they were the
most important and because they would most dramatically
alter wage garnishment (and hence insolvency counseling) if
enacted by piecemeal amendment to the Employees' Earnings
Protection Law in the 1980's. My comments are also intended
to urge these reforms.
Absence of Debtor Protection Reform
The important Commission reform proposals which were
excised from the final legislaton related to the amount of wages
which could be garnished by creditors. Since 1968, the amount
which could be garnished was determined by a rather curious
statutory route. Section 690.6(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure (hereafter C.C.P.) exempted from (post judgment)
execution "[o]ne-half or such greater portion as is allowed by
statute of the United States" of earnings of the debtor received
for services rendered within the thirty days preceding the date
of a withholding. 4 That portion of the language quoted which
protected "one-half" of the debtor's earnings was superfluous
(for the most part) since the enactment in 1968 of the Con-
the 1976 Regular Session. The Employees' Earnings Protection Law discussed in the
text was introduced by Assemblyman McAlister as A.B. 393, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978).
It was introduced on February 3, 1977, amended in the Assembly on March 21, 1977,
amended in the Senate on April 27 and June 14, 1977, subsequently referred to Confer-
ence Committee and carried over to 1978 as a two-year bill and finally enacted, after
further amendment, near the close of the 1978 Regular Session on August 31, 1978. The
governor signed the legislation on September 25, 1978. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM
HISTORY, 1977-78, Reg. Sess. 14 (1978).
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.6(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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sumer Credit Protection Act,85 a "statute of the United States,"
under which at least seventy-five percent of a debtor's
"disposable earnings" are exempted from garnishment (except
in specified cases)." The route did not end there, however, for
returning to C.C.P. section 690.6(b), one found that more than
seventy-five per cent and conceivably all of the debtor's earn-
ings could be exempted from garnishment if the debtor could
establish, in a claim of exemption proceeding under C.C.P.
section 690.50, that all of the debtor's earnings were necessary
for the support of the debtor or the debtor's family. However,
this "hardship exemption" was not available where the gar-
nishing creditor was seeking to collect a judgment debt in-
curred by the debtor (or the debtor's spouse or family) for the
common necessaries of life such as food, clothing, shelter or
medical care. In such cases, the debtor could only protect
seventy-five percent of disposable earnings even though the
debtor could conclusively demonstrate the absolute necessity
to devote all earnings to his or her current support or the sup-
port of family.
The Commission saw at least four basic problems with this
scheme. First, because of the definition of "disposable earn-
ings" in the federal garnishment legislation, debtors with large
families were afforded no more protection than debtors with
small families or with no dependents at all. Despite the number
of dependents, the debtor's take-home pay was roughly the
same. Second, low income debtors were provided inadequate
protection because the minimum amount protected from any
wage garnishment under the federal scheme was and is not
sufficient to maintain a minimum adequate standard of living.
Third, the common necessaries exception to the hardship ex-
emption was perceived as harsh to necessitous debtors and as
arbitrarily preferring some creditors to others. Finally, the judi-
cially evolved doctrine for measuring hardship, which referred
to the debtor's accustomed standard of living or a standard of
living appropriate to the debtor's station in life, was viewed as
unfair to creditors.
85. Consumer Credit Protection Act, §§ 301-307, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976
& Supp. 1 1977).
86. Id. § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1976). Greater protection from garnishment
is offered by the Consumer Credit Protection Act to low income debtors. Id. Garnish-
ment to enforce obligations for support or federal or state taxes are treated separately.
Id. § 303(b)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 11977); I.R.C. § 6334(a)(8)-(9);
CAL. CiV. Paoc. CODE §§ 723.031, .052, .074, .076 (West Supp. 1979).
87. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
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Unfair treatment of debtors with dependents
Though no doubt unintended, the federal formula for wage
garnishment gives no more protection to wage earners with
large families than it does to wage earners who are single. This
anomalous result was described by the Law Revision Commis-
sion:
For example, if the employee whose wages are garnished
has gross weekly earnings of $100, approximately $6.25 is
withheld [i.e. garnished] if he is single, $15.79 if he is
married and has two children, and $20.69 if he is married
and has six children. The employee's take-home pay after
garnishment will be $69 for the week, whether he is single
or is married with two or with six children. This strange
result occurs because garnishment under federal law is cal-
culated on disposable earnings, and disposable earnings
increase as the number of income tax exemptions for de-
pendents increases."
A garnishment formula which leaves more take-home pay
for debtors with dependents than for debtors without or with
fewer dependents would be more rational. The Law Revision
Commission proposed such a formula and compromised it at
least twice in an attempt to gain legislative approval,"5 but in
88. Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment Procedure, 13 CAL. L. REVI-
SION COMM'N REP. 621-22 (1975).
89. The Commission's original proposal would have avoided the anomaly de-
scribed in the text accompanying note 88 supra by computing the amount which could
be garnished on the basis of "available earnings" (rather than disposable earnings).
Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment Exemptions, 12 CAL. L. REVISION
COMM'N REP. 916 (1974). Available earnings for a workweek were defined as all earnings
for the workweek less the sum of the following: 1) the amount that would be withheld
for federal personal income taxes from the same amount of earnings of a single person
who claims no exemptions; 2) a prescribed amount for social security taxes; 3) a
prescribed amount for worker contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Disa-
bility Fund; 4) the amount that would be withheld for state personal income taxes from
the same amount of earnings of a single person who claims no exemptions; 5) thirty
times the federal minimum wage. Id. at 922. For purposes of garnishment, this defini-
tion effectively treated a person with several dependents as if he or she were a single
person. In this way, garnishment of wages of all persons, with or without dependents,
would be identical, but the debtor with dependents would be taking home a larger
paycheck because of lower income tax withholding.
The Commission's proposal specified that no wages were to be garnished if avail-
able earnings per workweek were less than $10, that 50 percent of available earnings
per workweek were to be garnished if such earnings amounted to not less than $10 and
not more than $45, and that $23 plus 25 percent of available earnings in excess of $45
were to be garnished if available earnings per workweek exceeded $45. Id.
While this formula was complicated, it was to be implemented by tables to be
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the end the legislature refused to change the existing scheme
because of creditor opposition which sought to preserve to cred-
itors the ability to garnish as much money as possible. Because
excessive garnishment may drive an employee to welfare or into
bankruptcy, creditor opposition to this aspect of garnishment
reform may disserve the aggregate best interests of creditors.
Inadequate protection for low income debtors
Under the federal garnishment formula, debtors whose
weekly disposable earnings do not exceed thirty times the mini-
mum wage are completely insulated from wage garnishment.,
While the minimum wage has increased,"' the resulting mini-
mum protected earnings are simply not enough to sustain even
the most meager standard of living given current rates of infla-
tion,9" especially for debtors with dependents. Consider, for
example, the case of a debtor, married and with one small
prepared by the Judicial Council for use by employers who could simply consult the
tables to determine the proper amount to be withheld. Given such ease of application,
the complexity of the formula was amply justified by the fairness of the result gener-
ated.
The Commission considered but rejected a proposed amendment to its formula
offered in 1976 by the Debtor/Creditor and Bankruptcy Committee of the State Bar.
COMM. ON RELATIONS OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, STATE BAR OF CAL., REPORT ON CALIFOR-
NIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO WAGE GARNISHMENT PRO-
CEDURES (July 9, 1976) [hereinafter BAR COMM. REPORT]. That amendment would
have altered the definition of available earnings to reflect regular paycheck deductions
for health insurance and to reflect higher costs of living. Id. at 6 app. B. The proposed
amendment would have reduced the amount of available earnings for all debtors and
thus reduced the amount of garnished funds from all debtors in the aggregate. The
Commission's rejection of the amendment on the ground, among others, that it would
draw heavy creditor opposition only too well anticipated the opposition to be success-
fully mounted against the Commission's own more modest formula.
Because the Commission's proposal extended greater protections to debtors, credi-
tor opposition surfaced. The Commission twice suggested compromise during the 1977-
78 Regular Session. The compromise solutions proposed a return to the basic federal
garnishment formula with the additional provision that the amount to be garnished
under such formula would be reduced by "dependency allowances". The first proposed
compromise suggested a $5 per dependent allowance and the subsequent proposed
compromise suggested a $3 per dependent allowance. All attempts at compromise
failed, however, and the legislature preserved the present garnishment formula intact
in the Employees' Earnings Protection Law, CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE §§ 723.050-.051
(West Supp. 1979)(operative January 1, 1980).
Some of the information provided above is drawn from memoranda of the Com-
mission and of the State Bar Debtor/Creditor and Bankruptcy Committee (on file at
Santa Clara Law Review).
90. Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1976).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
92. Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment Exemptions, 12 CAL. L.
REVISION COMM'N REP. 913-14, 914 n.16 (1974).
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child, whose weekly disposable earnings equal thirty times the
1979 minimum wage (30 x $2.90 = $87.00). Under the federal
garnishment formula, any raise of disposable earnings which
the debtor received, up to $116.00, would be taken in its en-
tirety by a garnishing creditor unless the debtor could qualify
for the California hardship exemption.93 To deny the debtor the
benefit of any of that raise, when his current monthly expenses
must frequently overrun disposable monthly income ($348.00)
seems very harsh. The Commission's attempt to remedy this
problem was also frustrated. 4
The common necessaries exception to the hardship
exemption
If a garnishing creditor is seeking to enforce a judgment for
a debt incurred for past provision to the debtor of medical care,
food, or clothing, the California hardship exemption is unavail-
able to the debtor. Thus, the California garnishment statute
prefers creditors who have extended credit to debtors for the
common necessaries of life.95 While this preference has a sur-
face plausibility, its primary justification has never been em-
pirically demonstrated and its impact upon hard pressed debt-
ors is unconscionable.
The primary justification for the common necessaries ex-
ception appears to be the claim that by assuring "common
necessaries creditors" some garnishment in any event they will
thereby be induced to extend credit more readily for goods or
services essential to living." Yet there is no evidence that such
93. Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1976); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 723.050-.051 (West Supp. 1979)(operative January 1, 1980).
94. The Commission's attempt to extend greater protection to all lower income
debtors was encompassed in its proposal to preclude all garnishment if the debtor's
available earnings did not exceed $10. Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnish-
ment Procedure, 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 659 (1975). See also note 89 supra.
The proposal of the State Bar Debtor/Creditor and Bankruptcy Committee included
a provision which would have extended even greater protection to lower income debtors
than the Commission's proposal. The provision would have amended the language
"thirty times the federal minimum wage" to read "forty times the minimum wage."
BAR COMM. REPORT, supra note 89, at 6 app. B.
95. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommenda-
tions, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1219 (1965):
The special treatment of debts for "common necessaries" is difficult
to justify. It can be argued that those who sell essentials should have
better means of collecting their debts than companies which extend
credit for unessential or luxury purchases. The other side of the picture
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creditors are even aware of their preferred position in the gar-
nishment scheme or that, even if aware, their credit policies are
affected by their knowledge of the preference. Absent such evi-
dence, the justification for the common necessaries exception
is purely theoretical or, at best, rests solely upon the paternalis-
tic assertion that common necessaries creditors are more de-
serving of governmental assistance in collecting debts than are
other creditors.
Even conceding some justification for the common neces-
saries exception, one cannot ignore the plight of the debtor
whose claim to the hardship exemption must be denied be-
cause of the exception. To say that a debtor would otherwise
qualify for the hardship exemption is to say that the debtor
absolutely needs the additional protected wages for current
sustenance. Deprivation of the additional protected wages
under the common necessaries exception is, therefore, a virtual
modern day equivalent of debtors' prison. Such deprivation is
also short sighted because of the clear potential for driving
wage earners from employment to welfare and from eventual
possible repayment of the debt to discharge in bankruptcy. Yet
the legislature here also refused to enact proposed reform. 7
The "station-in-life" standard for hardship
In view of the successful resistance to debtor protection
reforms described above it is curious that one reform to benefit
creditors was also rejected in the new legislation. Case law had
clearly established the right of the debtor to rest a claim of
hardship (in the absence of a common necessaries creditor)
upon his or her accustomed standard of living or "station in
life.""8 Thus, theoretically at least, a debtor accustomed to
is that the statute puts the prudent (or poor) family that buys only
essentials into a worse position than the family that buys nonessential
items on credit. For example, a big medical bill could lead to garnish-
ments while a debt resulting from the acquisition of a luxury car might
be exempt from execution on wages-at least where the debtor is sophisti-
cated in the use of the exemption provisions.
See Comment, Attachment and Garnishment in California-In Need of Reform, 4
U.C.D. L. REV. 57, 77-79 (1971).
97. The Commission's proposal included repeal of the common necessaries ex-
ception to the hardship exemption. Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment
Exemptions, 13 CAL. L. REviSION COMM'N REP. 623 (1975).
98. Ratzlaff v. Portillo, 14 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1015, 92 Cal. Rptr. 722, 723 (1971)
(dicta); Perfection Paint Products, Inc. v. Johnson, 164 Cal. App. 2d 739, 741, 330 P.2d
829, 830-31 (1958); Diamond v. Brent, 157 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 857, 859, 320 P.2d 621,
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driving two automobiles and living in a penthouse apartment
might be entitled to exempt all of his or her earnings from
garnishment if needed to make car and apartment lease pay-
ments. The same might not be true for the debtor driving a
used clunker and living in low cost housing. It seems unfair to
extend so much protection to the high living debtor and many
courts may, in fact, be influenced by the nature of current
expenses in ruling adversely on claims of hardship. Particularly
if courts are, de facto, ignoring the station-in-life test and cer-
tainly because the test is inequitable, it ought to be repudiated.
The legislature refused to adopt the Commission's recommen-
dation to do so."
This discussion suggests that the Employees' Earnings
Protection Law does very little to earn its magnanimous sound-
ing name. Significant debtor protection reform did not survive
the legislative process. Moreover, other reform proposals con-
cerning the procedure for claiming the hardship exemption
were never submitted for legislative consideration primarily
because of anticipated creditor opposition. Those proposals
and the procedure for claiming the hardship exemption are also
important concerns of the insolvency counselor and insolvent
debtor.
The Debtor's Claim of Exemption
Under the Employees' Earnings Protection Law, follow-
ing issuance of a writ of execution and application by the
judgment creditor to the levying officer for an earnings with-
holding order, the levying officer is required to serve on the
debtor's employer an original and one copy of that order to-
gether with instructions for the employer, a form for the em-
ployer's return, and a notice to the employee of the issuance of
an earnings withholding order.'" Service of these documents
622 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1957); Los Angeles Finance Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 850, 856, 243 P.2d 139, 143-44 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1952); Sanker v. Humborg,
48 Cal. App. 2d 205, 207-08, 119 P.2d 433, 434 (1941).
99. The Commission's proposal included the following language: "Neither the
judgment debtor's accustomed standard of living nor a standard of living 'appropriate
to his station in life' is a criterion for measuring the judgment debtor's claim for
[hardship] exemption .. " Recommendation Relating to Wage Garnishment Pro-
cedure, 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 662 (1975). The legislature deleted this
language. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 723.051 fWest Supp. 1979) (operative January 1,
1980).
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 723.102-.103 (West Supp. 1979) (operative January
1, 1980).
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upon the employer establishes a "withholding period" which
commences on the tenth day following service, by which date
the employer must have delivered to the debtor the copy of the
earnings withholding order and the notice to the employee.1""
This notice must contain a statement, in a form to be pre-
scribed by the Judicial Council,' 2 informing the debtor of the
wage garnishment, the right to claim an exemption of addi-
tional wages necessary for the support of the debtor or the
debtor's family, the availability without charge from the office
of the levying officer of a debtor's claim of exemption form and
financial statement form, and the procedure for seeking a hear-
ing on a claim of exemption.'13
The drafters did not require automatic delivery to the
debtor (by the levying officer through the employer) of a blank
claim of exemption and financial statement form.'"4 Such a
requirement would have eliminated the necessity for the debtor
to initiate contact with the levying officer to obtain those
forms, a contact which, for some, may be intimidating or at
least inconvenient.'05 By requiring that such blank forms auto-
matically be made available to the debtor, the law might have
facilitated the assertion of exemption rights by those entitled
to claim them. At the same time, such a requirement might
also have encouraged the filing of baseless claims for exemption
and would also have entailed some waste of paper and postage.
The procedure chosen thus assumes that individual consumer
debtors are sufficiently literate and assertive to take the steps
101. Id. §§ 723.022(a), 723.104(a).
102. With the exception of forms used in connection with garnishment for state
tax liabilities, all forms used in connection with wage garnishment must be those
prescribed by the Judicial Council. Id. § 723.120. The general informational require-
ments for each form are listed at id. §§ 723.121 -. 128.
103. Id. § 723.122.
104. Claim of exemption and financial statement forms are made available with-
out cost from the office of the levying officer. Id. § 723.129.
105. If there is only one office in a large urban county, a trip to that office during
working hours is inconvenient and may further irritate an employer who may already
be irritated by the fact of the garnishment. If the debtor requests that the forms be
mailed, any delay in mailing or in mail delivery will delay the debtor's filing of the
claim of exemption. The same inconveniences operate for the debtor's filing of the
claim of exemption and financial statement. My personal experience from debt coun-
seling informs me that any contact with the court system or law enforcement agencies
is laden with anxiety for many debtors. That anxiety springs from a variety of factors,
including ignorance, embarrassment about having wages garnished, and alienation
from the legal system, particularly for persons of racial minorities.
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necessary to fully protect their wages when that protection is
available.106
In formulating the wage garnishment proposal ultimately
submitted to the legislature, the California Law Revision Com-
mission, again in reasonable anticipation of creditor opposi-
tion, rejected a suggestion advanced by some members of a
state bar committee that judgment creditors afford a pre-levy
notice of garnishment to judgment debtors."'7 Had pre-levy no-
tice been required, debtors would have learned of impending
wage garnishment prior to service of the earnings withholding
order and would thus have been able to assert a claim of ex-
emption prior to rather than after the beginning of withhold-
ing. Pre-levy notice seems particularly appropriate because the
claim of exemption relates to wages allegedly necessary for the
immediate support of the debtor or the debtor's family; if the
claim of exemption is not granted until after some wages have
been withheld, the debtor may experience significant hardship.
Pre-levy notice for wage garnishment appears even more
appropriate than the pre-levy notice mandated where a judg-
ment creditor seeks to execute against a residence of a judg-
ment debtor which is potentially subject to the claimed resi-
dential exemption.'08 Even following execution sale of a resi-
dence, a debtor may not be dispossessed for a year;'"' yet, dur-
ing the effective period of an earnings withholding order, prior
to the granting of a claim of exemption and the return to the
debtor of the garnished funds, the debtor is without the funds
needed to buy food, pay rent, or pay for other necessary living
expenses. The hardship can be particularly severe because a
debtor may be deprived of the needed wages for as much as two
months."'" Yet it is certain that any proposal for pre-levy notice
106. This assumption of literacy, or more precisely, functional competency, is
probably unjustified. A significant percentage of the adult population of the United
States is either incapable or only barely capable of understanding or acting upon
simple instructions concerning basic living activities (e.g. following food recipes). See
Div. of Extension, U. of Tex. at Austin, Adult Functional Competency: A Summary
(Mar. 1975)(unpublished). There is a point, of course, at which debtor protection laws
cannot, or cannot be expected to, compensate for educational deficiencies which may
be attributable to a wide variety of social and economic problems. Deciding upon the
extent to which debtor protection laws should accomodate the functionally incompe-
tent is an enormously difficult question.
107. BAR COMM. REPORT, supra note 89, at 103 app. B-1.
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 690.31(d) (West Supp. 1979).
109. Id. § 702 (West Supp. 1979).
110. The two month period from the time wages are first withheld until they are
returned to the debtor is an approximation calculated by totaling the maximum num-
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would have been adamantly opposed by creditors.
The procedure for claiming a hardship exemption enacted
by the Employees' Earnings Protection Law is similar to the
procedure under the former law."' The debtor files a claim of
exemption, accompanied by a financial statement, with the
levying officer 'Who forwards those forms, together with a notice
of claim of exemption, to the judgment creditor. In absence of
creditor opposition, the levying officer must serve the employer
with an order terminating the earnings withholding order, and
any funds withheld or transferred to the levying officer or credi-
tor must be returned to the debtor. The judgment creditor
may, of course, challenge the claim of exemption by serving the
levying officer with a notice of opposition and by timely sched-
uling and notifying the levying officer and debtor of a hearing
on the claim of exemption. If the claim of exemption is granted,
funds withheld or transferred to the levying officer or creditor
must be returned to the debtor."2
Where the debtor cannot prevail on a claim of exemption
or doesn't wish to put up that fight, other measures for insol-
vency relief may be considered and recommended. Among
those alternatives is a petition for liquidation and discharge
under federal bankruptcy law.
LIQUIDATION AND DISCHARGE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT OF 1978
Debtors facing the prospect of liquidation and discharge
(frequently referred to as "straight bankruptcy") usually wish
to know the answers to three questions: "How much and what
kind of property will I be able to keep?"; "What debts will I
be able to eliminate?"; "What will be the effect of a bank-
ruptcy upon my credit rating and my future ability to obtain
credit?""' The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,"1 most of
ber of days for various acts of both creditor and debtor in a claim of exemption
proceeding, including the time for mail delivery, id. § 723.105 (West Supp. 1979), and
by adding thereto the two to four week period during which a debtor often must await
the issuance of a check from the county treasury (to whose account the employer's
payment by check to the levying officer may have already been credited).
111. Claims of exemption from wage garnishment were formerly governed by
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.50 (West Supp. 1979).
112. Id. § 723.105.
113. It is somewhat difficult to answer the debtor's question concerning the
impact of a bankruptcy proceeding upon credit rating and upon the ability to obtain
credit in the future. There are several possible responses to the question. One might
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suggest that the client avoid incurring debt on all but major items (e.g. home or
automobile) for some time if overuse of credit precipitated the current financial crisis.
One might advise the client that post-bankruptcy availability of credit depends en-
tirely upon individual creditors. Some will refuse extension of credit to all bankrupts.
Others may be willing to extend credit to some bankrupts because the prospective
debtor would generally be free from other debt and because discharge of newly created
debt is barred in any subsequent bankruptcy commenced within six years of the filing
of the petition in the first bankruptcy (see note 230 and accompanying text infra; but
see text accompanying note 340 infra). Still others will base their decision upon the
reason for the bankruptcy; a creditor might be more willing, for example, to extend
credit to the person whose bankruptcy was precipitated by unexpected and uninsured
medical expenses than to a person who filed bankruptcy to discharge debts incurred
by the injudicious use of credit cards. Other creditors may be willing to extend credit
if collateral will secure the loan (including purchase money loans for housing or auto-
mobiles).
Yet another response, cumulative to the others and of less immediate practical
value, is to advise the client of his or her rights under fair credit reporting legislation.
Under section 605 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, as amended by section 312(b) of
Title III of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, effective October 1, 1979, a credit
reporting agency is prohibited from reporting a bankruptcy which, from the date of
adjudication (an order for relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act), antedates the
report by more than ten years. Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 605, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c
(1976), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 312(b),
92 Stat. 2676. This prohibition provides the consumer debtor with greater protection
than does the analagous provision of California law, CAL. CiV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1979) which allows reporting of a bankruptcy for not to exceed fourteen
years following the filing of a petition. Originally section 605 of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 605, 84 Stat. 1129 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (c)) allowed reporting for a period not exceeding fourteen years. Under the
preemption provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1976),
the now greater protection afforded by the federal law governs. If, however, applicable
state law prohibited the reporting of a bankruptcy the petition for which antedated
the credit report by a period of time less than ten years, that greater state law protec-
tion would govern.
Under California law, a very stale bankruptcy (e.g., antedating the report by
twenty years) may nevertheless be reported if the report is being sought in connection
with a credit transaction involving a principal amount of greater than $50,000, or in
connection with the underwriting of life insurance involving an amount greater than
$100,000, or in connection with employment of an individual at an annual salary ex-
ceeding $30,000. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1785.13(b) (West Supp. 1979). In the analogous
provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, § 605(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b) (1976),
reporting of stale bankruptcies is permitted where the report is sought in connection
with a credit transaction involving more than $50,000, a life insurance policy involving
more than $50,000, or prospective employment involving a potential annual salary
of in excess of $20,000. In other words, the federal statute allows the reporting of stale
bankruptcies in more cases than does the law of California and, under the preemption
provision of the federal law, the state law on this issue governs.
The reporting of wage earners' proceedings (except in the specified "large" trans-
actions described above) is apparently prohibited under identical language in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act both
of which bar disclosure of "any other adverse information which antedates the report
by more than seven years." CAL. CMv. CODE § 1785.13(a)(7) (West Supp. 1979); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, § 605(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(6) (1976).
This information about credit reporting is sufficiently complicated and suffi-
ciently peripheral to the concerns of most consumer debtors that the attorney will
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which became effective October 1, 1979,111 provides some im-
portant new answers to the first of these questions. With some
exceptions to be discussed, the answers to the second and third
questions remain the same as under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.111 The Bankruptcy Reform Act also includes some signifi-
cant changes in wage earner proceedings, now termed Adjust-
ment of Debts of An Individual With Regular Income, dis-
cussed in the succeeding section of this article."7
The Bankruptcy Reform Act effectuates a number of other
far reaching and significant changes in bankruptcy law. There
are changes relating to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,
the appointment and terms of the bankruptcy judges, the re-
muneration of trustees, the avoiding powers of the trustee, and
business arrangements and reorganizations. For selected judi-
rarely need to inform the client in any more than general terms of the client's rights
under fair credit reporting legislation.
114. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contains four titles. Title I codifies and enacts the
substantive law of bankruptcy as title 11 of the United States Code, effective October
1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682
(effective date of Title I). References to sections of title 11 of the United States Code
will hereinafter be cited to 11 U.S.C.A. (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). Title II amends title
28 of the United States Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence on matters relating
to the organization, duties, powers and procedures in the bankruptcy courts. Title III
contains amendments to and repeals miscellaneous provisions of the United States
Code relating to bankruptcy. Title IV repeals the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, states
effective dates of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, and governs transition
from the old to new law.
Legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act includes H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963 [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT] and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The
final version of the Act is an amended version of H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1977), incorporating portions of the similar Senate bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1977). See statement by Hon. Don Edwards (D. Ca.) upon introducing the House
amendment to the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200, 124
CONG. REC. H11,089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); statement by Hon. Dennis De Concini
(D. Ariz.) explaining the House amendment to the Senate amendment in the nature
of a substitute to H.R. 8200, 124 CONG. REC. S17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). The
history of seven years of work preceding H.R. 8200 is summarized in HousE REPORT at
2-3 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963-65.
115. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682.
Cases pending on October 1, 1979 shall generally continue to be treated as if the
Bankruptcy Reform Act had not been enacted. Id. § 403, 92 Stat. 2683.
116. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (formerly 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103
(1976)). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has been frequently amended since its enact-
ment. Substantial revision was accomplished by the Chandler Act amendments of
1938. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883.
117. See text accompanying notes 304-359 infra.
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cial districts, during a five year experimental period, a United
States Trustee is created to perform functions heretofore per-
formed by the bankruptcy judge. Explanation and evaluation
of these and other changes are left to other forums because
their impact on consumer insolvency counseling is peripheral.
The focus here will be upon exemptions, discharge and dis-
chargeability, and reaffirmations and redemptions. Because
Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codifies the
substantive law of bankruptcy as title 11 of the United States
Code, section references in the text and in the notes will be
made to title 11.
The "Federal Floor/State Ceiling" Exemption Scheme
An introduction
Since its enactment in 1898, the Bankruptcy Act has pro-
vided that certain property deemed essential to the debtor's
post-petition fresh start be preserved inviolate against the
claims of creditors. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
accomplished this purpose by establishing as exempt that
property which would be exempt from execution under the
non-bankruptcy laws of the United States and under the laws
of the state in which the debtor was domiciled for a prescribed
period of time preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 8
Debate has long raged on the merits of this deference to state
law."9 Because the exemption statutes of each of the fifty states
118. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 548, as amended by Chandler
Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 847 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)) reads in part:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they
have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in
any other State ...
119. For discussion concerning the exemption scheme of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, see Countryman, For A New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 678 (1960); Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions In Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV.
445 (1960); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back To The Act of
1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1968); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique
and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1959).
Section 6's "patchwork" exemption policy was criticized not only because of the
lack of uniformity resulting from its incorporation of disparate state exemptions, but
also because it seemed to conflict with the underlying rehabilatory purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act to give the bankrupt debtor a "fresh start". Countryman, supra, at
680-84. "This rehabilatory purpose is served not only by the discharge provisions of
the Act, but also by the exemption provisions. But it is not well served by committing
the bankruptcy exemption policy to the parsimony and neglect of the state legisla-
ture." Id. at 684.
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differ, often substantially,10 section 6 has been criticized as
inequitable. At the same time, a uniform national exemption
scheme might also be unfair because of its failure to accommo-
date the varying standards of living in the fifty states.
A variety of suggestions has been advanced in response to
the perceived inequities of section 6. The Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed a somewhat
flexible uniform set of exemptions in bankruptcy. 2 ' Near the
end of the long journey of proposed bankruptcy reform, the
Senate proposed that the Bankruptcy Reform Act retain the
section 6 approach deferring to non-bankruptcy exemption
Though section 6's exemption scheme was condemned by many, it had its defend-
ers. Professor Kennedy, while noting that section 6 resulted in harsher treatment of
bankrupt debtors in states with limited exemptions (particularly in the Northeast),
maintained that this could be attributed to a difference in the appraisal of the relevant
interests by the legislatures of the states where they live. Kennedy, supra, at 449.
"[NJeither creditor nor debtor interests are so disproportionately represented in state
legislatures as to require federal intervention to protect their interests for the sake of
a sound national economy." Id. at 453.
120. This disparity may be exemplified by a comparison of the homestead ex-
emptions of New York, Texas and California. New York law provides that specified
types of residential property, a lot of land with a dwelling, shares of stock in a coopera-
tive apartment, or units of a condominium apartment, are exempt from execution to
the extent of $10,000 in value above liens and encumbrances. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §
5206(a) (McKinney 1978). Such property is exempt only if used as the principal resi-
dence of the homestead claimant, and the exemption automatically "ceases" when the
property is no longer occupied by the claimant. Id. § 5206(c).
In contrast to the New York scheme, the Texas homestead provisions exempt real
property in any amount if the property is rural. TEx. CONST. ANN. art. 16, H9 50-51
(Vernon Supp. 1979). If the property is urban, "in a city, town, or village," the exemp-
tion for a homestead is limited to $10,000. The Texas exemption applies to property
used either as a residence or "as a place to exercise the calling or business" to provide
for a family or a single adult person. Id. § 51. The homestead is not abandoned even
though the claimant resides elsewhere or temporarily rents the homestead property,
so long as no other homestead is acquired, unless the claimant abandons the property
without intent to return. Id.; West v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 427 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
The California provisions exempt real property consisting of the dwelling house
in which the claimant resides (and the land and outbuildings); a head of a family may
claim $40,000 exempt over and above the value of all liens and encumbrances. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1237 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979) (property constituting homestead); id. §
1260 (West Supp. 1979) (amount); CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 690.31 (West Supp. 1979)
(claimed residential exemption).
For a brief summary of the various types of state exemption schemes, see Karlen,
Exemptions From Execution, 22 Bus. LAW. 1167 (1967). See also Kennedy, supra note
119, at 447 n.10 (types of exemption laws) (citing Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws:
Time for Modernization, 34 INp. L.J. 355 (1959)).
121. COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, pt. 11 (1973).
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law.'22 The scheme finally adopted, however, is a modification
of the "federal floor/state ceiling" concept proposed by the
House. '23 This new exemption scheme offers fascinating new
opportunities for protecting property of debtors who file a peti-
tion for liquidation and discharge.'24
Under the exemption scheme of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, set forth in section 522 of title 11,15 the debtor is offered a
choice between the exemptions available under non-
bankruptcy exemption law (as under section 6 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act)'28 and the alternative exemptions provided in sec-
tion 522(d) of title 11, "unless the State law that is applicable
to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize .... 127
This quoted language was intended to compromise the House
exemption scheme (offering the debtor the choice between non-
bankruptcy exemptions and section 522(d) exemptions) with
the Senate exemption scheme (deferring exclusively to non-
122. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Title I, § 522(b)(1977).
123. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Title I, § 522(b)(1977).
124. In the Bankruptcy Reform Act the term "bankrupt" is replaced by the term
"debtor". 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
125. The full text of section 522 is long enough that full reproduction here seems
inappropriate. Selected subsections discussed in the text will be reproduced in foot-
notes accompanying that text. Section 522(b) reads in part:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may ex-
empt from property of the estate either - (1) property that is specified
under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applica-
ble to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically
does not so authorize; or, in the alternative, (2)(A) any property that is
exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or
State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180
days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a
longer portion of such 180-day period than in another place; . ..
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). Section 541 of title 11 provides that
commencement of a case under title 11 (including a liquidation under chapter 7 and
an adjustment of debts under chapter 13) creates an estate; section 541 describes the
property of the estate. Id. § 541. The Technical Amendments Act, S. 658, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1979) reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S2736 (daily ed. Mar. 14,1979), proposes
to replace the words "does not so authorize" with the words "prohibits application of
such subsection (d)". The substitute language would eliminate ambiguity.
126. The phrase "non-bankruptcy exemption law" will be used in the text in lieu
of the more cumbersome language of section 6 quoted in note 118 supra. Non-
bankruptcy exemption law consists of exemptions under state law (e.g., CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 690.1-.52 (West Supp. 1979)) and under non-bankruptcy laws of the
United States (e.g., Veterans' Administration Benefits, 38 U.S.C.A. § 3101(a) (West
Supp. 1979)).
127. The context of the quoted language and proposed clarifying language ap-
pears in note 125 supra.
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bankruptcy exemptions).' 8 The compromise allows the debtor
a choice unless a state legislature, seeing the section 522(d)
exemptions as too generous, specifically prohibits the debtor
from choosing the section 522(d) exemptions.
By offering the debtor a choice, in the absence of state
veto, the Bankruptcy Reform Act assures to each debtor a fed-
erally defined minimum amount of property for a fresh start
(the federal floor). At the same time, the Bankruptcy Reform
Act accommodates the potentially greater needs of debtors in
individual states by allowing the debtor to choose state exemp-
tions if they offer greater protection (the state ceiling). It would
appear that the debtor must choose one or the other set of
exemptions in its entirety and cannot select some non-
bankruptcy exemptions and some exemptions from section
522(d).'19 The statute does not identify the time at which the
choice must be made, nor does it specifically countenance or
prohibit a change of mind in the event of an improvident initial
choice.'30 Presumably the new Bankruptcy Rules'3 ' will speak
128. See notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra.
129. This would appear clear from, among other things, the grammar of section
522(b)(1) in which a semi-colon follows the word "authorize" and precedes the word
"or". Section 522(b)(1) is quoted in full at note 125 supra. The same would be true
after the amendment to this language proposed by the Technical Amendments Act.
See note 125 supra.
130. Section 522(t) provides, simply:
The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt
under subsection (b) of this section. If the debtor does not file such a list,
a dependent of the debtor may file such a list, or may claim property as
exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the debtor. Unless a party
in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
131. New Rules of Bankruptcy, including new official forms, are anticipated.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 292-93, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6249-50. Matters which will be dealt with by the Rules or by local rules are listed
id. at 293-308. Concerning exemptions, see id. at 296. Unlike Rules implementing the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Rules implementing the Bankruptcy Reform Act may not
conflict with provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, because the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act struck from 28 U.S.C. § 2075 the following sentence: "All laws in conflict with
such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2672. The possibil-
ity of any conflict is minimized because the Bankruptcy Reform Act, unlike the Bank-
ruptcy Act, contains little of a procedural nature, leaving most such matters to the
Rules. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 292-93, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6249-50. Until the new Rules are effective, present Rules will continue in
effect to the extent not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Reform Act or amendments
made thereby. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat.
2685. It is clear that new Rules will not be finally approved until well past the effective
date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. It is likely that most districts will be operating
[Vol. 19
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to these issues. On the basis of legislative history, it seems
realistic to expect that the rules will require the choice to be
made at the time the petition is filed, or shortly thereafter, but
also allow for a court to entertain a motion to amend the
debtor's claims of exemption in appropriate circumstances. 3 '
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act sug-
gests that pre-petition conversions of non-exempt to exempt
property remain permissible in the absence of a showing of
actual intent to defraud creditors.1 3 Many cases decided under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, notably In Re Dudley, 34 sanction
this important aspect of pre-petition planning even though
such conversions of non-exempt property reduce (often to zero)
the amount of assets which would otherwise be available to
creditors in bankruptcy.'35 In fact, insolvency counseling would
be inadequate, perhaps malpractice, were the attorney to fail
to suggest possible conversions (consistent with the holdings of
cases such as In Re Dudley) prior to the filing of a petition. If
full conversion cannot be accomplished, the client should cer-
tainly be advised that non-exempt property will be lost to (or
will have to be purchased by the debtor from) the trustee,
unless abandoned, 136 and that other alternatives, such as an
from suggested interim local rules which the Rules Committee intends to propose
pending action on final Rules and that existing forms shall be appropriately adapted
to use under the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
132. The House report states:
The Rules will provide for the situation where the debtor's choice of
exemption, Federal or State, was improvident and should be changed, for
example, where the court has ruled against the debtor with respect to a
major exemption.
HousE REPORT, supra note 114, at 360, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6316.
133. As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert
non-exempt property into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy
petition . . . . The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and permits
the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled
under the law.
Id. at 361, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6317.
134. In re Dudley, 72 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1948); accord, Rutledge v. Johansen, 270 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1959); In re Hygrade
Envelope Corp., 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 837 (1968); In re Smith,
366 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Idaho 1973).
135. Approximately ninety percent of all bankruptcies are individual consumer
bankruptcies and of these approximately eighty percent are no asset or nominal asset
bankruptcies. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 8, at 767.
136. Assets of the estate which are only partially exempt, especially automobiles,
are almost invariably purchased by the debtor from the trustee. See, e.g., id. at 771,
781. Under section 554 of title 11, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
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adjustment of debts, might avoid those consequences. ' Given
the importance of pre-petition planning to effective and com-
petent insolvency counseling, it is somewhat surprising to see
this practice addressed only in the legislative history and not
in the explicit language of the statute. It may be, however, that
the drafters did not wish to tamper with the developed case law
on the subject for fear of inviting litigation with any statutory
language which they might have chosen.
Many of the exemptions specified in section 522(d) refer
to specific dollar amounts of property."8 It is important to re-
member that under section 104 of title 11 those dollar amounts
are subject to adjustment for inflation upon action by the Con-
gress and the President following recommendation by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States prior to May 1, 1985, and
prior to May 1 of every sixth year after May 1, 1985.111 More-
over, any exemptions available under non-bankruptcy law are
also subject to periodic adjustment for inflation; under the laws
of some states, adjustment may be automatic.'4
Making the choice
It seems useful to illustrate the types of decisions that this
new exemption scheme will necessitate in the counseling of
California debtors planning to file petitions for liquidation and
discharge. The chart reproduced at page 858 may assist the
which is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 15
U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
137. In a proceeding to adjust debts of an individual with regular income, dis-
cussed in the succeeding section of this article, an estate is created, see note 125 supra,
but confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1327(b) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
138. For example, section 522(d)(2) refers to the debtor's interest, not to exceed
$1200 in value, in one motor vehicle. Id. § 522(d)(2).
139. Id. § 104. Section 104 applies to all dollar amounts in title 11 and to section
1930 of title 29 (filing fees). Id. Section 104 accomplishes little more than what Con-
gress and the President can always do anyway: enact legislation increasing the amount
of exemptions available in bankruptcy. The section does, however, require recommen-
dations every six years from the Judicial Conference of the United States to Congress
and the President and those recommendations are likely to induce legislation to in-
crease dollar amounts in the exemption provisions. An increase in cost of living does
not necessarily mandate an adjustment of dollar amounts for exemptions or for other
provisions of title 11 or for section 1930 of title 28. SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at
28-29, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5814-15.
140. The California Law Revision Commission, which is drafting a comprehen-
sive reform of the state's enforcement of judgment provisions, including its exemption
provisions, proposes a clause for an automatic cost of living escalator. See COMM'N
TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 22, at 98-100.
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illustration. The chart compares the most commonly signifi-
cant exemptions available under California law with the
roughly corresponding alternative exemptions afforded by
section 522(d) of title 11.'1' The chart is only partial; it does
not list every exemption afforded by California law or by sec-
tion 522(d) of title 11. The chart is also over-simplified and
hence is in some respects inaccurate. For example, the Cali-
fornia residential exemption is listed as $25,000. That amount
is the exemption available to a single person under the age of
sixty-five, effective January 1, 1979,112 ignoring potential prob-
lems of retroactivity and other complexities associated with
the protection of residences in California.'" The purpose of
the over-simplification is to make the chart manageable and
useful.
Disregarding, for the moment, other exemptions that are
available under California law or under section 522(d), the
comparisons offered in the chart suggest several important
rules of thumb.
(1) All other things being equal, if the debtor's equity in
a residence is substantial, the California exemptions will prob-
ably be the most provident choice. For example, for the single
debtor who owns a home with an equity of $15,000, the Califor-
nia declared homestead or claimed residential exemption will
protect the total amount of that equity,'45 whereas section
522(d) will protect only one-half of that amount."' It will be a
rare case where the loss of $7,500 exempt residential equity
through choice of section 522(d) exemptions would be offset by
141. Although the exemption scheme of the Bankruptcy Reform Act allows a
choice between section 522(d) exemptions and exemptions available under non-
bankruptcy law, including non-bankruptcy laws of the United States, the chart and
the discussion in the text simplifies the issue of choice somewhat by treating non-
bankruptcy exemption law as if it consisted exclusively of California exemption law.
This is for purposes of illustration only.
142. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
690.31(a) (West Supp. 1979).
143. For discussion of problems of retroactive application of increases in amounts
of exemptions to creditors whose claims arose prior to the increase, see text accompa-
nying notes 203-21 infra.
144. The relationship between the California declared homestead law, CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 1237-1304 (West 1954 & Supp 1979) and the California claimed residential
exemption, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.31 (West Supp. 1979), is explored in Adams,
supra note 24, at 737-53 (1978); Review of Selected 1977 California Legislation, 9 PAC.
L.J. 375, 375-77 (1978); Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation, 8 PAC. L.J. 226,
226-28 (1977).
145. CAL. Cxv. CODE § 1260 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
690.31(a) (West Supp. 1979).
146. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
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Maximum Exempt Amount of
Individual Debtor's Equityt
Type of Property Section 522(d) California
Residencej4 $7,500. $25,000.
Motor Vehicle $1,200. $500.
Household furnishings, $200. for any single No dollar limit; must be
wearing apparel, item, with no limit reasonably necessary to
books, animals, crops, on the aggregate and personally used by
musical instruments debtor
Jewelry $500. No comparable
exemptionttt
Tools of trade" $750. $2,500.
Funds in savings & loan No provision $1,000.
Funds in credit union No provision $1,500.
Residual amount of $400. plus any unused No comparable
any property portion of residential exemption
exemption**
Health aids No limit No limit
Notes to Chart:
t See text accompanying notes 155-68 infra, for discussion of exemp-
tions in the case of husband and wife filing a petition in a joint case. The
amounts listed here are drawn from sections 522(d) (1), 522(d) (2), 522
(d) (3), 522(d) (4), 522(d) (5), 522(d) (6), and 522(d) (9) of title 11 and
sections 690.1, 690.2, 690.4, 690.5, 690.7, and 690.31 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure, section 1260 of the California Civil Code, and section
15406 of the California Financial Code.
ft Under section 522(d) (1) of title 11, the $7,500 exemption for a resi-
dence includes the debtor's interest in real or personal property that the
debtor or dependent of the debtor uses as a residence and in a coopera-
tive that owns property used by the debtor or dependent of the debtor for
a residence, and also includes the debtor's interest in a burial plot. Since
the residence may be either real or personal property, mobile homes or
vessels used as a residence are presumably included. California exempts
mobile homes or houseboats as well as real property residences, CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 690.3 (West Supp. 1979), but separately exempts burial
plots in an unlimited amount, id. § 690.24. Thus, under California exemp-
tions, unlike the section 522(d) exemptions, the debtor would not be put to
the choice between a residence and a burial plot.
"1"ft Some jewelry, such as a wedding band, is arguably exempted under
section 690.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure which exempts
wearing apparel ordinarily and reasonably necessary to and personally
used by the debtor. See Estate of Millinstein, 63 Cal. App. 498, 218 P.
1022 (1923).
r In California, tools of the trade are specifically defined to include
one commercial motor vehicle reasonably necessary to and actually used
in a commercial activity, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.4 (West Supp. 1979).
Thus, equity in a motor vehicle not protected under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 690.2 might nevertheless be protected if used in a com-
mercial activity.
Thus, for example, a debtor who rents an apartment for a residence
is entitled to claim exempt $7,900 in value of any 'property.
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a comparable gain in exemptions of other property through
choice of the section 522(d) exemptions rather than California
exemptions.
(2) All other things being equal, if the debtor rents living
accommodations and therefore could not claim any residential
exemption, section 522(d) exemptions will be the most provi-
dent choice because the debtor is thereby afforded an exemp-
tion of $7,900 in any property in addition to the other exemp-
tions listed in section 522(d). Nothing in the California exemp-
tions approaches the generosity of this "grubstake" exemption.
(3) All other things being equal, if the fair market value
of individual items of household furniture, appliances, musical
instruments and such is high, choice of the California exemp-
tions will be more beneficial because, unlike section 522(d)
exemptions, California law does not establish a dollar limit on
the value of individual household items which may be ex-
empted. Rather, household furnishings are exempt as long as
they are ordinarily and reasonably necessary to and personally
used by the debtor and his or her resident family.'47
(4) All other things being equal, if the debtor owns an
automobile with substantial equity, he or she would profit by
choosing the section 522(d) exemptions which would protect
$1,200 of that equity; the California motor vehicle exemption
would protect only $500 equity. 8
(5) All other things being equal, if the debtor owned a
substantial amount of tools used in his or her trade or profes-
sion, he or she would be advantaged by choice of the California
exemptions rather than the section 522(d) exemptions because
of the significantly higher amount of protection offered by the
California tools of the trade exemption.'49
Of course, the difficulty in making the decision between
the California exemptions and the section 522(d) exemptions
is that all other things are not usually equal. Thus, a debtor to
whose advantage it would be to claim the California exemp-
tions because of substantial equity in a home would be disad-
vantaged by such a choice if he or she owned a motor vehicle
147. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.1 (West Supp. 1979). Case law in Calilornia
makes clear that the determination of what constitutes reasonable and necessary
household furnishings is to be made in the context of the debtor's station in life.
Newport Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 83 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); Independ-
ence Bank v. Heller, 275 Cal. App. 2d 84, 79 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1969).
148. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.2 (West Supp. 1979).
149. Id. § 690.4.
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with an equity exceeding $500 (the maximum exempt amount
under California law) because of the $1,200 exemption allowed
under section 522(d), or if he or she were the beneficiary of an
award under a crime victim's reparation law, also exempt
under section 522(d) ° but not under California law. The ulti-
mate choice, then, must be made by evaluating the net gain
to be obtained by choosing one or the other set of exemptions
after allowing for all feasible pre-petition conversions of non-
exempt property. Two hypothetical cases are offered to illus-
trate the process of choice.
Client A is an unmarried male who wants to file bank-
ruptcy to discharge a large personal injury judgment in excess
of insurance coverage (and thus reinstate a suspended driver's
license). Assuming that the judgment were dischargeable
under section 523,111 and that the bankruptcy were otherwise
advisable, the counselor and client would need to decide which
exemptions to choose and what pre-petition conversions, if any,
should be undertaken to maximize the amount of property
which the debtor could retain for his fresh start. The choice
might initially appear difficult if the client's assets consisted
of the following (values stated are amounts above any liens and
encumbrances):
Real property residence $12,000.
Automobile $ 1,250.
Shares of common stock $ 500.
Tools of trade $ 250.
Household goods/furnishings $ 5,000. including
several expensive
antiques and a grand
piano
Award for wrongful death of wife in $ 7,500.
auto accident (unrelated to personal
injury judgment against client)
Absent any pre-petition conversions, choice of section
522(d) exemptions wbuld protect all save $50 of the automo-
bile, the tools of the trade, all items of furniture individually
valued at less than $200, and probably most if not all of the
award for wrongful death,'52 but that choice would sacrifice
150. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(11)(A) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
151. Dischargeability of debts is discussed in the text accompanying notes 245-
85 infra.
152. Payment on account of wrongful death of an individual of whom the debtor
was a dependent is exempt to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the
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$4,100 of equity in the home (applying the section 522(d)(5)
"grubstake" allowance to the home), the common stock, and
all items of furniture valued at more than $200. Conversely,
choice of the California exemptions (again, absent any pre-
petition conversions) would protect the entire equity in the
home, the tools of the trade, and probably all of the furniture,
but sacrifice $750 of equity in the automobile, the stock, and
all of the wrongful death award. Absent pre-petition conver-
sions, then, choice of section 522(d) exemptions would protect
a total of $16,850 in value of property plus all of the furniture
valued at less than $200 per item, and the choice of California
exemptions would protect a total of $12,750 in value of property
plus, perhaps, all $5,000 worth of furniture. Without an ap-
praisal of the furniture and without being able to predict what
amount of the wrongful death award the bankruptcy court
might rule to be exempt, the choice would be troublesome.
Pre-petition conversions might simplify or mandate the
choice by protecting greater amounts of property. Fifteen
hundred dollars of the wrongful death award could be depos-
ited in a credit union and $1,000 could be deposited in a savings
and loan account (some of which could then be used to pur-
chase the trustee's $750 interest in the automobile); the re-
maining funds ($5,000 from the wrongful death award and $500
from liquidation of the stock) could be used to purchase up to
$2,250 worth of tools of the trade and additional furniture and
household goods. Alternatively, some or all of the cash could
be used to reduce the debt to debtor's real property secured
creditor, although this might require payment of a pre-
payment penalty. Although the trustee might seek to claim
some of the household goods and furnishings as not reasonably
necessary to the debtor, the debtor will nevertheless have pro-
tected a greater amount of property by choosing the California
exemptions after these conversions than by choosing either the
California or section 522(d) alternative without such conver-
sions.
Clients Mr. and Mrs. B are a married couple who want to
file bankruptcy to discharge their liability for uninsured medi-
cal expenses of $30,000 incurred in the treatment of their son
for a severe spinal injury suffered while playing football. Their
assets consist of the following community property (values
listed are amounts beyond liens and encumbrances):
debtor and any dependent of the debtor. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(11)(B) (West Spec.
Pamp. 1979).
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Real property residence $13,500.





1976 Buick $ 2,500.
1972 Pinto $ 350.
Husband's tools of trade $ 2,000.
Grand piano $ 7,500.
Award under crime victim's reparation $ 7,000.
law
Absent pre-petition conversions, the choice of section
522(d) exemptions would protect all of the equity in the home,
all of the household goods and furnishings but not the grand
piano, all the husband's tools (using sections 522(d)(6) and
522(d)(5)), $2,400 in value in the automobiles,' and all of the
award under the crime victim's reparation law. Choice of the
California exemptions without pre-petition conversions would
also protect the entire equity in the home, all of the household
furnishings including, probably, the grand piano, all of the
husband's tools of the trade, only $500 in value of the automo-
biles, and none of the award under the crime victim's repara-
tion law. In short, choice of section 522(d) exemptions would
protect a total of $29,900 in value of property and choice of the
California exemptions would protect a total of $28,500 worth of
property. However, through pre-petition conversions the debt-
ors could protect all their property under the California exemp-
tions.
Any number of pre-petition conversions would make this
possible. For example, the debtors could sell the 1972 Pinto,
and mortgage the 1976 Buick as security for a $2,000 loan from
a relative, and use the $350 proceeds from the sale of the Pinto
to pay attorney's fees for the bankruptcy and deposit the $2,000
loan proceeds in two separate savings and loan accounts (the
money later to be used, if desired, for a down payment on
another car). They could use the $7,000 award under the crime
victim's reparation law to reduce the mortgage on the house,
although this might involve pre-payment penalty and would
reduce income tax benefits.
These two examples have illustrated the ways in which the
insolvency counselor and insolvent debtor can plan to preserve
153. See teit accompanying notes 156-66 infra.
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the greatest amount of property for the debtor's post-petition
fresh start. There is more to be considered, however, because
there is much more to the section 522 exemption scheme.
Some complications and variations
Section 522(m) provides that section 522 applies to each
debtor in a joint case (husband and wife) and raises a question
about the relationship of some of the exemption scheme of
section 522 to California community property law. Section
522(f) through 522(j) empower the debtor to exempt certain
property that has been transferred prior to the filing of the
petition but which may be recaptured for the estate. In addi-
tion, section 522 does not purport to resolve the continuing
controversy concerning the retroactive application of increases
in dollar amounts of exemptions to creditors whose claims an-
tedate the increase. Each of these three important aspects of
bankruptcy exemption law, exemptions in a joint case, avoid-
ance of pre-petition transfers, and retroactive application of
changes in exemptions, is the subject of ensuing discussion.
Exemptions in joint cases. Section 302 of title 11 permits
a debtor and the debtor's spouse to commence a joint case by
the filing of a single petition.' 54 Section 522(m) of title 11 pro-
vides that section 522 "shall apply separately with respect to
each debtor in a joint case."' 5 Accordingly, each debtor in ajoint case is entitled to make the choice of exemptions allowed
by section 522(b). The allowance to each debtor in a joint case
of the right to choose either non-bankruptcy exemptions or
section 522(d) exemptions raises some interesting and impor-
tant questions, two of which are addressed here.
Section 522(d)(2) protects "the debtor's interest, not to
exceed $1,200, in one motor vehicle."' 56 It is not clear in all
cases what that "interest" is under California community
property law. Clearly, if each spouse were the owner of a sepa-
rate property motor vehicle, each would be entitled to claim
exempt $1,200 in value in their respective motor vehicles if
154. 11 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) reads as follows:
A joint case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with
the bankruptcy court of a single petition under such chapter by an indi-
vidual that may be a debtor under such chapter and such individual's
spouse. The commencement of a joint case under a chapter of this title
constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
155. Id. § 522(m).
156. Id. § 522(d)(2).
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both chose to utilize section 522(d) exemptions. It is proble-
matic whether the same result ($2,400 in value in motor vehi-
cles exempt) would follow if the spouses owned one or more
community property vehicles and if each of them had otherwise
exhausted the "grubstake" exemption of section 522(d)(5). 57
In the context of dissolution of marriage, or death of one
spouse, California law provides for equal division of community
property.'58 Accordingly, in dissolution, half of any item of com-
munity property or half of its value may be awarded to each
person,' and, following death of one spouse, half of any item
of community property or half of its value will devolve to the
surviving spouse and half will be subject to testamentary dis-
position of the decedent.' If that characterization of a spouse's
interest in community property were carried forward to the
bankruptcy exemption context, one might argue that the
debtor's interest in one community property motor vehicle
would be one-half of its dollar value. If the spouses owned
without encumbrance one community property motor vehicle
with a value not exceeding $2,400 each spouse could claim
$1,200 exempt and the entire vehicle could be protected. If,
however, the spouses owned without encumbrance two com-
munity property vehicles, each with a value of $1,200, their
respective interests in each would be $600 and they therefore
could only protect one of the two motor vehicles because each
could claim their interest in only one motor vehicle.''
There are good reasons for rejecting this analysis. First,
husband and wife could easily protect both motor vehicles in
the example just posed by agreeing orally, prior to the filing of
the petition, to convert each vehicle from community property
to the separate property of each one of the spouses." 2 Through
157. Because any specific resolution of the issue discussed in the text is not
clearly predictable, it may be advisable for the debtor to avoid the issue by insuring
that he or she has available sufficient "grubstake" exemption to protect any motor
vehicle sought to be preserved as exempt.
158. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West
1956).
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1979). That section also empowers a
court to "award.any asset to one party on such conditions as it deems proper to effect
a substantially equal division of the property." Id.
160. CAL. PROB. CODE § 201 (West 1956).
161. This issue will not arise in the context of other exemptions listed in section
522(d) because in none of those other exemptions is the debtor limited to a claim of
exempt value in one item.
162. Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962);
Woods v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956); Mooney v.
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that device, each spouse could claim the total value of one
$1,200 motor vehicle as exempt. This bit of pre-petition plan-
ning would be easy and it would also be a trap for the unwary.
Certainly the bankruptcy court should not deny exemption for
an equal total value of motor vehicles in a case where the
spouses were unaware of their right to orally agree to convert
community property to separate property.
Second, because any creditor executing a judgment can
reach the entire non-exempt amount of any item of community
property by virtue of the contract of only one spouse,' it would
be consistent to argue that each spouse in a bankruptcy case
should be entitled to claim the full amount of an exemption for
any item of community property even if that amount exceeds
one half of the total value of the property. Thus, if husband and
wife owned two community property vehicles each worth
$1,200, one spouse should be entitled to claim the entire value
of one motor vehicle exempt and the other spouse should be
entitled to do the same for the other motor vehicle. This result
would be consistent with, though not specifically supported by,
the fact that the "respective interests of the husband and wife
in community property during continuance of the marriage
relation are present, existing and equal interests"'' 4 and that,
with certain exceptions, "either spouse has the management
and control of the community personal property."'65 The ulti-
mate resolution of this issue should, of course, depend on
whether Congress intended, through the operation of section
522(d)(2), section 522(m), and community property law, to
protect one vehicle per family or rather intended to protect
$2,400 in value of motor vehicles per family, but there is noth-
ing in the legislative history to indicate congressional intent. "''
A second question posed by the operation of section 522(m)
will arise in the case where one spouse chooses section 522(d)
exemptions and the other debtor chooses non-bankruptcy ex-
emptions. Was it truly the drafters' intent, for example, that a
Mooney, 91 Cal. App. 2d 118, 204 P.2d 630 (1949).
163. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1979).
164. Id. § 5105.
165. Id. § 5125.
166. An analagous issue under California law involving exemption of funds de-
posited in a savings and loan association was resolved when the California legislature
re-enacted former section 690.21 of the California Code of Civil Procedure as section
690.7 of that Code and stated that the exemption "shall be a maximum of one thou-
sand dollars ($1,000) per person, whether the character of the property be separate or
community." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.7 (West Supp. 1979).
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husband in California who is the head of a household could
claim $40,000 in value of a residence exempt under the Cali-
fornia declared homestead or claimed residential exemption" 7
and that the wife would choose the section 522(d) exemptions
to protect an additional $7,500 in value of equity in that
residence? This result flys clearly in the face of the intent of
the California legislature to protect only $40,000 in value of
equity in a residence for a family, yet it appears to be the result
compelled by the plain meaning of the statutory language. Of
course, the congressional compromise on exemptions in bank-
ruptcy reflected in section 522(b) permits a state to enact legis-
lation which will prohibit any debtor from choosing section
522(d) exemptions. This authority will very likely be used in
those states where exemptions are not nearly so generous as the
section 522(d) exemptions and where the state does not wish
to countenance the generosity of the section 522(d) exemptions.
California would probably not enact such legislation because
its exemptions, especially the declared homestead and claimed
residential exemption, are more generous than those allowed
under section 522(d). Yet in the example posed, split choices
of exemptions in a joint case, there might be incentive for the
California legislature to consider such legislation.
It is not clear whether the language of section 522(b),
which allows a state to prohibit a debtor from choosing exemp-
tions under section 522(d), would allow the California legisla-
ture to permit a debtor generally to choose section 522(d) ex-
emptions but restrict that option in a joint case where the
combined exemptions resulting from the choice by one spouse
of non-bankruptcy exemptions and choice by the other spouse
of section 522(d) exemptions would exceed the amount other-
wise exempt to joint debtors if they both chose non-bankruptcy
exemptions. It would be unfortunate if such a limited prohibi-
tion were not permissible under the language of section 522(b)
because, at least in California, there would be good reason for
the limited prohibition but no good reason for a broader prohi-
bition entirely precluding the debtor's choice of section 522(d)
exemptions.168
167. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
690.31(a) (West Supp. 1979).
168. In proposing that the Bankruptcy Reform Act continue to defer exclusively
to non-bankruptcy exemption law, the Senate noted the abuse which might be possible
through split choice of exemptions by debtors in a joint case if the Act provided for
choice of exemptions as suggested in H.R. 8200.
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Avoidance of pre-petition transfers. Title 11 also empowers
the debtor to avoid certain pre-petition transfers of property of
the debtor which the debtor might have exempted had the
transfer not been made' 9 and to exempt some of the property
recovered through use of the avoiding power.'7 0 These impor-
tant powers, granted in section 522(f) through 522(j) of title 11,
will be described in the context of the following hypothetical
case history.
Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their two children, aged two and
four, live in a rented three bedroom home. Mrs. Smith stays
at home to care for the children and Mr. Smith earns enough
money from his job to pay basic monthly living expenses, a
monthly car payment, a monthly payment to a finance com-
pany, and $75 per month for other outstanding bills. Several
months ago the financial affairs of the Smith family were dis-
rupted by an unexpected and uninsured hospital expense, ex-
ceeding $13,000, incurred for emergency medical treatment of
their youngest child. The Smiths'were unable to pay the hospi-
tal and the debt was assigned for collection to a collection
agency. A financial crisis was precipitated by the following
recent action of the collection agency to enforce its judgment:
the sale, two weeks ago,"' of Mr. Smith's 1974 half-ton Chevro-
Such a provision in joint cases would result in a husband choosing State
exemptions while a wife might choose Federal exemptions. Together,
they could thus retain after bankruptcy, very substantial amounts of
property, while their debts would have been discharged. The committee
feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start, but
not instant affluence, as would be possible under the provisions of H.R.
8200.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5792. When the compromise on section 522(b) was reached between Senate and House,
see text accompanying note 123 supra, the language of the compromise did not address
this concern. From the language of the Senate Report and from the fact of the compro-
mise one might infer an intent to allow a limited state prohibition such as that de-
scribed in the text.
169. "Transfer" is defined broadly in section 101(40) of title I1 to include:
"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including reten-
tion of title as a security interest." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
A pre-petition transfer would thus include the creation of a security interest in prop-
erty to secure repayment of an obligation as well as a simple cash payment to a creditor
in partial or complete satisfaction of a pre-existing indebtedness.
170. The procedure for exercise of these powers is to be specified in the Bank-
ruptcy Rules. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114 at 297, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6254.
171. For purposes of ensuing discussion in the text it should be assumed that all
time periods specified in the hypothetical case are to be considered as time periods
antedating the filing of a petition.
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let pick-up, following levy of a writ of execution two months
ago; the recording of an abstract of judgment affecting, and
thus creation of a lien upon,' some undeveloped mountain real
property (valued at $4,500) owned by Mr. and Mrs. Smith
which they had expected to retain for future construction of a
retirement cabin; the threat by the collection agency to begin
garnishing Mr. Smith's wages.
The total outstanding obligations of Mr. and Mrs. Smith
are:
Bank of America $ 2,500.
(holds pink slip to Ford)






Finance Company $ 3,000.
(secured by household goods)
Hospital, assigned for collection $13,249.




Mr. and Mrs. Smith's assets consist of household furnish-
ings (collateral for a non-purchase money secured loan from the
finance company), wearing apparel, a small sum in a savings
and loan account, camera equipment, sporting goods, a 1976
Ford (obtained with the proceeds of a purchase money secured
loan made by the Bank of America), and the undeveloped real
property now subject to lien. In addition, five months ago, Mr.
and Mrs. Smith used a $700 tax refund to partially repay Mr.
Smiths $1,500 debt to his brother. Mr. and Mrs. Smith have
been making minimum payments on their credit card obliga-
tions for the past year.
Under section 522(f) through 522(j) of title 11, the liens on
the undeveloped real property and household furnishings and
the execution sale of the Chevrolet half-ton pick-up may be
avoided and these items of property claimed exempt. The pay-
ment to Mr. Smith's brother may be avoided but the funds
recovered may not be claimed exempt. The Ford automobile
may be redeemed from the bank's lien by the Smith's payment
172. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (West Supp. 1979).
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to the bank of the automobile's fair market value. Some of the
payments on credit card obligations might or might not be
avoidable; if avoided, funds recovered could not be claimed
exempt.
Pursuant to section 522(f), Mr. and Mrs. Smith may avoid
the fixing of a judicial lien upon their interest in the undevel-
oped real property to the extent that the lien impairs an ex-
emption to which they otherwise would have been entitled had
the lien not been created.' This would be true even if the
fixing of the lien were not a preferential transfer;' under sec-
tion 522(f), a judicial lien may be avoided no matter how long
the fixing of the lien antedates the filing of a petition. Thus,
for example, a lien on real property arising ten years previous
to the filing of a petition could be avoided by the debtor if that
real property could otherwise be exempted under section
522(b). Since Mr. and Mrs. Smith do not own real property
which they use as a residence, it would be advisable for them
to claim the section 522(d) exemptions, entitling each of them
to a "grubstake" exemption of $7,900.' " By so doing, they may
claim the undeveloped real property exempt. Given that choice
of exemptions under section 522(b), the lien on the undevel-
oped real property impairs an exemption to which they would
be entitled under section 522(b) and thus, under section
522(f)(1), the lien may be avoided.' 6
The power of the debtor to avoid judicial liens on otherwise
exemptable property poses some interesting questions when
considered in the context of California's declared homestead
and claimed residential exemption law.'7 To depart briefly
173. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(1) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) reads:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in such property to the extent
that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is - (1) a judicial
lien ....
174. Under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the fixing of a lien upon
property of the debtor within ninety days of the filing of the petition (or within one
year of the filing of the petition if the judgment creditor is an insider with respect to
the debtor) may constitute a voidable preference. Id. § 547(b). Section 547 accom-
plishes in one section what the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 accomplished in section 60
(voluntary transfers) and 67a (involuntary transfers). Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
§§ 60, 67a, 30 Stat. 562, 564 (as amended) (formerly 11 U.S.C. §§ 96, 107a (1976)).
175. See text following note 146 supra.
176. Presumably the new Bankruptcy Rules will prescribe the appropriate proce-
dure to avoid the lien. See note 131 supra.
177. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1237-1304 (West 1954 & Supp. 1979); CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 690.31 (West Supp. 1979).
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from the given hypothetical, suppose that Mr. and Mrs. Smith
owned a home and that their equity in the home was $30,000.
If Mr. and Mrs. Smith had recorded a Declaration of Home-
stead for that property following a judgment creditor's recorda-
tion of an abstract of judgment, the lien resulting from recorda-
tion of the abstract would impair their homestead exemption.'75
Thus, under section 522(f)(1), the lien could be avoided if, as
would be advisable, the Smiths chose to rely on non-
bankruptcy exemptions. Suppose, however, that the Smiths
had not recorded a Declaration of Homestead but rather had
intended to rely upon California's claimed residential exemp-
tion. 7 ' The recorded abstract of judgment would still consti-
tute a lien on their residence but it would arguably not impair
an exemption to which they would otherwise be entitled."" if
the lien does not impair an exemption, the lien may not be
avoided under section 522(f)(1). Thus, by virtue of the strange
nature of California's presently existing exemption scheme for
real property used as a residence, it is possible that a lien
which, under the homestead law, is superior to a debtor's claim
of exemption can be avoided in bankruptcy but a lien which,
under the claimed residential exemption, is subordinate to the
debtor's claim of exemption cannot be avoided.
Mr. and Mrs. Smith would also be entitled to avoid the
lien of the finance company on their household goods. Section
522(f)(2) empowers the debtor to avoid all non-purchase money
non-possessory security interests in household goods, tools of
the trade, and health aids.'8' This power strikes directly at the
178. Recordation of an abstract of judgment prior to recordation of a Declaration
of Homestead would create a lien on the property, see note 24 supra, and that lien
would take priority over the debtor's claim of exemption under the homestead provi-
sions. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1241(4) (West 1954 & Supp. 1979).
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.31 (West Supp. 1979).
180. The abstract would constitute a lien on the property despite the claim of
exemption, id. § 674(c) (West 1955 & Supp. 1979), but the lien would arguably not
impair the exemption because the lien is subordinate to the debtor's claim of exemp-
tion under CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 690.31(j) (West Supp. 1979). It is unclear whether
this state law subordination of a lien means that the lien does not impair an exemption.
One might argue that the lien does impair the exemption despite its subordination to
the exempt amount in a forced sale, because upon voluntary sale of the property by
the debtor the lien would in effect reduce the amount paid to the debtor as proceeds
of the sale. Unlike the case of the homestead exemption, the exempt amount under
the claimed residential exemption is not protected in the event of voluntary sale of' the
property. Id. § 690.31(k).
181. More precisely, the lien which is avoidable under section 522(f)(2) is a lien
on items of property which are described in sections 522(d)(3), 522(d)(6), and 522(d)(9)
of title 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). The debtor need not claim
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standard finance company practice of securing non-purchase
money loans with security interests in household goods and
furnishings. Congress correctly perceived that finance compa-
nies insist upon such collateral primarily for leverage and not
as meaningful security because actual repossession of second
hand furnishings (or tools or health aids) rarely nets the credi-
tor sufficient funds to repay the loan. The threat of reposses-
sion, however, frequently coerces the debtor into reaffirmation
of debt after bankruptcy because the debtor's cost of replacing
the items is high.' 2 Title 11 sets strict limits elsewhere on the
ability of debtors to reaffirm debts after the filing of a peti-
tion;'83 section 522(f)(2) provides even further protection
against reaffirmation by invalidating the primary leverage by
which a reaffirmation of a debt to a finance company is in-
duced.'84 It will be interesting to observe whether this new
avoiding power will decrease the availability of consumer credit
extended by finance companies or lead to pressure by finance
companies upon legislators to raise interest rate ceilings.""
It should be emphasized that section 522(f)(2) does not
permit the debtor to avoid purchase money security interests'5
section 522(d) exemptions, however, to take advantage of section 522(f)(2) as long as
the non-bankruptcy exemptions chosen by the debtor include the kinds of' property to
which section 522(f)(2) refers.
182. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 761-62, 946, 960 (testimony of David
Williams, Counsel, Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed-
eral Trade Commission; testimony of Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., Staff Attorney, The
National Consumer Law Center, Inc.; and testimony of Linn K. Twinem, General
Counsel, Beneficial Finance Co.).
183. See text accompanying notes 291-303 infra.
184. It was a standard practice of finance companies in cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Act to contact the bankrupt shortly after the debtor filed a petition, often at
the first meeting of creditors, to ask that the debtor make arrangements to reaffirm
part or all of the existing secured indebtedness. Frequently, the contact was initiated
by a question such as: "Are you going to reaffirm the debt or are we going to have to
repossess your furniture?" If well counseled, the debtor was usually able to negotiate
a reaffirmation of the debt for no more than the fair market value of the collateral
because the creditor would get no more than that amount by repossession in any event.
Contrast the practice of certain motor vehicle secured lenders described in note 296
infra.
185. Finance companies may argue that inability to seek reaffirmation through
the leverage of security will lead to increased operating losses resulting from default
and that extension of credit, therefore, must be restricted or that higher interest rates
must be charged to compensate for such losses. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at
903.
186. For example, a debtor could not avoid a security interest in a refrigerator
the purchase of which was financed by a loan from a finance company. Congress was
urged to permit avoidance of purchase money security interests. See House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 940.
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and does not permit the debtor to avoid any security interest,
whether or not purchase money, in an automobile (unless the
automobile is a tool of the trade). These limits to the avoiding
power may induce a change in the pattern of finance company
loans to consumers or prompt finance companies to seek a secu-
rity interest in automobiles more frequently.
Finance companies are likely to mount a due process chal-
lenge to section 522(f)(2), claiming that its implementation
constitutes a taking of property (avoidance of a security inter-
est) without due process of law. Such a challenge will probably
fail in view of broad congressional power to implement the
constitutional grant of authority to enact uniform laws respect-
ing bankruptcy and because the value of the property taken is,
on the whole, de minimus. 181
Section 522(f) provides only that the debtor may avoid
certain transfers. It does not by itself give the debtor the power
to exempt property the transfer of which has been avoided.
Subsections 522(i) and 522(j)' 81 grant that specific power by
stating that the debtor may exempt such property (subject to
the limitations of section 550), "1 but only to the extent that the
debtor has exempted less property in value of such kind than
that to which the debtor is entitled under section 522(b). Thus,
in the given hypothetical for example, if Mr. and Mrs. Smith
owned another asset valued at $14,000 and had thus otherwise
each "used" $7,000 of their $7,900 "grubstake" exemption,
they would each be entitled to claim exempt only $900 more
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 empowers Congress to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcy. Although Congress is not limited by the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts, id. art. I, § 10 (prohibits
states from impairing obligation of contracts), Congress is nevertheless bound by fifth
amendment due process standards. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U.S. 555 (1934) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Act abridging rights of mortgagees).
Under these standards, bankruptcy legislation will be upheld unless the challenged
provisions are "so grossly arbitrary and unreasonable as to be 'incompatible with
fundamental law."' Campbell v. Alleghany Corp. 75 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 581 (1935) (quoting Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192
(1901)) (upholding "cram down" corporate reorganization provisions of Bankruptcy
Act before Chandler Act amendments). In view of the well considered purposes of the
relief afforded by section 522(f)(2), discussed in the text, the section would appear to
withstand constitutional scrutiny applying these standards.
188. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(i) - (j) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
189. Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act describes the liability of a trans-
feree of an avoided transfer. Under that section, neither the trustee nor the debtor
could recover property or the value of such property from certain good faith transferees
of the initial transferee of an avoidable transfer. Id. § 550.
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in value of the undeveloped real property. 90
If Mr. and Mrs. Smith had filed their joint petition prior
to the forced sale of the Chevrolet half-ton pick-up, they might
in that case also have been able to invoke section 522(f)(1) to
avoid the lien of the collection agency which had arisen by
virtue of the levy of the writ of execution.'"' Assuming, however,
as the hypothetical case postulates, that the lien had already
been extinguished by sale,"' section 522(f)(1) would not be
availing because there would no longer be a lien to avoid at the
time of the filing of the petition. There would be other grounds,
however, for avoiding the transfer (of the proceeds of the forced
sale to the collection agency in partial satisfaction of its claim)
and provision is made for the debtor to exempt the property
thus regained for the estate.
The hypothetical case postulates that the collection
agency's lien on the automobile arose two months prior to the
filing of the petition.'9 3 Under those circumstances, the creation
190. If the debtors could not exempt the full value of the property subject to the
lien, the lien may be avoided only "to the extent that [it] impairs an exemption to
which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section." Id. §
522(f). It is not clear whether this language means that the amount of the debt secured
by the lien is reduced by the amount of the exemption that is impaired by the lien or,
rather, that the lien remains to the full extent of the debt but is subordinated to the
debtor's exemption. For example, assume that a piece of real property valued at
$10,000 is subject to a judicial lien securing a debt of $9,000 and that this lien impairs
a debtor's exemption to the extent of $2,500. If the "avoid" language of section 522(t)
means that the debt secured by the lien is reduced in the amount by which the
exemption is impaired, the property would be sold by the trustee and the proceeds
would be distributed $2,500 to the debtor, $6,500 to the lien creditor ($9,000 reduced
by $2,500) and $1,000 to the trustee. If the "avoid" language means that the lien
remains to the full extent of the debt but is subordinated to the debtor's exemption,
the trustee would not be able to sell the property and the lien creditor would benefit
from any subsequent appreciation in the value of the property; if the debtor subse-
quently sold the property for $15,000, the lien creditor would realize the full amount
of its $9,000 judgment. This latter interpretation would appear to be consistent with
analagous treatment given to judicial liens on residential real property in California
(where no declaration of homestead has been filed), CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 674(c)
(West Supp. 1979), but there is certainly no reason to suspect that the drafters of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act were thinking of that California law when choosing the lan-
guage of section 522(f).
191. Levy of a writ of execution creates a lien on the property on which levy is
made. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 688 (West 1955 & Supp. 1979). 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(27)
(West Spec. Pamp. 1979) defines judicial lien to include a lien through levy of execu-
tion. Such a judicial lien could be avoided under the terms and to the extent provided
in section 522(f)(1).
192. Sale under a writ of execution extinguishes the lien created by the levy. Fry
v. Bihr, 6 Cal. App. 3d 248, 257, 85 Cal. Rptr. 742, 743 (1970); Haskins v. Certified
Escrow & Mortgage Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 688, 691, 216 P.2d 90, 93 (1950).
193. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
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of the lien would most probably constitute a preferential trans-
fer avoidable by the trustee under section 547 of title 11.111 If
avoidable by the trustee under section 547, the debtor may
benefit by the trustee's avoidance.of the transfer, or the debtor
may himself undertake to avoid the transfer if the trustee fails
to act. Almost never will the trustee act to avoid pre-petition
transfers of property which the debtor could claim entirely ex-
empt because the trustee would have no financial incentive to
do so.'" If, however, the debtor has transferred property of
substantial value only some of which the debtor could exempt
once recovered by the trustee, the trustee might act to avoid
the transfer." In that event, the debtor, under section 522(g), 117
will be entitled to exempt such property as is recovered by the
trustee but, again, only to the extent allowed by section 522(j),
194. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). It is clearly important for the
consumer insolvency counselor to be conversant with the avoiding powers of the trus-
tee, especially so under the Bankruptcy Reform Act because the debtor's rights to
exempt property transferred prior to the petition in large part rest upon the avoiding
powers of the trustee. The lien described in the text would be an avoidable transfer
under section 547, because it meets all of the conditions of section 547(b) and is not
an excepted (i.e. non-avoidable) transaction under section 547(c). Id.
195. Under section 330 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the trustee is to be paid
$20 for serving in a case under Chapter 7, together with "reasonable compensation for
actual, necessary services rendered by such trustee" and "reimbursement for actual,
necessary expenses." Id. § 330(a)-(b). However, compensation for services rendered in
a case under Chapter 7 is limited by section 326 to declining fixed percentages applied
to "all moneys disbursed or turned over in the case by the trustee to parties in interest,
excluding the debtor, but including holders of secured claims." Id. § 326(a) (emphasis
added). The trustee would thus earn nothing for his or her services if the property
recovered were entirely exempt and would have to be turned over to the debtor.
Creditors would not suffer by trustee inaction in such a case because the property could
be claimed exempt by the debtor.
196. Suppose, for example, that property of the debtor valued at $15,000 had
been lost by the debtor at an execution sale preceding the filing of the petition. If the
trustee could avoid that transfer and if the debtor could exempt $7,900 in value of such
property under section 522(d)(5), the trustee would have available (expenses for recov-
ery of the property aside) $7,100 for disbursal to creditors. Under section 326, the
trustee would be entitled to compensation not exceeding $393 for his or her efforts in
recovering the property. Id. § 326(a).
197. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(g) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) reads:
Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor may ex-
empt under subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee re-
covers under section 510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to
the extent the debtor could have exempted such property under subsec-
tion (b) of this section if such property had not been transferred, if -
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property
by the debtor; and
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or
(2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection
(f)(2) of this section.
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that is, only to the extent that the debtor has exempted less
property in value of such kind than that to which the debtor is
entitled under section 522(b).' 8
If the trustee fails to act, however, the debtor may invoke
section 522(h) to avoid certain transfers which the trustee could
have avoided.'99 If the trustee fails to seek to regain the pro-
ceeds of the execution sale of the automobile, Mr. Smith may
do so because, under section 522(h), which refers to section
522(g)(1), the transfer was not a voluntary transfer and Mr.
Smith had not concealed the property. Similarly, and of great
practical importance, any debtor could recover wages the pre-
petition garnishment of which constitutes a preferential trans-
fer to the garnishing creditor.
Mr. Smith could not accomplish this same result to re-
cover and exempt the moneys paid to his brother in partial
satisfaction of a pre-existing indebtedness. That payment, too,
would probably constitute an avoidable preferential transfer
but, if the trustee fails to set aside that transfer, Mr. Smith
would not be able to recover the payment because the transfer
was voluntary. 00
Neither the trustee nor Mr. Smith would be able to recover
payments made on credit card obligations during the months
preceding the filing of the petition, although this conclusion is
not entirely certain. Section 547(c)(2) provides that the trustee
may not avoid a transfer of property (otherwise preferential
under section 547) if the transfer was in payment of a debt
incurred in the ordinary course of the financial affairs of the
debtor and transferee, was made not more than forty-five days
after the debt was incurred, and was made in the ordinary
course of the financial affairs of the debtor and according to
ordinary business terms. 0' The legislative history concerning
this exception from the trustee's power to avoid preferences
refers specifically to the payment of utility bills and suggests
198. See text accompanying notes 188-89 supra.
199. 11 U.S.C.A. 522(h) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) reads:
The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a
set off to the extent that the debtor could have exempted such property
under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided such
transfer, if - (1) such transfer is avoidable by the trustee under section
544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title or recoverable by the trustee
under section 553 of this title; and
(2) the trustee does not attempt to avoid such transfer.
200. Id.
201. Id. § 547(c)(2).
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that other similar payments to creditors which do not bear the
indicia of rapid pre-bankruptcy dissipation of the estate should
not be subject to the avoiding power.'" Accordingly, it would
seem that payment on credit card obligations within forty-five
days of incurring the debt will not be an avoidable transfer. It
is doubtful, in any event, that the issue will be frequently pre-
sented because most debtors seeking insolvency counseling will
not have been making such timely payments.
The foregoing discussion serves to indicate the importance
to effective bankruptcy planning of evaluating the nature, ex-
tent and timing of the debtor's pre-petition transfers and the
importance of understanding the trustee's avoiding powers.
Section 522(f) through 522(j) provide significant additional
tools with which to protect property for the debtor's post-
petition fresh start.
Retroactive application of increases in dollar amounts of
exemptions. Creditors have long insisted and, until recently,
usually convinced judges, that increases in the dollar amount
of exemptions should not, and constitutionally cannot, apply
retroactively to creditors whose claims arose prior to the effec-
tive date of the increase.203 The constitutional argument has
been grounded in article I, section 10 of the United States
Constitution 2 4 which precludes any state from impairing the
obligation of contract. In California, In Re Rauer's Collection
Co.,205 England v. Sanderson,211 and, more recently, Daylin
Medical and Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Thomas27 and Swenor
202. SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 88, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5874; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 373-74, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6329-30.
203. See, e.g., In re Messinger, 29 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Rechtman,
11 F. Supp. 347, 350-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); In re Marx, 5 F. Supp. 954, 955 (E.D. La.
1916). See generally Comment, The Contract Clause and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Application of Exemption Statutes: A Reconsideration, 9 PAC. L.J. 889
(1978); Comment, Contracts Clause Prevents Exemption Change, 1 STAN. L. REv. 350
(1949).
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 states: "No State shall ... pass any . . . law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . ." This language is substantially the same
as that in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16, and the clauses in both constitutions are construed
identically by California courts. Birkhofer v. Krum, 27 Cal. App. 2d 513, 81 P.2d 609
(1938), with deference to the controlling construction of the federal courts. Id. at 536,
81 P.2d at 621.
205. 87 Cal. App. 2d 248, 196 P.2d 803 (1948).
206. 236 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'g In re Sanderson, 134 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Cal. 1955).
207. 69 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 37, 137 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1977).
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v. Robertson208 have articulated and applied the constitutional
argument. Description and analysis of Swenor, the most recent
published bankruptcy opinion on the question, will provide a
useful starting point for considering the present and future
resolution of this important question.
Mr. and Mrs. Swenor filed a voluntary petition on March
17, 1977, two and one half months after the effective date of the
then latest increase in the amount of the California homestead
exemption (from $20,000 to $30,000 for head of household). The
Swenors claimed $30,000 in value of their home exempt; the
trustee was willing to allow only $20,000 in value exempt. In
litigation on the issue, the parties stipulated that the claims of
some of the Swenor's creditors arose prior to the effective date
of the increase in the homestead exemption. On appeal from
the decision of the Bankruptcy Judge in favor of the Swenors,
the District Court for the Northern District of California, rely-
ing on In Re Rauer's Collection Co., articulated a compromise
position which rested on the accepted constitutional principle
that increases in exemptions could not be applied retroac-
tively. 201
Departing from England v. Sanderson, decided by the
Ninth Circuit in 1956, the court held that the trustee was not
entitled to assert the position of such pre-increase creditors
under section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act210 because that section
only entitled the trustee to assert the position of a hypothetical
creditor who was deemed to extend credit to the bankrupt and
obtain a lien with respect to such credit on the date of the filing
of the petition, a time clearly after the increase in the amount
of the exemption. 21' The court suggested that it was not bound
by a contrary conclusion in England v. Sanderson2 12 because
that decision relied, in part, upon the Second Circuit's 1954
interpretation of section 70c in Constance v. Harvey, 213 a case
overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Manufacturer's National Bank of Detroit. 2 1
Since the trustee did not have the power, under section 70c
208. 452 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
209. Id. at 678.
210. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70c, 30 Stat. 566 (as amended) (formerly
11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976)).
211. 452 F. Supp. at 676-77.
212. Id. at 676.
213. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
214. 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
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or under any other section of the Bankruptcy Act, to assert the
position of pre-increase creditors, the court recognized what
amounts to something like a common law power in the trustee
which would protect the interests of such creditors against the
increase in the amount of the exemption without unduly delay-
ing the administration of the bankrupt's estate." 5 The court
held that the claims of pre-increase creditors should be aggre-
gated and that the total of their claims (not to exceed the
difference between the old and new exemption amounts)
should be subtracted from the higher exemption amount (in
the Swenor case, from $30,000) to arrive at the amount of the
Swenor's exemption. Any equity in the home exceeding that
amount was then to be distributed to all creditors of the bank-
rupts."'
The developing case law in other jurisdictions, and recent
case law in California, would support the overruling of In Re
Rauer's Collection Co. and its progeny, upon which the court
relied in Swenor v. Robertson."7 Cases in other jurisdictions
215. 452 F. Supp. at 677-78.
216. Id. at 678.
217. Recent California decisions upholding the retroactive application of com-
munity property and sovereign immunity laws have invoked due process analysis. In
re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976)
(community property); Robertson v. Willis, 77 Cal. App. 3d 358, 367-69, 143 Cal. Rptr.
523, 527-30 (1978) (community property); Fluornoy v. State of Cal., 230 Cal. App. 2d
520, 530-31, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190, 196-201 (sovereign tort immunity of public entities).
These cases have applied a balancing approach to determine whether retroactive appli-
cation of a statute transgresses the bounds of due process. As announced by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Bouquet:
In determining whether a retroactive law contravenes the due process
clause, we consider such factors as the significance of the state interest
served by the law, the importance of the retroactive application of the law
to the effectuation of that interest, the extent of reliance upon the former
law, the legitimacy of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the
basis of that reliance, and the extent to which the retroactive application
of the new law would disrupt those actions.
16 Cal.3d at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
If the Bouquet due process criteria were applied to test the constitutionality of
applying exemption statutes retroactively, the balance of interests would seem to favor
permitting retroactive application. Comment, The Contract Clause and the Constitu-
tionality of Retroactive Application of Exemption Statutes: A Reconsideration, supra
note 203, at 909-19. Traditionally, however, California courts have not applied this
balancing approach in assessing the constitutionality of retroactive application of in-
creases in exemption amounts. See, e.g., Daylin Medical Surgical Supply, Inc. v.
Thomas, 69 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 37, 138 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1977). "The cases cited by the
plaintiff all stand for the general proposition that statutes cutting down the creditor's
rights by granting the debtor exemptions, in the absence of an emergency situation
(such as great depression) are unconstitutional as an impairment of contractual obliga-
tions." Id. at 41, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
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.permitting retroactive application of increases in exemption
amounts emphasize that the creditor's interest in protecting
the obligation of contract must be balanced against the inter-
ests of debtors in exempting property for a fresh start. Deci-
sions in these cases have struck the balance in favor of debtors
because most creditors do not, in fact, rely upon an existing
dollar amount of exempt property when extending credit (and
their contract could not then realistically be said to be im-
paired) and because debtors, squeezed by inflation, require
increased amounts of property for a fresh start. Consistent
with this balancing approach, the cases do not articulate a per
se rule of retroactivity. Rather, they appear to articulate a
rule allowing retroactivity unless the impairment is extreme;
increases to keep pace with inflation would thus probably pass
constitutional muster while exemption of an entirely new kind
of property, in large amounts, might not."'
If, then, a California state court or a federal court inter-
preting California law determine to articulate a new constitu-
tional principle in this area, the compromise position articu-
lated in Swenor v. Robertson will be history and debtors will
be entitled to choose non-bankruptcy exemptions in amounts
permitted by non-bankruptcy law as of the date of the filing
of the petition."'
This literal approach to contract clause analysis ignores the "softening" of' the
United States Supreme Court's approach to the issue since Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and a substantial body of authority which suggests
that "the standard of reasonableness under the contract clause is the same as that
utilized in determining the validity of retrospective legislation under the due process
clauses .. " Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 695 & n.19 (1960). See also United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 12-23 (1977); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497,
515-16 (1965). This authority strongly suggests that the per se approach inherited from
In re Rauer's Collections Co. is incorrect and that a balancing approach, applying the
due process standard of reasonableness, is appropriate.
Cases in Louisiana and Oregon have adopted a balancing approach to sustain the
constitutionality of applying increases in exemption amounts retroactively. Wilkinson
v. Carpenter, 277 Or. 557, 561 P.2d 607 (1977) (amount of homestead exemption to be
determined at time of levy followed by claim of exemption rather than at time judg-
ment obtained); Hooter v. Wilson, 273 So. 2d 516, 522 (La. 1973); accord, Oachita Nat'l
Bank v. Rowan, 345 So. 2d 1014 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Natchitoches Collections, Inc. v.
Gorum, 274 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
218. See note 217 supra.
219. Consistent with the developments described in note 217 supra, the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission Staff has proposed in its tentative recommendation
relating to California's enforcement of judgment law that the existence or amount of
an exemption be determined pursuant to the exemption statutes in effect at the time
the claim of exemption is made. COMM'N TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 22,
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Under title 11, of course, a debtor may not choose non-
bankruptcy exemptions but rather may choose section 522(d)
exemptions. In that case too, a debtor should be able to benefit
from the full value of the section 522(d) exemptions (including
amounts subsequently substituted under section 104)220 even
though the debtor may have incurred obligations prior to the
effective date or even the enactment date of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act (or prior to the effective date of increases pursuant
to section 104). Title 11 does not state that section 522(d) ex-
emptions will apply retroactively to creditors whose claims pre-
date the enactment or effective date of the Act, (or an increase
pursuant tosection 104). However, courts faced with the issue
should permit retroactive application for the reasons discussed
above and probably will permit retroactive application both
because the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contract only limits state action and because Congress appears
to have the power to make such exemptions retroactive despite
the limitations imposed by the fifth amendment due process
clause .21
The foregoing discussion has suggested the plasticity of
bankruptcy exemption law and its crucial importance to com-
petent insolvency counseling. Indeed, title 11 provides some
at 232. If this recommendation became law and withstood constitutional attack, a
debtor in a case under title 11, filing in California, who chose to claim non-bankruptcy
exemptions, would be entitled to exemptions provided by California law in the
amounts provided by exemptions statutes in effect at the time the petition is filed,
because section 522(b)(2) of title 11 provides that an individual debtor may exempt
from the property of the estate "any property that is exempt under Federal law... .
or state or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition." 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
The state law "applicable on the date of the filing of the petition" need not
necessarily permit full retroactive application of increases in exempt amounts. For
example, the current amount of the California homestead exemption can be claimed
only "to the extent that such increase [from $30,000 to $40,000 for the head of a family
effective January 1, 1979] does not impair or defeat the right of any creditor to execute
upon the property which existed prior to such date [when the increase became effec-
tive]." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). Thus, a state may
provide that the determination of the amount of an exemption shall be made at the
time a creditor's claim arises (no retroactivity), or at the time the creditor obtains a
lien on the property claimed exempt (partial retroactivity), or at the time the debtor
claims the exemption (full retroactivity). The proposal from the staff of the California
Law Revision Commission is thus but one possible choice concerning the extent to
which increase in exempt amounts shall be retroactive. Therefore, even if the constitu-
tional hurdle is surmounted, one need be alert to developments under state law (legis-
lation or case law) which will determine the extent to which increases in exempt
amounts are to be applied retroactively.
220. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
221. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
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significantly different answers to the debtor's inquiry about
property which can be retained for the debtor's post-petition
fresh start. There remains to be considered the answers to the
debtor's inquiry about the kinds and amounts of debt which
the bankruptcy will lift from the debtor's shoulders.
Discharge and Dischargeability
Provisions of title 11 governing discharge and dischargea-
bility do not alter the contours of consumer insolvency counsel-
ing to the same extent as provisions governing exemptions or
provisions governing reaffirmations or redemptions.' As a con-
sequence, the description here of discharge and discharge-
ability under title 11 will be more a sketch of adjustments
and refinements than a portrait of major revisions.
Title 11 preserves the distinction drawn by sections 14 and
17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 between the debtor's general
discharge from debts and the debtor's continuing liability for
particular kinds of debts notwithstanding the general dis-
charge. Section 727 of title 11 roughly parallels section 14 of the
Bankruptcy Act; it requires the bankruptcy court to grant the
(individual)12 debtor a discharge unless the court finds that
one of ten grounds for denial of discharge exists. Section 727
also states the time in which and the conditions under which a
discharge may be revoked. Section 523, like section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act, lists debts which are to be excepted from any
discharge and circumscribes the procedure for litigating the
dischargeability of certain of those debts. Sections 524 and 525
describe the effect of a discharge in somewhat greater detail
than does section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 524
mandates a new procedure, the discharge hearing, which is
intended to help safeguard the uninformed debtor against post-
petition pressures from creditors and to impress upon the
debtor the solemnity of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Discharge
For the most part the grounds for denial of discharge under
section 727(a) track those in section 14 of the Bankruptcy
222. Reaffirmation and redemption are discussed in the text accompanying notes
291-303 infra.
223. Section 727, unlike section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, allows a discharge only
to an individual debtor and not to a corporation or partnership. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(1)
(West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
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Act.224 These include transfer, destruction, or concealment of
property, within the year preceding the filing of a petition, with
the intent to defraud creditors, 25 concealment, destruction or
falsification of books and records reflecting the debtor's finan-
cial position,22 failure to satisfactorily explain any loss of assets
of the debtor,2 7 and failure to obey lawful orders of the court.,,
In addition, under section 727(a)(7), a debtor will be de-
nied a discharge if he or she has committed any act specified
in sections 727(a)(2) through (a)(6) in connection with a case
concerning an insider.2 Thus, for example, a debtor will be
denied a discharge if it be determined that within one year
preceding the filing of the debtor's petition he or she concealed,
destroyed or falsified books or records necessary to ascertain
the financial condition of the debtor's brother who had pre-
viously filed a petition in bankruptcy. This additional ground
for denial of discharge obviously penalizes persons who assist
or cooperate with others in frustrating the purposes of bank-
ruptcy law.
Section 727(a)(8) continues to prohibit a debtor from ob-
taining a discharge in a liquidation more than once every six
years. 10 Section 727(a)(9), however, permits the debtor a dis-
charge in a liquidation notwithstanding discharge in a prior
wage earner proceeding which commenced less than six years
224. Differences between section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 727 of
title 11 which are not discussed in the text include: (1) Under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, a debtor would be denied a discharge if, while engaged in business as a sole
proprietor, partnership or corporate executive, the debtor obtained property or money
for the business on credit by filing a false financial statement. There is no comparable
provision in title 11. Compare Bankrupty Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14(c)(3), 30 Stat. 550
(as amended to § 14c(3)) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (1976)) with 11 U.S.C.A. §
727 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). Under title 11, use of a false financial statement is only
grounds for excepting the specific debt from discharge. See text accompanying notes
255-66 infra. (2) Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a debtor could be denied a dis-
charge for refusal to pay the required bankruptcy filing fees. Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, § 14(c)(8), 30 Stat. 550 (as amended to § 14c(8)) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(8)
(1976)). Under title 11, failure to pay filing fees is grounds for dismissal of the case.
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
225. Id. § 727(a)(2).
226. Id. § 727(a)(3).
227. Id. § 727(a)(5).
228. Id. § 727(a)(6)(A).
229. Id. § 727(a)(7). An insider is defined in section 101(25) of title 11 to include
a relative, and a relative is defined in section 101(34) of title 11. Id. §§ 101(25), 101(34).
230. Id. § 727(a)(8). To be more precise, the section prohibits the debtor from
receiving a discharge in a liquidation if the petition is filed within six years of the
commencement of a previous liquidation case in which the debtor was granted a
discharge.
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preceding the filing of the petition for liquidation, if the prior
discharge followed payment in full by the debtor of allowed
unsecured claims in the wage earner proceeding or payment of
seventy percent of such claims where the payment plan was
proposed in good faith and the plan represented the debtor's
best effort . 3' This provision is consistent with congressional
policy to preclude the development of a class of habitual bank-
rupts, because persons who are granted two discharges within
the six year time period will either have paid all or a substan-
tial portion of each debt dealt with in the first proceeding. In
view of this new right granted to debtors to invoke the protec-
tions of bankruptcy law more than once during any six year
period, it would seem incumbent upon the attorney represent-
ing a debtor in a wage earner proceeding to advise the client of
the potential advantage of a composition plan and to propose
such a plan for confirmation if the client desires. In the event
such a plan is proposed, the attorney should seek a confirma-
tion order finding that the plan was proposed in good faith and
represented the debtor's best effort. 3 1
The Effect of Discharge
As under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a discharge under
title 11 voids any judgment against the debtor to the extent
that the judgment determines personal liability of the debtor
for a dischargeable debt,23 but the discharge does not affect the
liability of any other person, such as a guarantor, for the
debt.2 34 The discharge also continues to operate as an injunc-
231. Id. § 727(a)(9). The phrase "wage earner proceeding" is used in the text only
as a shorthand reference to proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act or
under Chapter 13 of title 11. See text following note 322 infra.
232. The Bankruptcy Rules are expected to provide for this "best effort" deter-
mination. Statement by Hon. Don Edwards (D. Cal.) upon introducing House amend-
ment to Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200, 124 CONG. REC.
H11,098 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). For a fuller discussion of wage earner proceedings,
see the concluding section of this article infra.
233. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(1) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
234. Id. § 524(d). Section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 preserved the liability
of guarantors notwithstanding the discharge of the primary obligor. Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 550 (as amended) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1976)). The
National Consumer Law Center had urged Congress that cosigners be allowed to dis-
charge their obligation to a creditor in connection with a bankruptcy of the primary
obligor unless the creditor could "demonstrate actual and reasonable reliance upon the
cosigner's ability to secure payments and the cosigner's knowing assumption of legal
obligation for the debt (or else the receipt of independent consideration for his signa-
ture) .... " House Hearings, supra note 8, at 943-44 (testimony of Ernest L. Sarason,
Jr., Staff Attorney, The National Consumer Law Center, Inc.).
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tion against the commencement or continuation of any action
or employment of any process to collect a dischargeable debt.2
Moreover, section 524(a)(2) of title 11 makes clear what was
not explicit in the language of section 14 of the Bankruptcy
Act: discharge operates as an injunction against any act, in-
cluding extra-judicial collection efforts, by which a creditor
seeks to collect debts. The discharge, then, continues in force
the injunctive relief first operative upon the filing of the peti-
tion by virtue of the automatic stay."'6
Section 524(a)(3) particularizes the impact of this injunc-
tion in community property states. Under California com-
munity property law, property of a debtor rather than the
debtor himself or herself, is liable for payment of a debt."' In
some cases, only the separate property of an individual debtor
may be liable for payment of a debt;"' in other cases, the com-
munity property or both the community and separate property
of a debtor or the debtor's spouse may be liable for payment of
a debt. 3 ' If the debtor and the debtor's spouse file a joint peti-
tion, the claims of creditors of both will be discharged to the
extent consistent with section 523. If only the husband or only
the wife files a petition for liquidation, the discharge received
by that debtor will obviously not affect the creditor whose
claim is assertable against separate property of the non-filing
spouse. However, where only one spouse files, the discharge
will, by virtue of section 524(a)(3), preclude any creditor hold-
ing a dischargeable claim which was assertable against com-
munity property of the debtor (even such a creditor who ex-
tended credit to the non-filing spouse) from seeking to enforce
that claim by resorting to any community property that is
acquired by the debtor or the debtor's spouse after the com-
mencement of the case.2"0 Since community property was oth-
235. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
236. The automatic stay, effective upon the filing of the petition, is described in
section 362. Id. § 362. With respect to liquidation, the automatic stay of section 362
codifies and expands the automatic stay provided under Rule 401 and Rule 601 of the
Bankruptcy Rules, effective under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Rules 401,
601, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1324, 1335 (1976).
237. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5116, 5120-5123 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979).
238. See, e.g., id. § 5121.
239. See, e.g., id. §§ 5116, 5122.
240. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(3) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) reads:
A discharge in a case under this title-(3) operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or any act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property
of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is
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erwise liable for payment of the debt, it is the community
property, in effect, as well as the individual debtor (and the
debtor's separate property) that is discharged from the obliga-
tion. Were the law otherwise, a discharge for a married debtor
not accompanied by the discharge for the debtor's spouse
would mean little other than protection of the debtor's separate
property.
Section 525 prohibits certain forms of discrimination by a
governmental unit against a debtor who has not paid a dis-
chargeable debt. 4' The language of this section codifies and
builds upon the holding of Perez v. Campbell."' In Perez the
United States Supreme Court invoked the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution to forbid a state from denying
reinstatement of a driver's license to a debtor whose bank-
ruptcy had discharged a debt attributable to the debtor's fault
in an automobile accident. Section 525 also appears to codify
the result of Handsome v. Rutgers"' which forbade a state
university from denying transcripts to a debtor whose bank-
ruptcy had discharged a student loan obligation. Section 525
does not expressly prohibit a private university from that same
conduct and does not expressly prohibit other forms of private
discrimination following discharge in bankruptcy, but the draf-
ters apparently intended that the language of the section not
limit courts in their determination of what types of discrimina-
tion are impermissible."
acquired after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowa-
ble community claim, except a community claim that is excepted from
discharge under section 523 or 1328(c)(1) of this title, or that would be
so excepted, . . . in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on
the date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the
debtor . ..
Property specified in section 541(a)(2) is certain community property, id. § 541(a)(2),
and a community claim is defined as a claim arising before the commencement of a
case concerning a debtor for which the property specified in section 541(a)(2) is liable,
id. § 101(6). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 80, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5866. The operation of section 524(a)(3) is qualified by section
524(b). 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(b) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
241. 11 U.S.C.A. § 525 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
242. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
243. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
244. SENATE REPORT supra note 114, at 81, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5867. Procedure for raising the issue of discrimination is to be explained
in the Bankruptcy Rules. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 297, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6254.
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Debts Excepted from Discharge
Like section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, section 523 of title
11245 excepts certain debts from discharge; the debtor's fresh
start does not terminate all responsibility of the debtor for past
conduct. The categories of debt for which the debtor remains
responsible even after discharge are generally the same as in
section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act: certain taxes; '46 debts in-
curred through use of a false financial statement or other types
of fraud; 4 ' debts owed to certain creditors not scheduled by the
debtor; '48 debts owed due to fraud while acting in a fiduciary
capacity; 4 ' alimony and child support; 50 debts for wilful or
malicious injury to the person or property of another;' fines
payable to a governmental unit; 5 ' certain educational loans; '3
and debts which were scheduled or could have been scheduled
in a prior bankruptcy in which the debtor waived or was denied
a discharge. '54 Debts in four of these categories are frequently
encountered in consumer insolvency counseling.
The false financial statement and other fraud. Section
523(a)(2) provides that a discharge under section 727 does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt:
for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, by -
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an
insider's financial condition; or
(B) use of a statement in writing -
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is
liable for obtaining such money, property, services, or
credit reasonably relied; and
245. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
246. Id. § 523(a)(1). Property of the debtor which is exempt under section 522
remains liable for such debts. Id. § 522(c)(1).
247. Id. § 523(a)(2).
248. Id. § 523(a)(3).
249. Id. § 523(a)(4).
250. Id. § 523(a)(5). Property of the debtor which is exempt under section 522
remains liable for such debts. Id. § 522(c)(1).
251. Id. § 523(a)(6).
252. Id. § 523(a)(7).
253. Id. § 523(a)(8).
254. Id. § 523(a)(9).
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(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published
with intent to deceive;255
This section, with some refinements, preserves the exception to
discharge stated in section 17a.(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. 56
Considerable debate in the legislative hearings preceding
enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act centered on the ex-
ception to discharge for debts incurred through use of a false
financial statement.25 Persons representing debtor interests
insisted that the allegation of the debtor's use of a false finan-
cial statement continued, even after the 1970 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act, 58 to be used unfairly by creditors (most
frequently personal property brokers) to leverage reaffirmation
of debts after bankruptcy. 51 Persons representing creditors ins-
isted that the false financial statement exception to discharge
was not abused by creditors and that the financial statement
255. Id. § 523(a)(2).
256. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. 550 (as amended)
(formerly 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976)).
257. Compare House Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 801-03 with id. at 899.
258. Section 17a.(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended in 1970, Act of
Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990. The primary purpose of the amendment
was to "effectuate, more fully, the discharge in bankruptcy by rendering it less subject
to abuse by harassing creditors." H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. .1, reprinted
in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4156. Prior to the amendment, creditors were
permitted to sue in state court after a discharge in bankruptcy was granted, asserting
nondischargeability on grounds enumerated in section 17a. Often the debtor would not
appear in the state court action either because of misplaced reliance on the discharge,
inability to retain an attorney because of lack of funds, or because he or she was not
properly served with process. As a result, a default judgment would be entered against
the nonappearing debtor, again subjecting his or her wages or property to garnishment
or levy of execution. "All this results because the discharge is an affirmative defense
which if not pleaded, is waived." Id.
Most commonly, the state court action was initiated by a creditor claiming that
a debt owed was nondischargeable because of a false financial statement of the debtor.
To curb this sharp practice, the 1970 amendments to section 17 required determina-
tions of dischargeability concerning certain debts, including debts allegedly incurred
in reliance upon a false financial statement, to occur exclusively in bankruptcy court
within prescribed 'time limits. Absent timely application by an affected creditor, the
debt was discharged and further creditor action was barred. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-467, §§ 2, 3, 84 Stat. 990, 991. See Countryman, The New Dischargeability
Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1971); Shuchman, The Fraud Exception in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REV. 735, 765-69 (1971). For a case history and reproduction
of documents in connection with a creditor's application for determination of dischar-
geability under the 1970 amendments see In Re Hill, Bankr. No. 28,738 (E. Tenn.
1971), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 981-1005. For statistics
concerning applications for determination of dischargeability under the 1970 amend-
ments see id. at 924, 942.
259. See, e.g., In Re Hill, Bankr. No. 28, 738 (E. Tenn. 1971), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 873.
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obtained from debtors prior to the extension of credit was a
meaningful input to the decision of the creditor to extend or
deny credit. ' Congress responded to the debate by codifying
in section 523(a)(2) the law stated in and developed under
section 17a.(2) (materiality, reasonable reliance and intent to
deceive)26' and by seeking to discourage baseless assertions of
exception to discharge under section 523(a)(2) through a grant
of authority to the bankruptcy court to award costs and reason-
able attorney's fees to a debtor in the event that a debtor pre-
vails in a hearing to determine dischargeability under section
523(a)(2) .22
The creditor seeking to except a debt from discharge on the
basis of an alleged false financial statement will thus continue
to bear a heavy burden of proof and may well be deterred from
trying by the prospect of having to pay costs and attorney's
fees. Increased sophistication in credit reporting will make it
difficult for the creditor to base a claim of reasonable reliance
upon a false financial statement if alternative sources of credit
verification are easily accessible. Moreover, if the debtor can
establish that the creditor encouraged the debtor to be some-
what carefree in the preparation of a financial statement, it
would be impossible for the creditor to establish either the
debtor's intent to deceive or the creditor's reasonable reliance.
As under section 17c of the Bankruptcy Act, the creditor
seeking to except from discharge a debt allegedly incurred on
the basis of a false financial statement must seek a determina-
tion of dischargeability in the bankruptcy court and may not
litigate the matter in state court. ' Title 11, unlike the Bank-
ruptcy Act, leaves to the Bankruptcy Rules specification of the
limited time period in which this request for determination
must be made.2 "
260. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 899-900.
261. See, e.g., Palter v. Lake Sales, Inc., 435 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1970) (where there
were reasonable grounds for believing creditor relied on false financial statement,
burden of proof shifted to bankrupt to show lack of reliance by creditor); Rogers v.
Gardner, 226 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1955) (elements for precluding discharge of debt in-
curred on basis of false financial statement).
262. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979); HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 114, at 129-31, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6090-92. Proce-
dure for the awarding of costs and attorney's fees is left to the Bankruptcy Rules. Id.
at 297, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6254.
263. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
264. Section 17(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that "a creditor who con-
tends that his debt is not discharged under [§ 17a.(2)] must file an application for a
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Section 17a.(2) of the Bankruptcy Act also excepted from
discharge any debt obtained by other false pretenses or false
representations, and section 523(a)(2) expands the former law
to also except from discharge any debt obtained by other kinds
of fraud. Section 523(a)(2) also adds that a debt for obtaining
services, as well as a debt for obtaining money or property,
shall be excepted from discharge if obtained by false pretenses,
false representations, fraud, or false financial statement.
Finally, section 523(a)(2) explicitly states that a debt aris-
ing from renewal or refinancing of a previously existing debt
shall not be excepted from discharge if obtained through fraud
of the kinds listed. The language concerning refinancing and
renewal was intended to codify certain case law"65 under which
refinanced debt will be excepted from discharge only to the
extent of fresh money advanced if the debt were refinanced
pursuant to state law requiring that a creditor refinance exist-
ing credit even if there has been no default, but the entire debt
will be excepted from discharge if the creditor is refinancing the
debt in lieu of pursuing otherwise available remedies for the
debtor's default. 6' The statutory language itself does not com-
determination of dischargeability within the time fixed by the court pursuant to [§
14b(1)] . . . and, unless an application is timely filed, the debt shall be discharged."
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (as amended to § 17c(2)) (formerly
11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(2) (1976)). Section 14b(1) provided that the court issue an order
fixing a time for filing objections to the bankrupt's discharge and for filing a § 17c(2)
application "which time or times shall be not less than thirty days nor more than
ninety days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors." Id. § 14 (as
amended to § 14b(i)) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 32(b)(1) (1976)). The new Bankruptcy
Rules will detail timing and procedure for a hearing to determine dischargeability of a
debt. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 297, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6254.
265. In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to refinance
existing credit on which there has been no default. If the creditor does
not forfeit remedies or otherwise rely to his detriment on a false financial
statement with respect to existing credit, than an extension, renewal or
refinancing of such credit is non-dischargeable only to the extent of the
new money advanced; on the other hand, if an existing loan is in default
or the creditor otherwise reasonably relies to his detriment on a false
financial statement with regard to an existing loan, then the entire debt
is non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B). This codifies the reason-
ing expressed by the second circuit in In Re Danns, 558 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1977).
124 CONG. REC. S17,412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Senator De Concini, D.
Ariz.); 124 CONG. REC. H11,096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards,
D. Cal.).
266. In Re Danns, 558 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1977). See In re Peterson, 437 F.
Supp. 1068, 1070 (D. Minn. 1977); In re Ellis, 400 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
In re McNee, 390 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Fuhrman, 385 F. Supp.
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mand that result, however, and the question will no doubt be
the subject of litigation.
Alimony and child support. Alimony and child support
remain excepted from discharge unless the debt has been as-
signed." 7 It is sometimes difficult, of course, to decide whether
a debtor's obligations arising from a dissolution of marriage are
properly classifiable as alimony or child support or as property
settlement. For example, a debtor will often be obligated by the
terms of a property settlement agreement in a dissolution to
pay certain debts incurred during marriage. This obligation to
a former spouse may be in the nature of property settlement
or, alternatively, it may be in the nature of indirect alimony,
reducing the amount of alimony that the debtor might other-
wise have been required to pay under the terms of the settle-
ment agreement. Title 11 continues to leave interpretation of
settlement agreements to case by case determination.5 8
If the question is not free from doubt in a particular case,
there might be advantage to the debtor in seeking a determina-
tion on the issue in the bankruptcy court. 6 Otherwise, the
1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Schuerman, 367 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (E.D. Ky. 1973);
Townsend, "Fresh Cash" - Another Element of a Bankrupt's "Fresh Start"?, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 275, 281-86 (1977) (discussing "fresh cash" limitation in cases under
section 17a.(2)). As noted in Danns: "Since Congress gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over dischargeability questions in 1970 . . . a large majority of federal
district courts and bankruptcy referees have concluded that only that portion of the
credit obtained as a result of a fraudulent statement should be barred from discharge."
558 F.2d at 115-16.
267. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979); Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (as amended to § 17a(7)) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7)
(1976)). Section 127(b) of the Technical Amendments Act, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. S2736-37 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1979), pro-
poses to amend the language of section 523(a)(5) such that debts for child support
shall be excepted from discharge where assigned to a state in connection with aid to
families with dependent children.
268. See generally In re Birdseye, 548 F.2d 321, 322-25 (10th Cir. 1977) (award
of attorney's fees in divorce proceedings was in nature of alimony and support, rather
than property settlement, and hence was a nondischargeable debt in subsequent bank-
ruptcy proceeding initiated by debtor husband); In re Cox, 543 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir.
1977) (under state law, alimony judgment in lump sum payable in monthly install-
ments pertains to division of property and was discharged in bankruptcy); Jones v.
Tyson, 518 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1975) (property settlements are not in nature of alimony
under California law and are dischargeable in bankruptcy).
269. Section 17c(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 authorized the bankrupt to
file an application with the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of any
debt. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (as amended to § 17c(1))
(formerly 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(1) (1976)). That explicit authority was not carried forward
to section 523 of title 11 because the same power is implicit in the broader grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(n) (West Supp. 1979)
1979] INSOLVENCY COUNSELING 891
debtor may find himself or herself the defendant in a cross-
complaint filed by his or her former spouse in an action initi-
ated by the unpaid creditor,270 or the debtor may be named
respondent in an order issued by the superior court with con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the dissolution to show cause why he
or she should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with
the terms of a marital property settlement agreement or decree
of dissolution.27' Of course, this problem could be avoided if the
debtor succeeds in convincing his or her former spouse to also
file a petition, in which case the obligations of both persons
would be discharged (if the debts are otherwise dischargeable
under section 523) and further creditor action would be barred.
Wilful or malicious injury to property or person. Section
523(a)(6) restates in one section the exception to discharge
found in sections 17a.(2) (wilful and malicious conversion of'
the property of another) and 17a.(8) (wilful and malicious inju-
ries to the person or property of another, other than conversion)
of the Bankruptcy Act. Jurisdiction to determine dischargea-
bility of a debt conceivably falling within the ambit of section
523(a)(6) rests exclusively with the bankruptcy court and a
request for hearing by the interested creditor will need to be
made within time limits to be fashioned by the Bankruptcy
Rules. 72
(added by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2668).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 77, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5862-63.
270. In this scenario, the debtor receives a discharge in bankruptcy and refuses
further payment to creditors who were to be paid by the debtor under the terms of the
property settlement agreement or decree of dissolution. The creditor then sues the non-
debtor former spouse whose share of the community property, and in some instances
separate property, would be liable for the debt. The non-debtor former spouse then
cross-complains against the debtor. At this point the debtor could interpose the de-
fense of discharge to the cross-complaint and litigate that issue in state court or seek
determination of the dischargeability of the debt in the bankruptcy court. See note 269
supra. If the bankruptcy case has been closed, the case may be reopened for this
purpose under section 350 of title 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 350 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
271. In this scenario, the debtor receives a discharge in bankruptcy and refuses
further payment to creditors who were to be paid by the debtor under the terms of the
property settlement agreement or decree of dissolution. The creditor then sues or
threatens to sue the non-debtor former spouse. That spouse then seeks relief from the
superior court having jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings. CAL. CIv. CODE §
4380 (West Supp. 1979) (enforcement of court orders, judgments and decrees pursuant
to Family Law Act); see Severdia v. Alamo, 41 Cal. App. 3d 881, 116 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1974); Sheldon v. Superior Ct., 257 Cal. App. 2d 541, 65 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1967). In
response to the order to show cause the debtor would have the same options as those
available for response to a cross-complaint. See note 270 supra.
272. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). See also note 264 and ac-
companying text supra.
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There are two fairly common instances in which the issue
of dischargeability under section 523(a)(6) issue will be pre-
sented. Often, a debtor seeking counseling will have incurred
liability for injury to person or property resulting from an acci-
dent in which the debtor was driving while intoxicated. Courts
must decide whether the debtor's action was wilful and mali-
cious. Courts applying the language of section 17a.(2) have
reached differing results, no doubt influenced by the particular
facts in each case.113 The language of section 523(a)(6) of title
11 provides no further guidance for resolution of the issue. Lan-
guage in the House Report 7' indicates that choice of the word
"wilful" (the same language employed by section 17a.(8) of the
Bankruptcy Act) is intended to overrule Tinker v. Colwell"'
which had held that mere "reckless disregard" was conduct
sufficiently culpable to except a resulting debt from discharge.
To the extent that this guidance in the legislative history is
followed, and wilful is found to mean wilful, there may be fewer
cases than at present in which debts arising from injuries in-
flicted by virtue of drunk driving will be nondischargeable.
The insolvency counselor may also discover that the client
has disposed of personal household belongings which consti-
tuted collateral for a secured loan, such as a loan from a per-
sonal property broker. In many instances the lien of the secu-
rity interest will be avoided and the creditor will have no basis
for a claim of conversion. 76 Even if the lien is not avoided, it
will frequently be difficult for the creditor to prove that disposi-
tion of the collateral was wilful and malicious; in many if not
most cases the debtor disposes of personal household belong-
ings simply because they no longer have any value. Moreover,
there is little sense, because there is no damage, to a creditor
asserting a claim for conversion of a refrigerator that will no
longer freeze or a couch that is in shreds. Further, any debt for
wilful and malicious conversion will be discharged unless the
creditor seeks a determination of dischargeability in the bank-
273. Compare In re Smith, 161 F. Supp. 896, 897 (W.D.N.Y. 1956) (default
judgment based on operation of motor vehicle while debtor intoxicated based on
"willful and malicious misconduct" and nondischargeable in bankruptcy) with Dillard
v. Dillard, 244 Or. 597, 418 P.2d 839, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 983 (1966) (mere fact that
one injures another while driving intoxicated does not necessarily establish debtor's
conduct was "willful and malicious" within meaning of § 17a(8)).
274. HousE REPORT, supra note 114, at 365, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6320.
275. 193 U.S. 473 (1902).
276. See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
892 [Vol. 19
1979] INSOL VENCY COUNSELING
ruptcy court within specified time limits." ' Timely action by
creditors is unlikely because they often fail to inquire about the
location or condition of the collateral until after the time
limit has expired.
Educational loans. The recent history of dischargeability
of educational loans is bizarre, largely because of the continu-
ing controversy about the fairness of singling out educational
loans for exception from discharge.7 8 Prior to October 1, 1977,
educational loans were dischargeable.7 9 Between October 1,
1977 and November 6, 1978, federally insured educational
loans280 were excepted from discharge unless the loan first be-
came due more than five years prior to the receipt of discharge
in a pending bankruptcy or unless the debtor could demon-
strate that repayment would constitute undue hardship to the
debtor or the debtor's family. 8 ' During that same period, with
277. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). See also note 264 and ac-
companying text supra.
278. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 1065-1140; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
114, at 132-64, 536-38, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 6093-6125,
6423-25.
The rate of educational loans discharged in bankruptcy has risen dramat-
ically in recent years. However, the rise appears not to be dispropor-
tionate to the rise in the amount of loans becoming due or to the default
rate generally on educational loans. The rise has been slightly higher than
the rise in the bankruptcy rate overall. The sentiment for an exception
to discharge for educational [loans] does not derive solely from the in-
crease in the number of bankruptcies. Instead, a few serious abuses of the
bankruptcy laws by debtors with large amounts of educational loans, few
other debts, and well-paying jobs, who have filed bankruptcy shortly
after leaving school and before any loans became due, have generated the
movement for an exception to discharge.
Id. at 133, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6094.
279. September 30, 1977 was the postponed effective date of a provision to except
federally insured educational loans from discharge. Higher Education Act of 1965, §
439A, 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976) (added by Education Amendments Act of' 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2141) (originally effective Oct. 1, 1976).
280. The federally insured student loan program was created in the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1976, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1089 (1976). In contrast to other educational
loans, under this program the government guarantees an educational loan made by a
private institutional lender and, in the event of default by the debtor, the government
is subrogated to or is assigned the rights of the private lender. Id. § 1078-1 (insurance
program); id. § 1080 (default and subrogation provisions).
281. Id. § 1087-3 (1976). See Wisconsin Higher Educ. Bd. v. MacPherson, 4
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 950 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (court may consider whether partial amount of
loan dischargeable or whether payment by deferred installments within debtor's means
in determining "undue hardship"); Hayman v. Wilmington Trust Co. & United Stu-
dent Aid Fund, Inc., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 932 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (court's discretion not
intended to be exercised to permit discharge where debtor's hardship self-imposed by
living beyond his means); New York State Higher Educ. Services Corp. v. Moore, 4
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some exceptions, all other educational loans remained dis-
chargeable. 2 '
From November 6, 1978 (the enactment date of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act) until October 1, 1979 (the effective date of
title 11), all educational loans again were discharageable, ' 3
possibly because of legislative oversight.2 4 Effective October 1,
1979, however, all educational loans repayable to a governmen-
tal unit or nonprofit institution of higher education are ex-
cepted from discharge unless the loan first became due more
than five years prior to the filing of the petition or unless repay-
ment of the loan would constitute an undue hardship for the
debtor and debtor's dependents." 5
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 432 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (court considers present and future income and
expenses in determining "undue hardship"); Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency v. Glover, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (seeing no prospect of bank-
rupt's ability to pay loan out of future income, loan is discharged); Ohio v. Kirsch, 4
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 680 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (strict construction of "undue hardship").
282. Compare State v. Wilkes, 41 N.Y.2d 655, 363 N.E.2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d 849
(1977) (National Direct Student Loan not dischargeable because too contingent to be
"provable" claim under Bankruptcy Act § 63) with Oregon v. Mwongozi, 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 120 (D. Or. 1978) (National Direct Student Loan provable and hence dischargea-
ble).
283. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 317, 92 Stat. 2678
provides: "Section 439A of part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1087-3) is repealed." Id. § 402(d) provides that § 317 is effective "on the date
of enactment of this Act." The effective date of repeal, then, was November 6, 1978.
Under the terms of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, id. § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682, § 533(a)(8)
(excepting educational loans from discharge) took effect October 1, 1979. Thus, in
cases filed between the repeal of 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 and the effective date of §
523(a)(8), from November 6,1978 to October 1, 1979, student loans were dischargeable.
Contra Wisconsin Higher Educ. Aids Bd. v. Edson, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1191 (D. Nev.
Jan. 22, 1979) (dictum). See author's Addendum infra.
284. The Technical Amendments Act, S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S2736 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1979), and H.R. 2807, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979) each proposed, in slightly different fashion, to shorten the apparently
inadvertent gap between November 6, 1978 and October 1, 1979 during which educa-
tional loans were again dischargeable (see note 283 supra) by reinstating the exception
to discharge for educational loans. See author's Addendum infra.
285. The first condition of dischargeability (expiration of five years) is slightly
different from the comparable condition stated in former 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3. Unlike
section 1087-3, the five year period under section 523(a)(8) runs from the time the
obligation first became due until the time of the filing of the petition, not to the time
of receipt of discharge. This change precludes a debtor from filing a petition prior to
the expiration of the five year period but hoping to delay the discharge until after the
five year period. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). Determination of
undue hardship under section 523(a)(8) will no doubt be influenced by cases confront-
ing the same issue under previous law. See note 281 supra.
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The discharge hearing
In most cases under the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor
needed to travel to court only once, there to attend the first
meeting of creditors.28 Section 524(d) of title 11 may require a
second trip, to attend the discharge hearing. At this hearing the
bankruptcy court will inform the debtor that a discharge has
been granted or why a discharge has been denied. In addition,
the court will evaluate and then either approve or disapprove
any agreement of the debtor to reaffirm a pre-petition debt as
well as explain to the debtor his or her rights concerning reaffir-
mation.
There appear to be two basic purposes for this hearing: To
help enforce the new law's restrictions upon reaffirmation2 '
and to impress upon the debtor the meaning of the discharge
and the solemnity of the bankruptcy proceedings. This latter
purpose is no longer served, if it ever was, by the first meeting
of creditors because title 11 prohibits the solemnizer, the bank-
ruptcy judge, from attending that meeting.88 In cases in which
the debtor has decided or has been induced to reaffirm an
otherwise dischargeable debt and in cases where the debtor
seeks court approval for the redemption of property from a
lien,' 8 the discharge hearing seems a useful procedure. In other
cases, however, particularly where the debtor is advised by
competent counsel, the discharge hearing seems unnecessary.
There is little solemnity or information that the judge can pro-
vide that could not be provided by counsel, especially if the
bankruptcy judge advises debtors in the same fashion as many
judges in criminal arraignments advise amassed defendants of
their constitutional rights.
In addition, the requirement to attend this hearing will
prove very inconvenient to the many debtors who wish to relo-
cate their residence as soon as possible after filing the petition,
unless the hearing is scheduled immediately following the first
meeting of creditors. Often an insolvent debtor wishes the
286. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 7a(1), 30 Stat. 548 (as amended) (for-
merly 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1976)). Additional trips were necessary in some cases, such
as a case in which a creditor sought a hearing on the dischargeability of a debt.
287. See text accompanying notes 291-303 infra.
288. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). The Bankruptcy Rules will
specifiy the procedure for examination of the debtor at the first meeting of creditors.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 294, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6251.
289. See text accompanying notes 295-98 infra.
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freshness of new environs as well as the fresh start offered by
bankruptcy. Finally, the requirement to attend this hearing
may boost attorney's fees charged for representation in the
case
. 90
In considering the grounds for denial of discharge and the
kinds of debts which will be excepted from discharge, one finds
only a partial answer to the client's inquiry about the impact
of bankruptcy upon the client's debts. The remainder of the
answer comes with a consideration of reaffirmation of debt and
redemption of collateral subject to a lien.
Reaffirmations and Redemptions
The congressional hearings preceding the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act document the standard post-petition
practice of creditors, particularly secured creditors, pressuring
debtors to reaffirm debts which will be or have been discharged
in the bankruptcy.29' The secured creditor's leverage for reaffir-
mation derives from the threat to repossess collateral, usually
household furnishings or an automobile, which is almost al-
ways more valuable to the debtor than to the creditor because
the replacement cost but not the resale value of such collateral
is high. Consumer debtors also reaffirm debts to unsecured
creditors where compelled by some special bond of obligation,
filial or otherwise. Thus, consumer debtors will frequently reaf-
firm debts owed relatives, or physicians, or credit unions affili-
ated with their employer, or creditors whose debts are guaran-
teed by a friend or relative of the bankrupt who has not filed
and does not contemplate filing bankruptcy. Of course, the
greater amount of debt reaffirmed, the less valuable the bank-
ruptcy, particularly because the right to a discharge in bank-
ruptcy arises only once every six years. 9'
Congress has restricted the potential for post-petition reaf-
firmation in several ways. As discussed previously, the debtor
has been granted the power to avoid non-purchase money non-
possessory security interests in certain otherwise exempt prop-
erty. 9' Personal property brokers are the most frequent holders
290. Attorney's fees for straight bankruptcy generally range between $200 and
$350 in Santa Clara County. These fees are generally quoted as covering the client
interview, preparation and filing of the petition and accompanying schedules, and
attendance with the client at the first meeting of creditors.
291. House Hearings, supra note 8, at 761-62, 874-75, 943, 946.
292. See note 230 and accompanying text supra.
293. See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra.
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of such security interests and are among the most assertive in
using the existence of the security interest to leverage reaffir-
mation. 9 Where such security interests are avoided, the lever-
age is eliminated.
Section 722 of title 11 also undercuts the leverage of other
secured creditors seeking reaffirmation. Under section 722, any
holder of an allowed secured claim must permit the debtor to
redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for per-
sonal, family or household purposes from the lien of the secu-
rity interest where the lien secured a dischargeable consumer
debt and where the property involved is exempt under section
522 or has been abandoned under section 554.115 This section
will of course be superfluous in those cases in which the lien is
avoided, such as under section 522(f), but will be of enormous
value to consumer debtors who wish to retain personal property
subject to a lien which cannot be avoided. This right of re-
demption will no doubt most frequently be used to redeem
automobiles from purchase money security interests. Automo-
bile secured lenders have heretofore frequently insisted upon
reaffirmation of the entire amount of a secured debt as the only
alternative to repossession, even if the debt were undersecured
at the time the petition was filed.29
Under section 722, the creditor must allow the debtor to
redeem the collateral by paying the creditor the amount of the
creditor's allowed secured claim."9 7 If the debtor can afford this
redemption, the debtor may retain the collateral without com-
mitting to repay what often may be the substantially larger
sum of the outstanding debt which will be or has been dis-
294. See note 182 and accompanying text supra.
295. 11 U.S.C.A. § 722 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
296. For example, a bank which held the pink slip to an automobile worth $1,000
to secure a debt of $2,000 often would insist upon reaffirmation of the entire debt rather
than accept $1,000 in settlement of the bank's interest in the automobile. This practice
of automobile secured lenders contrasts sharply with the practice of personal property
brokers who have almost always been willing to accept payment of the fair market
value of household goods in settlement of their security interest in those items. See
note 184 supra.
297. The amount of the allowed secured claim is equivalent to the value of' the
secured party's interest in the estate's interest in the property, 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)
(West Spec. Pamp. 1979), which will be the value of the collateral or the amount of
the creditor's claim, whichever is less. That value is to be determined "in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use. ... Id. The hearing will
be the discharge hearing. Id. § 524(c)(4)(B)(ii). The Bankruptcy Rules will provide for
the method of valuation. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 299, reprinted in [19781
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6256.
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charged. The statute does not state whether this right of re-
demption includes the right of the debtor to demand, or the
right of the creditor to allow, a redemption by installment pay-
ments.'2"
Section 524(c) of title 11 is the remaining hurdle to post-
petition reaffirmation. That section provides as follows:
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the
debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is
based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this
title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived, only if -
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of'
the discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this
title;
(2) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement
within 30 days after such agreement becomes en-
forceable;
(3) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section
have been complied with; and
(4) in a case concerning an individual, to the extent
that such debt is a consumer debt that is not secured
by real property of the debtor, the court approves
such agreement as -
(A) (i) not imposing an undue hardship on
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor; or
(B) (i) entered into in good faith; and
(ii) in settlement of litigation under
section 523 of this title, or providing for re-
demption under section 722 of this title."'9
Subsection 524(d), to which section 524(c)(3) refers, requires
the bankruptcy court to hold a hearing at which the debtor
shall be informed concerning his or her discharge and also in-
formed about his or her rights concerning and the effect of a
reaffirmation of a dischargeable debt.10a
298. Surely the creditor ought to be able to permit payment in installments; it
is not nearly so clear that the debtor ought to be able to insist upon repayment in
installments. The Bankruptcy Rules may treat this issue. HousE REPORT, supra note
114, at 299, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6256. The National
Consumer Law Center, Inc., urged a provision allowing a debtor to insist upon install-
ment redemption. House Hearings, supra note 8, at 941 (testimony of Ernest L. Sara-
son, Jr., Staff Attorney).
299. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
300. See text accompanying notes 286-87 supra.
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These restrictions upon reaffirmation are fairly severe, re-
flecting the congressional conclusion that the practice is much
abused and substantially undercuts the fresh start intended by
bankruptcy law. Indeed, one is somewhat hard pressed to im-
agine many debts, other than those which are to be approved
under the separate standards of section 524(c)(4)(B), "'I the
reaffirmation of which will be in the best interest of the debtor.
A debt to a family physician may be one such debt because the
best interest of the debtor and his or her family may be served
by retaining the good will and hence the services of the physi-
cian. A debt owed to a credit union affiliated with the debtor's
employer, with whom the debtor wishes to maintain cordial
working relations, may be another debt the reaffirmation of
which may serve the best interest of the debtor. There will
probably be others in the specific circumstances of an individ-
ual case, but the bankruptcy courts are unlikely to lightly ap-
prove reaffirmation agreements in view of the evident congres-
sional intent to curb the practice.
Any reaffirmation agreement is enforceable, in any event,
only to the "extent enforceable under applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law."3 °0 Thus, section 524(c) incorporates the provision
of California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Law concerning
reaffirmation of debts discharged in bankruptcy. Under section
1788.14(a) of the California Civil Code, 303 a creditor may not
seek a reaffirmation of a discharged debt without clearly and
conspicuously disclosing to the debtor in writing at the time
the reaffirmation is sought that the debtor is not legally obli-
gated to reaffirm. Creditors who seek reaffirmation in Califor-
nia will therefore need to include this written disclosure in
their post-petition collection practices and debtors will be thus
given additional protection against the pressure to reaffirm.
It should be noted, in closing, that nothing in title 11 pre-
cludes a debtor from making such voluntary payments on debts
which have been discharged in bankruptcy as the debtor is able
and wishes to make.
To facilitate a client's choice of action for relief from the
distress of insolvency, it is crucial for the attorney to under-
stand and be able to cogently explain rights afforded debtors
by title 11. For the alternative of liquidation and discharge,
301. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c)(4)(B) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
302. Id. § 524(c).
303. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1788.14(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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title 11 provides significant new measures of debtor protection,
including more generous and more flexible exemptions for a
post-petition fresh start and greater constraints on post-
petition reaffirmation of debt. Liquidation and discharge are,
of course, but one form of debtor relief afforded by bankruptcy
law. Bankruptcy law also affords the important alternative of
court supervised adjustment of debts by way of extension or
composition.
ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS OF A PERSON WITH REGULAR INCOME
In 1938, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to include
Chapter XIII, entitled Wage Earners' Plans.' 4 The provisions
of Chapter XIII permitted certain debtors to propose and im-
plement a plan, under the supervision and protection of the
bankruptcy court, under which the debtor could pay from fu-
ture earnings all or a portion of his or her debts over a period
of time not to exceed three years.35 The purpose of Chapter
XIII was to allow debtors who wished to pay all or a portion of
their debts or who wished to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy
to do so, free of wage garnishments or other collection efforts
by which some creditors might frustrate the debtor's efforts to
pay all creditors in installments and which might drive the
debtor to an undesired bankruptcy.3°0 Of course Chapter XIII
304. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 930 (adding §§ 601-686 to the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1976)). For a discussion of Chap-
ter XIII proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, see D. GILL, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY AND
WAGE EARNER PLANS (C.E.B. 1971); Bare, New Rules in Straight and Chapter Xl1
Bankruptcies, 41 TENN. L. REV. 567 (1974); Note, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Petitions
Under the New Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 554 (1974).
305. Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act did not specifically limit the payment
plan to three years but many courts declined to confirm plans with a longer payment
period, perhaps relying on the language of section 661 of the Bankruptcy Act. Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 661, added by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat.
936 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976)). Section 1322(c) of title 11 permits courts to
confirm plans providing for payments over a period of not to exceed five years. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1322(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
306. U.S. Arr'y GEN., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 65, 72nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1932).
Our inquiry has led us to the following conclusions:
(1) That most wage earners who fall into debt desire to pay their debts
in full and wish to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy; (2) that they are
driven into bankruptcy chiefly by garnishment and other attachments,
even in the midst of an effort to pay in installments; (3) that at least a
third of the wage earners who are forced into bankruptcy and released
from their debts could, if given time and protection, pay their creditors
in full; (4) that if the law offered such relief without stigma, a larger
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relief was only available to the debtor whose anticipated future
earnings were sufficient to make payments called for by the
proposed plan in addition to payment of daily living expenses
during administration of the plan. Moreover, Chapter XIII re-
lief was unnecessary where the debtor could negotiate and im-
plement a payment plan with the voluntary consent of credi-
tors.307
Given the differences between Chapter XIII and the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act governing liquidation and dis-
charge, there were additional reasons why a debtor might have
chosen the relief afforded by Chapter XIII. First, a debtor could
preserve existing or anticipated assets that would not be ex-
empt in a liquidation and that the debtor was unwilling or
unable to convert to exempt property. In a wage earners' pro-
ceeding, the debtor was entitled to keep his or her property
because future earnings, not proceeds from the liquidation of
the debtor's property, were to be used to pay creditors."" Sec-
number of wage earners, who now resort to loan companies in an effort
to stave off creditors and gradually get into debt beyond their capacity
to pay, would find a means of relief at a comparatively early stage of
indebtedness ....
Id.
307. In many areas of the country, consumer credit counseling services will assist
a debtor in arranging a payment plan by contacting the debtor's creditors and obtain-
ing their consent to a payment plan. Typically, the counseling service will charge a
small fee to cover expenses, usually less than fees which would be paid to a trustee
under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1302(e) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) (fees collected
by trustee). A consumer debtor utilizing such a service would also be able to avoid
incurring attorney's fees for a Chapter 13. The Consumer Credit Counselors of Santa
Clara County will decline to assist any individual whose income is insufficient to
implement a payment plan.
308. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 646(4), added by Chandler Act of 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 934 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4) (1976)) required that a plan
under Chapter XIII "include provisions for the submission of future earnings or wages
of the debtor to the supervision and control of the court for the purpose of enforcing
the plan. ... This requirement is carried forward in Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.A. §
1322(a)(1) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). In addition, the debtor may but need not provide
for payment from property of the estate (property of the debtor as of the filing of the
petition, id. § 541(a)) or other property of the debtor (property, including but not
limited to earnings, acquired by the debtor after the filing of a petition, other than
property described in section 541(a)(5)). Id. § 1322(b)(8). Except as provided in a
confirmed plan or in an order confirming a plan, the debtor remains in possession of
property of the estate and is vested with all property of the estate free and clear of the
claim or interest of any creditor provided for in the plan. Id. §§ 1306(b), 1327(b),(c).
The rule of section 1306(b) takes precedence over the rule of section 521(3) which
requires the debtor to surrender possession of property of the estate to the trustee. Id.
§ 521(3).
Rule 13-403, superceding section 637 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, nevertheless
required that the debtor claim exemptions in the Chapter XIII statement filed with
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ond, a debtor could provide in the payment plan for the pay-
ment of creditors whose debts would not be dischargeable in a
liquidation, such as arrearages in alimony and child support."9
Third, a debtor was allowed the protection of the bankruptcy
court during payment under an extension plan even though the
debtor had been granted discharge in a liquidation proceeding
commenced within the preceding six years. While section 14 of
the Bankruptcy Act precluded discharge in a liquidation too
closely following a preceding liquidation, it did not bar confir-
mation of an extension plan proposed closely following a liqui-
dation proceeding.310 Fourth, a debtor might re-establish a fa-
vorable credit rating. Some creditors were more willing to ex-
tend credit to a debtor who had completed payments under a
wage earners' plan than to a debtor who had discharged debts
in a liquidation."' Fifth, a debtor could provide in the plan for
payment of certain claims which could arise subsequent to the
filing of the petition for relief,"' whereas in a liquidation only
those dischargeable debts existing at the date of the filing of'
the petition are discharged. Sixth, a debtor could forestall re-
the petition in anticipation of the possibility that the case could be converted to a
liquidation. Bankruptcy Rule 13-403, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1549 (1976). Section 522(i) of
title 11 requires that a debtor file a list of property claimed as exempt and this require-
ment applies to cases under Chapter 13 because the provisions of Chapter 5 apply to
cases under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 103(a), 522(1) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). In a
case under Chapter 13, the listing of property claimed as exempt will serve the addi-
tional function of enabling the court and interested parties to determine whether
payments to unsecured creditors under the plan are not less than amounts that would
have been available for distribution to creditors had the debtor sought liquidation
under Chapter 7. See text accompanying notes 335-36 infra.
309. In re Willett, 265 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
310. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399 (1966). The ability to pro-
pose an extension closely following discharge in a preceding liquidation was especially
important for those many debtors who experienced financial distress after their earlier
discharge. Under title 11, apparently, a debtor may be granted a Chapter 13 discharge
closely following a prior liquidation discharge whether the Chapter 13 plan is an exten-
sion or a composition. See note 340 and accompanying text infra. However, some
composition plans proposed shortly following discharge in a liquidation may not be
confirmed. See text preceding note 348 infra.
One should distinguish between the case in which Chapter 13 relief is sought
subsequent to relief under Chapter 7 (or relief under the liquidation provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act) from the case in which Chapter 7 relief is sought subsequent to relief
under Chapter 13 (or relief under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act). Issues relating
to the first case are discussed in the preceding paragraph of this note. Issues relating
to the second case are discussed in notes 230-32 and accompanying text supra.
311. See also note 113 supra.
312. See Bankruptcy Rule 13-305, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1543 (1976). The effect of'




possession or foreclosure in secured transactions and thus gain
time to cure defaults where the debtor did not otherwise wish
to seek the relief of liquidation. 3 '
Despite these signifiant advantages of Chapter XIII, the
number of Chapter XIII cases filed in some parts of the country
was dramatically different from the number of such cases filed
in other parts of the country."1 4 These differences could be ex-
plained partially by the differing attitudes of debtors, credi-
tors, and judges in the community of the debtor's residence,
partially by the differing attitudes and expertise of attorneys
who render insolvency counseling services in the debtor's com-
munity, and partially by the limitations of Chapter XII."'
Chapter 13 of title 11 preserves all of the advantages of
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act described above 331' and
introduces dramatic changes, some perhaps unintended. Some
of these changes appear to provide startling new powers for the
debtor, powers which would enable the debtor to achieve far
more than was originally intended by Congress in its 1938 en-
actment of Chapter XIII. 311 In fact, under possible interpreta-
tions of Chapter 13, one might claim that there no longer is any
good reason for a debtor to seek the relief of liquidation and
discharge! If these possible interpretations are accepted by
bankruptcy judges and are not precluded by congressional
amendment to Chapter 13, the rise in the number of Chapter
13 filings throughout the country may be dramatic.31 1
313. See Bankruptcy Rule 13-401, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1547 (1976). The effect of
Rule 13-401 is carried forward in section 362 of title 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West Spec.
Pamp. 1979). See also text accompanying note 359 infra.
314. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1975); McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan in
Practice, 15 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1961).
315. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 117, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6077-78; SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 12-13, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5798-99.
316. See notes 308-13 supra.
317. But see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 114, at 118, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6078-79.
318. The House Report on H.R. 8200 implies that a rise in the number of Chapter
13 filings is desirable. "The premises of the bill with respect to consumer bankruptcy
are that use of the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that if it [relief under title
11] is used, debtors should attempt repayment under Chapter 13 . I..." d  Despite
the intent to encourage use of Chapter 13, Congress declined the invitation of' some to
condition the availability of relief under Chapter 7 upon a finding that a debtor would
be unable to fund a plan under Chapter 13. Telephone conversation with Kenneth
Klee, Esq., formerly Associate Counsel to the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (May 21, 1979). Cf. 11 U.S.C.A.
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Eligibility for Chapter 13
Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, only individu-
als whose principal income was derived from wages, salaries,
or commissions could seek relief."' Chapter 13 of title 11 has
broadened eligibility to include any individual, but not a part-
nership or corporation, with a regular income"" whose noncon-
tingent, liquidated, unsecured debts are less than $100,000 and
whose noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts are less than
$350,000.21 A joint petition may also be filed by an individual
and his or her spouse if their debts do not exceed the amounts
listed above, even if only one spouse receives regular incomeY."
By eliminating the requirement that an individual need derive
income principally from wages, salaries, or commissions, Con-
gress has extended the possibility of Chapter 13 relief to more
individuals, including those who own small bu'sinesses and for
whom the more expensive and cumbersome arrangement pro-
ceedings of Chapter 11 would be inappropriate and undesir-
able. In keeping with the broadened eligibility of persons to use
Chapter 13, its title has been changed from "Wage Earners'
Plans" to "Adjustment of Debts of An Individual With Regular
Income."
Protection of Codebtors
Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, a creditor dis-
satisfied with extended installment payments under a plan
could seek immediate full satisfaction of the debt from a codeb-
§9 706(c), 707 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979) (conversion from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13;
dismissal of case initiated under Chapter 7). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at
94, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5880; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
114, at 120, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6080-81.
319. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 606(8), added by Chandler Act of 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 931 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976)). Courts in many
jurisdictions have nevertheless confirmed plans where a regular source of income other
than wages, salaries or commissions, such as income under public benefit plans, was
available to fund the plan.
320. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). Id. § 101(24) defines
"individual with regular income" as an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable
and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under Chapter
13 of this title, other than a stock broker or a commodity broker .
321. Id. § 109(e).
322. Id. §§ 109(e), 302. Even if an individual's spouse does not join in the filing
of a petition for relief under Chapter 13, the discharge received by the spouse who files
and who completes payments under the plan will protect the non-filing spouse against




tor who had not sought relief under the Bankruptcy Act.:'
Such action by a creditor was likely to undermine the debtor's
rehabilitation effort where the debtor would be pressured by
the codebtor, often a relative or friend, to immediately pay the
creditor in full to relieve the codebtor of any obligation. 2 ' Sec-
tion 1301 of title 11 restricts this creditor practice." 5 A creditor
may not seek to collect all or any part of a consumer debt 2"
from a codebtor unless the codebtor became liable on or se-
cured such debt in the ordinary course of such codebtor's busi-
ness or unless the case has been closed, dismissed, or converted
to a case under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.127
The Plan, Confirmation of the Plan, and Discharge
(Also See Addendum)
As under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, the debtor
under Chapter 13 may propose either an extension plan or a
composition plan, to be implemented, generally, in three years,
and in no event in more than five years.328 Composition plans
under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act were relatively rare
in at least some jurisdictions, perhaps because a discharge
granted after completion of payment under a composition plan
would preclude discharge in a subsequent liquidation proceed-
ing commenced within six years of the petition under Chapter
XIII,329 or because creditors would not accept such a plan, 33 1 or
because a composition would not reflect a debtor's desire to pay
debts in full. However, under Chapter 13 of title 11 there may
very well be a large number of composition plans. Moreover,
many of these compositions may be in the nature of a no asset
or nominal asset liquidation (e.g., creditors paid less than five
percent of their claims) because, arguably, such a composition
323. The automatic stay of Rule 13-401 protected only the debtor. Bankruptcy
Rule 13-401, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1547 (1976).
324. HousE REPORT, supra note 114, at 121-22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6081-83.
325. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (West Spec. Pamp. 1979); SENATE REPORT, supra note
114, at 138-39, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5924-25.
326. "Consumer debt" is a defined term. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Spec.
Pamp. 1979).
327. A creditor may seek relief from this stay under specified circumstances. Id.
§ 1301(c).
328. Id. § 1322.
329. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 550 (as amended to § 14c(5))
(formerly U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1976)).
330. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. at 395 n.4.
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under Chapter 13 would avoid the disadvantages of a liquida-
tion under Chapter 7.
Consider, for a moment, the major disadvantages to a
Chapter 7 liquidation. First, a debtor will lose any property
which may not be claimed exempt under section 522. While
section 522 provides generous exemptions for the debtor in liq-
uidation, there may be many cases in which a debtor either
cannot or is not willing to convert non-exempt assets into ex-
empt assets. For example, a debtor may have equity in a home
which would far exceed any exempt amount, even utilizing
California exemptions, and may be unwilling to mortgage the
home (and protect the proceeds of the mortgage loan through
investment in exempt property) in an amount sufficient to re-
duce the equity to the exempted amount. Second, a debtor may
not be granted a discharge in a liquidation if the court finds to
exist any of the grounds for denial or discharge listed in section
727. Third, the discharge to which a debtor would be entitled
under Chapter 7 will not discharge the debtor's liability for
specific kinds of debts, such as debts incurred through use of a
false financial statement or by virtue of wilful and malicious
conduct of the debtor.
It is possible to interpret the provisions of Chapter 13 to
permit a debtor to propose and implement a plan where noth-
ing or only a trivial sum is paid to unsecured creditors-the
virtual equivalent of a no asset or nominal asset liquidation
under Chapter 7-and which will avoid all of these disadvan-
tages of a Chapter 7 liquidation! How, one may wonder, may
this be accomplished and, if it can be accomplished, why would
anyone ever wish to seek relief under Chapter 7?
The protests of unsecured creditors would be unavailing
against such a plan. Unlike Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act, unsecured creditors have no voice because the plan pro-
posed by the debtor does not require their acceptance. 33 1 A plan
must only provide for submission to the supervision and con-
trol of the trustee of as much of the debtor's future income as
is necessary for the execution of the plan, 32 must provide for
the payment in full, in deferred cash payments, of all priority
claims, unless the holder of any such claim agrees to different
331. Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 651-652 added by Chandler
Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 934 (formerly 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1052 (1976)) with
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1325, 1327(a) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
332. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(1) (West Spec. Parpp. 1979).
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treatment,33 3 and must treat claims within a class equally if the
plan classifies claims. 34 While the plan may of course provide
for full payment or substantial partial payment to unsecured
creditors, it need not do so. Rather, a plan might in fact provide
for zero or only nominal payment to unsecured creditors, if
unsecured creditors would have received no dividend upon liq-
uidation of the debtor's estate in a liquidation under Chapter
7.335 All the debtor need establish to convince the court that
unsecured creditors would have received no dividend in a liqui-
dation under Chapter 7 is that all property of the debtor would
have been exempt in liquidation, and that will be possible in
most cases because most liquidation cases are no asset (or only
nominal asset) cases. 331 To the extent that some property of the
debtor would not have been exempt in a liquidation under
Chapter 7, at least that much in value must be distributed to
unsecured creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.3
333. Id. § 1322(a)(2). Claims entitled to priority are those enumerated in section
507 of title 11. These include certain taxes owed governmental units, id. § 507(a)(6),
but no longer include other debts owed the United States which are, by statute,
entitled to priority. Compare id. § 507(a) with Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 64,
30 Stat. 563 (as amended to § 64a(5)) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1976)). Compare
31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (West Supp. 1979) (as amended) (priority of debts owed the
United States) with 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (West 1976) (prior to amendment). Under
Chapter XIII, plans were frequently not feasible or not acceptable to creditors be-
cause payment in full to priority claimants was required prior to disbursement to other
creditors. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 659(6) added by Chandler Act of 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 935 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1059(6) (1976)). See In re Belkin, 358
F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966). More plans will be feasible under Chapter 13 both because
claims, other than taxes, held by the United States are no longer entitled to priority
and thus need not be paid in full under the plan, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507, 1322 (West Spec.
Pamp. 1979), and because most claims (including tax claims) which do have priority
under section 507, and which thus must be paid in full under the plan, need not be
paid prior to payment of other claims. Id. § 1326.
334. Id. § 1322(a)(3).
335. Id. § 1325(a)(4).
336. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 8, at 767.
337. Even though a debtor must provide in a plan for payment to unsecured
creditors of an amount not less than the value of non-exempt property of the debtor
on the date of the filing of the petition under Chapter 13, the debtor still reaps the
advantage of being able to keep that property because payments are to be made from
future earnings (although the plan may provide for payment from other property, id.
§ 1322(b)(8)). The debtor, the court and other parties in interest will look to the
debtor's claim of exemptions filed with the Chapter 13 Statement to determine the
amount of minimum payment which must be made on account of the existence of non-
exempt property. See note 308 supra.
A debtor might argue that no payment whatsoever is due unsecured creditors by
virtue of the requirement of section 1325(a)(4) despite the existence of non-exempt
property on the effective date of the plan if the debtor can show that conversion of such
non-exempt property to exempt property could have been made. If that argument
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If such a plan is confirmed by the court, unless otherwise
provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, all
property of the estate, not just exempt property, vests in the
debtor and such property is free and clear of any claim or
interest of any creditor provided for in the plan."' This feature
of Chapter 13 is, of course, no different from Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act.
In addition, if such a plan is confirmed and if the debtor
completes all payments under the plan, the debtor is entitled
to a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan except for
certain long-term obligations and except for obligations to pay
alimony and child support.3 Section 1328(a) of title 11, which
mandates this discharge, does not condition the discharge on
the absence of any of the grounds for denial of discharge enu-
merated in section 727, and section 1328(a) permits the dis-
charge even of the debts listed in section 523(a), such as those
arising from wilful and malicious conduct of the debtor (but
not for alimony and child support), which are excepted from
discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 30
Thus, a composition in the nature of a no asset liquidation
would appear to allow a debtor to pay unsecured creditors
prevailed, a debtor could keep all of his or her property, whether or not actually exempt
on the effective date of the plan, and propose a plan which would pay unsecured
creditors nothing. The argument probably would not survive the language of section
1325(a)(4) which seems to suggest a payment to unsecured creditors based upon the
value of non-exempt property which actually does exist on the effective date of the
plan. In addition, a court might refuse to confirm such a plan on the grounds that it
was not proposed in good faith. Id. § 1325(a)(3). See text accompanying notes 342-49
infra.
338. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1327(b)-(c) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
339. Id. § 1328.
340. Id. § 1328(a). If the debtor is granted a "hardship discharge" under section
1328(b) (payments under a plan can't be completed because of circumstances for which
the debtor could not be held accountable and the plan can't be modified), the dis-
charge does not discharge any of the debts excepted from discharge by section 523. Id.
§ 1328(b). This difference, between a discharge under section 1328(a) and a discharge
under section 1328(b), may prove ironic, if not unfair. Thus, for example, a debtor who
proposed to pay creditors in full in an extension plan and who makes payments equiva-
lent to fifty percent of their claims prior to seeking and receiving a hardship discharge
under section 1328(b) will not be discharged from debts excepted from discharge by
section 523, but a person who completes a composition plan in which little or nothing
was paid to creditors will receive a discharge which discharges all debts, including
those excepted from discharge by section 523 (other than a debt for alimony and child
support), except certain long term obligations dealt with by the plan under the author-
ity of section 1322(b)(5). This possibility may be another factor supporting a court's
denial of confirmation of a plan on the grounds that it was not proposed in good faith.
See text accompanying notes 342-49 infra.
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nothing, keep all of his or her property, receive a discharge even
if he or she has committed acts which would bar discharge in
a liquidation under Chapter 7, and the discharge would allow
the debtor to escape paying all but one of the debts excepted
from discharge in a liquidation under Chapter 7.341 Could Con-
gress have intended such a result?
There is precious little, but maybe just enough, language
in Chapter 13 by which these consequences might be pre-
vented. Under section 1325 of title 11, a court must confirm a
plan if six conditions are fulfilled."' Among those conditions,
the plan must be "proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law. ' 3 3 One might argue, accordingly, that a plan
such as that just described need not be confirmed by the court,
because it is not proposed in good faith. If the plan is not
confirmed, .another must be submitted to avoid dismissal of the
case or conversion of the case to Chapter 7 or Chapter 11.1
Unfortunately, "good faith" is not defined in title 11 or in
legislative history and one must therefore attempt to divine its
meaning from its context, from prior interpretations of "good
faith" in analagous provisions under the Bankruptcy Act, and
from the relationship of Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 and to the
overall structure and purpose of title 11.
Section 1325(a)(1) and (6) require, respectively, that the
341. There would seemingly only be one deterrent to the filing of such a plan
(other than the desire of the debtor to pay debts more fully). Under section 727(a)(9),
a debtor would be precluded from receiving a discharge in a liquidation commenced
within six years following the commencement of the case under Chapter 13 unless
payments under the Chapter 13 totaled at least seventy percent of all allowed unse-
cured claims. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(9) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). See text accompany-
ing notes 231-32 supra. The Senate Judiciary Committee seemed to think that this
would be an effective deterrent. Referring to the limitation on discharge ultimately
enacted as section 727(a)(9), the Committee Report commented: "It is also necessary
to prevent Chapter 13 plans from turning into mere offers of composition plans under
which payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of the debtor." SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 114, at 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5799.
However, given the potential advantages to the plan discussed in the text, the possibil-
ity of being precluded from discharge in a subsequent liquidation commenced within
the six year period hardly seems much of a deterrent.
There might be one other possible deterrent to the proposal of a plan such as that
discussed in the text. A debtor might feel that completion of such a plan would be less
favorably viewed by persons from whom the debtor might later wish to seek credit.
This, of course, assumes that such potential future creditors would understand the
intricacies of relief under Chapter 13. Many creditors do not understand the nature of
relief under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.
342. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
343. Id. § 1325(a)(3).
344. See note 348 and accompanying text infra.
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plan comply with the provisions of Chapter 13 (such as section
1322 governing the contents of the plan), and that the debtor
be able to make all payments under the plan and comply with
the plan (i.e., that the plan be feasible). "Good faith" should,
then, mean something different from the requirements of sec-
tion 1325(a) (1) and (6) because otherwise the separate require-
ment of "good faith" listed in section 1325(a)(3) would be
redundant." 5 "Good faith" might mean that the debtor in fact
345. The logic of this argument is severely undercut by the history of the use and
meaning of the phrase "good faith" in Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, particularly if one heeds the admonition of the Supreme Court in an
analagous context that one should "adhere to the familiar rule that where words are
employed in an act which had at the time a well known meaning in the law, they are
used in that sense unless the context requires the contrary." Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939) (interpreting meaning of "fair, just and equita-
ble"). In each of Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the
requirement for confirmation of a plan that the plan be offered in good faith was stated
separately from a requirement that the plan be feasible. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, § 221(2)-(3) added by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 897(formerly 11
U.S.C. § 621(2)-(3) (1976)) (Chap. X); id. § 366(2), (4) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 766(2),(4)
(1976)) (Chap. XI); id. § 472(2), (4) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 872(2), (4) (1976)) (Chap.
XII); id. § 656(2), (4) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1056(2), (4) (1976)) (Chap. XIII). In none
of these chapters was the phrase "good faith" defined. Collier defined the phrase by
stating that generally the courts' inquiry was "directed to whether or not there [had]
been an abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter XIII in the proposal of
a plan." 1A COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL XIII-9.06[6], at 1408 (1978). That inter-
pretation would support the broader reading of "good faith" suggested in the text,
but the interpretation is not supported by any case law under Chapter XIII and is
undermined by the case law interpreting "good faith" in Chapters X, XI, and XII.
Interpretations of "good faith" in Chapters X, XI, and XII are directly applicable to
interpretation of that phrase in Chapter XIII, Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 323 F.2d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 1963), In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 522, 524 (C.D. Cal.
1974), because the provision of "a means of relief and rehabilitation to debtors with-
out adjudication as bankrupts was the common principal purpose of Chapter X, XI,
XII and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act." 323 F.2d at 570.
Decisions under Chapter XI and XII indicated that, absent fraud or other egre-
gious conduct by the debtor, the primary factor used in determining the debtor's "good
faith" was whether the proposed plan was "feasible", i.e., whether the debtor had
sufficient means to effect the composition or extension. Salter, "Good Faith", 43 J.
NAT'L CONF. REFEREES BANKR. 30 (1969) (Chap. XI); Sumida v. Yumen, 409 F.2d 654,
654 (9th Cir. 1969) ("good faith" means bona fide attempt to effect an arrangement
by providing adequate means for execution of the plan) (dictum) (Chap. XII); In re
Bolton Hall Nursing Home, 432 F. Supp. 528, 530-31 (D. Mass. 1977) (Chap. XIII).
There is nothing in the legislative history relating to the use of the phrase "good
faith" in Chapter XIII which suggests a contrary view. The requirement of "good faith"
was added to Chapter XIII (and to Chapters XI and XII) in 1952. Act of July 7, 1952,
§ 50, 66 Stat. 437. The House Report relating to that act simply stated that the test of
good faith was substituted for the test "fair, just and equitable" because Supreme
Court interpretation of "fair, just and equitable" made that language inappropriate
other than in the context of a Chapter X. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21,
reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1960, 1981-82.
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intends to complete payments under the plan (however mini-
mal they might be) or it might mean that the debtor's motiva-
tions in proposing the plan are somehow pure or noble. If "good
faith" simply refers to the intent of the debtor to complete
payments under the plan, it would not be a basis for denying
confirmation to the type of plan described above. If, however,
"good faith" refers to the debtor's motives, the court could
deny confirmation of such a plan on the ground that the debtor
was seeking relief under Chapter 13 as a subterfuge for the
discharge of debts without the disadvantages of Chapter 7. For
it would appear almost preposterous to suppose that Congress
intended Chapter 13 to be such an easy escape valve from
Chapter 7 considering the thoroughness and care taken in eval-
uating the competing interests to be balanced in Chapter 7 and
in drafting. language to reflect the balance of interests which
was struck.
Yet there are difficulties with these arguments. Cases
under Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act
construed "good faith" more narrowly. 4 Without clearer guid-
ance in the language of title 11, that developed understanding
of the phrase cannot lightly be dismissed, even more so because
the language of section 1325(a)(4) requires only that payment
to unsecured creditors under a plan not be less than the
amount that would have been paid to such creditors had the
debtor obtained relief under Chapter 7. If Congress wanted to
require that compositions under Chapter 13 offer more to unse-
cured creditors, the language of section 1325(a)(4) would have
been different. And if Congress wished to leave the amount of
such payment to the sound discretion of the court, it could
easily have included language which would have stated just
that.347
Moreover, there are no standards articulated anywhere in
title 11 or in the legislative history by which a court could
measure a debtor's good faith if that meant measuring the
debtor's motivations by reference to the elements of a plan. A
court could, of course, ask whether income of the debtor poten-
tially available for the plan exceeds the amount committed to
the plan, but there is nothing to guide the court once the an-
346. See note 345 supra.
347. For example, Congress might have required that a plan constitute a debtor's
"best effort". Title 11 requires just that in another context. See text accompanying
notes 231-32 supra.
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swer to that question has been obtained. Must the debtor com-
mit all of the available income to the plan? Surely not, because
section 1322(a)(1) requires only that the debtor submit to the
trustee so much of anticipated future income "as is necessary
for the execution of the plan". Must the debtor commit half of
available income to the plan, or twenty-five percent, or ten
percent, to be in good faith? Since that question is so difficult
to answer, some courts may simply eschew the inquiry and thus
send a message to Congress that if this loophole in Chapter 13
is to be closed, Congress must close it.
There may be a middle position. A court might consider
the amount of payment to unsecured creditors as only one fac-
tor relevant to a determination of good faith. A court might also
consider the number, nature and extent of unsecured claims,
including the claims which would be dischargeable under
Chapter 13 but which would not be dischargeable under Chap-
ter 7. Thus, a Chapter 13 composition in which little is to be
paid to unsecured creditors and in which no unsecured creditor
holds a claim that would be nondischargeable in a liquidation
under Chapter 7 might be a plan proposed in good faith,
whereas a similar composition affecting unsecured creditors
with claims that are nondischargeable in a liquidation would
not be in good faith. For the latter plan to be proposed in good
faith, a court might require a composition which committed all
or substantially all of the debtor's available income to the plan.
The court might further consider whether the proposed
plan is sought despite the existence of facts which would pre-
clude a discharge if the case were brought under Chapter 7.
Thus, confirmation might be denied on the grounds of lack of
good faith where the debtor commits little to the payment of
unsecured creditors in a plan proposed only one year after the
debtor has received a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation,
because such a plan 'vould frustrate the general policy of Con-
gress to preclude the creation of a class of habitual bankrupts.
Given the uncertainty which exists concerning this vital
issue, it seems important for attorneys to proceed cautiously in
testing the limits of "good faith". Section 1307(c)(4) allows any
party in interest to request that a case initiated under Chapter
13 be dismissed, or converted to Chapter 7, without the
debtor's consent, if the court has denied confirmation of a plan
and if the court has also denied additional time for filing an
[Vol. 19
INSOLVENCY COUNSELING
alternate or modified plan.34 If a court denies confirmation of
a plan for lack of good faith on the grounds just discussed and
if additional time for filing an alternate or modified plan is
denied, the debtor may find himself or herself in an unwanted
Chapter 7, resulting in the liquidation of non-exempt assets
which it was his or her purpose to preserve through the use of
Chapter 13.1"
The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of "good faith"
and the permissible bounds of Chapter 13 relief either belies
the magificent effort evident in the drafting of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, or reflects an untested assumption by the drafters
that most persons will propose plans which approach their best
effort, or 'reflects the intention of the drafters to move Chapter
13 far away from the original purposes of Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act. If the last is true, I strongly suspect that those
who voted for enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act failed
to fully understand this particular intent of the drafters.
Cram-down and Curing Defaults or Maintaining Payments on
Long Term Obligations
Chapter 13 of title 11 advances the cause of individual
debtor protection in other ways. Most notably, Chapter 13 ena-
bles the debtor to cope more easily with secured debts than did
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. The most usual secured
debts for the individual consumer debtor are debts owed per-
sonal property brokers secured by an interest in household
goods and furnishings, debts owed a lender that is financing the
acquisition of a motor vehicle, or debts secured by real prop-
erty.
As noted earlier, a non-possessory, non-purchase money
348. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c)(4) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
349. Perhaps this possibility is remote. Assume, for example, that a debtor
wishes to preserve $5,000 of non-exempt equity in a residence (the debtor's only non-
exempt property) through a Chapter 13 in which the claims of unsecured creditors total
$20,000. In such a case, the debtor's plan could not be confirmed, given section
1325(a)(4), unless the debtor committed at least $5,000 (the amount which would be
realized in a Chapter 7 liquidation) to the plan. It seems unlikely that a court would
deny confirmation of such a plan on the grounds of lack of good faith unless $5,000
were but a very small percentage of the income which the debtor could devote to the
plan. $5,000 would probably be more than a small percentage of available income
because the debtor, unless an outright wealthy "deadbeat," would otherwise not need
insolvency relief in the first place. Even were the court to deny confirmation, it seems
likely that additional time to propose an alternative or modified plan would be
granted.
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security interest in household goods and furnishings can be
avoided in a Chapter 7 liquidation;350 such a security interest
can also be avoided in a case under Chapter 13 because section
522(f)(2), which grants the power to avoid the fixing of such
liens, applies to cases under Chapter 13 (as do all other provi-
sions of Chapters 1, 3 and 5 of title 11).111 Accordingly, creditors
holding such security interests will lose their liens and be
treated as unsecured creditors in any plan under Chapter 13.
Debts secured by an interest in a motor vehicle which the
debtor needed to use to maintain his or her livelihood caused
the most difficulty for debtors seeking relief under Chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. One way or another the debtor was
usually required to pay this secured creditor the full amount
to which the creditor was entitled under the loan agreement to
avoid losing the vehicle.35 If there were insufficient funds to
make this payment in addition to payments to the trustee for
disbursal to other creditors, Chapter XIII relief by way of ex-
tension was not feasible; the debtor may have been compelled
to file bankruptcy. Chapter 13 of title 11 provides succor to the
debtor with this problem (or similar problems arising from se-
cured debts involving other types of personal property collat-
eral) by including the power to cram-down on secured credi-
tors, a power formerly reserved to Chapters X and XII of the
Bankruptcy Act. Section 1322(b)(2)353 permits a debtor to pro-
pose a plan which modifies the rights of certain holders of
secured claims and section 1325(a)(5), one of the six conditions
for confirmation of a plan, requires only that the plan preserve
the secured creditor's lien and that the plan provide for pay-
ment to the secured creditor of an amount not less than the
amount of the allowed secured claim.354 For example, if a deb-
tor owed $3,000 to a bank which held the pink slip to a motor
350. See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra.
351. 11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). The important implications
of the applicability of Chapters 1, 3 and 5 to Chapter 13 should not be overlooked. For
example, the hypothetical debtors whose financial difficulties were discussed in the
text accompanying notes 171-73 supra would be entitled to exercise precisely the same
rights in a Chapter 13 proceeding that they were entitled to exercise under Chapter 7.
352. But see Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 475 F.2d 1217, 1218-19 (5th
Cir. 1973) (referee may deny reclamation by secured creditor under Chap. XIII plan
where general equitable considerations favor restraining foreclosure).
353. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979).
354. Id. §§ 506(a), 1325(a)(5) (determination of secured status). Alternatively,
the plan shall be confirmed if the secured creditor accepts the plan or if the debtor
surrenders the collateral to the secured creditor.
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vehicle registered to the debtor and the motor vehicle had a
fair market value of $1,000, the debtor's plan would be con-
firmed, assuming all other conditions for confirmation were ful-
filled, if the plan provided for payment to the bank of $1,000
during the period of the plan. If the plan extended over thirty
six months, payment of the secured creditor would be slightly
less than $28 per month even though the loan agreement called
for substantially larger monthly payments. Following comple-
tion of the plan, the debtor would keep the motor vehicle free
and clear of the lien and the underlying debt will have been
discharged. 5 The right of cram-down under section 1325(a)
(5) is thus the functional analogue of the right of a debtor in a
Chapter 7 liquidation to redeem certain property from a lien. 38
Debts secured by an interest of the debtor in real property,
usually the debtor's residence, may also be accommodated in
a plan under Chapter 13, though not in the same way as other
secured debts. This, too, is a change from Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act in which no debt secured by an interest in real
property could be treated by the plan.357 Section 1322(b)(5)
permits the debtor to propose a plan which will provide for the
curing of defaults and the maintenance of payments on long-
term obligations during the pendency of the case. This includes
debts secured by an interest in real property, or an unsecured
obligation such as an educational loan.3 15 Thus, for example, a
debtor facing imminent foreclosure under a deed of trust could
file a petition for relief under Chapter 13, stay the foreclosure,
and propose in the plan for payments to cure the default
(within a reasonable time) and maintain the loan. Following
completion of the plan, the debtor would then, of course, con-
355. Id. §§ 1328(a) (discharge), 1327(c) (effect of confirmation).
356. See text accompanying notes 295-98 supra.
357. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 606(1), added by Chandler Act of 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 930 (formerly 11 U.S.C. § 1006(1) (1976)).
358. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(5) (West Spec. Pamp. 1979). The example of the
educational loan is worth pursuing especially because such loans will generally not be
dischargeable in a liquidation. See text accompanying notes 278-85 supra. Suppose
that a debtor had scheduled repayment of a $10,000 federally insured loan over a ten-
year period with payments approximating $100 per month. If the debtor wished to
propose a five-year extension plan to pay all of the debtor's creditors, the debtor would
need to shorten the repayment period for the educational loan from ten to five years
and thus nearly double monthly payments on account of that debt alone. That necess-
ity might make the plan impossible of performance. Section 1322(b)(5) permits the
debtor to propose a five-year extension plan under which all other creditors are paid
in full and under which payments on the educational loan may be continued at the
rate of $100 per month.
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tinue payments on the obligation.35 9 The ability of the debtor
to provide for the real property secured debt in this way is a
decided advantage over Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act
under which the filing of a petition would only stall the foreclo-
sure until the creditor obtained relief from the automatic stay,
an event which could usually only be avoided if the debtor
secured a purchaser for the real property or obtained refinanc-
ing.
In contrast to other novelties of Chapter 13, the expanded
eligibility for relief, the power to stay action against co-debtors,
the right to cram-down on certain secured creditors and the
right to cure defaults and maintain payments on long-term
obligations were clearly contemplated by the drafters of Chap-
ter 13 and there should be little difficulty in their application.
Irrespective of the resolution of the issue of "good faith", these
changes will certainly make relief under Chapter 13 a valuable
tool for insolvency counseling in the 1980's.
CONCLUSION
The outlines and much of the detail of consumer insol-
vency counseling for Californians in the 1980's have been pro-
vided us in the late 1970's by Congress and by the California
legislature. There will be some changes, of course. The federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act may be extended to govern
the actions of creditors collecting debts on their own behalf.
Further restrictions upon the amount of wages of a debtor
which can be garnished, such as those proposed by the Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission, may finally gain legislative
approval. There will be changes in the amounts of property
exempt in bankruptcy as the country endures inflation and
there may very well be changes in the kinds of property exempt
if the California legislature adopts provisions of the working
proposals of the California Law Revision Commission concern-
ing California's enforcement of judgment law. In addition, ret-
roactive application of increases in exempt amounts to pre-
increase creditors may finally surmount its constitutional hur-
dle. There most certainly will be judicial construction and pos-
sibly congressional amendment of the apparently over-
generous debtor relief measures of Chapter 13 of title 11. And,
359. Debts provided for under section 1322(b)(5) are not subject to the general
discharge of section 1328. Id. §§ 1328(a)(1)-(c)(1).
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perhaps, the pattern and amount of consumer credit, especially
credit advanced by personal property brokers, may shift to
accommodate and adjust to those provisions of the new bank-
ruptcy law which strengthen the debtor's ability to gain a post-
petition fresh start.
The need for consumer insolvency counseling will almost
certainly increase in the decade of the 1980's as economic dislo-
cations result from the nation's search for and shift to new
forms of energy and as the demand for and use of consumer
credit continues to grow.3 16 Attorneys who are well informed
about the tools of insolvency counseling and who can lend com-
passion and understanding to their counseling will play a valu-
able role in fulfilling that need.
ADDENDUM
During final preparation of this article for publication, the
Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported an amended
version of S. 658, the Technical Amendments bill. 36' This
amended version of S. 658, to take effect, if passed, on October
1, 1979, includes two very important amendments to title 11
which were not included in the original version of S. 658. Sec-
tion 188 of the amended bill would amend section 1325(a)(3)
of title 11 to require that a debtor's Chapter 13 plan be a
debtor's best effort in addition to being proposed in good
faith. 31 Section 191 of the amended bill would amend section
1328(a)(2) of title 11 such that a completed Chapter 13 plan
would not discharge any debts which would be nondischarge-
able in a liquidation. "3 These two changes would close the
apparant gaping Chapter 13 loopholes described in the article.
While these changes hardly seem consistent with the stated
purpose of S. 658 "[t]o correct technical errors, clarify and
make minor substantive changes to Public Law 95-598, ,,364 they
probably are consistent with the prevailing congressional view
about the nature and purpose of Chapter 13 relief.
The amended version of S. 658 also includes the proposed
360. In the 1980's, the size of the population aged 35 to 44 will grow from approxi-
mately 28 to 40 million. The persons in that age range are major users of credit. TIME,
May 28, 1979, at 39.
361. S. REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
362. Id. at 14.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1.
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amendment to title 11 referred to in footnote 125.11 In addition,
sections 130b and 221 of S. 658 would revive prior law that
claims for alimony are nondischargeable despite assignment to
a state welfare agency as a condition of the extension of welfare
benefits.366 Section 218 of S. 658 would amend the Fair Credit
Reporting Act to prohibit the reporting of Chapter 13 relief
subsequent to seven years following the filing of the petition for
relief." 7
H.R. 2807,68 concerning the dischargeability of educa-
tional loans, was signed by the President on August 14, 1979,
as Public Law 96-56. It was effective immediately. H.R. 2807
also amended the definition of educational loans in section
523(a)(8) of title 11.
365. See discussion of the Technical Amendments Act in note 125 supra.
366. See discussion of the Technical Amendments Act in note 267 supra.
367. Contrast the discussion in paragraph 4 of note 113 supra.
368. Referred to in note 284 supra.
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